ecological psychology

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Carvalho, E. M. (2021).  An Ecological Approach to Disjunctivism. Synthese. 198(Radical Views on Cognition), 285–306. Abstractan_ecological_approach_to_disjunctivism.pdfWebsite

In this paper I claim that perceptual discriminatory skills rely on a suitable type of environment as an enabling condition for their exercise. This is because of the constitutive connection between environment and perceptual discriminatory skills, inasmuch as such connection is construed from an ecological approach. The exercise of a discriminatory skill yields knowledge of affordances of objects, properties, or events in the surrounding environment. This is practical knowledge in the first-person perspective. An organism learns to perceive an object by becoming sensitized to its affordances. I call this position ecological disjunctivism. A corollary of this position is that a case of perception and its corresponding case of hallucination—which is similar to the former only in some respects—are different in nature. I show then how the distinguishability problem is addressed by ecological disjunctivism.

Carvalho, E. (2020).  Sintonizando com o mundo: uma abordagem ecológica das habilidades sensoriomotoras. Ciência e Conhecimento. , Teresinha: Editora UFPI Abstract

Neste capítulo, apresento e sustento uma articulação da noção de habilidade corporal ou sensoriomotora a partir da psicologia ecológica e mostro como ela é relevante para o debate entre Dreyfus e McDowell sobre a lida habilidosa e também para o debate sobre se saber-fazer se reduz ou não a conhecimento proposicional. A metáfora correta para compreender habilidades corporais não é a do computador, mas a do rádio. Essas habilidades resultam de um processo de sintonização do organismo com o seu ambiente.

Carvalho, E. M., & Rolla G. (2020).  An enactive-ecological approach to information and uncertainty. Frontiers in Psychology. 11, 1-11. AbstractFrontiers in Psychology

Information is a central notion for cognitive sciences and neurosciences, but there is no agreement on what it means for a cognitive system to acquire information about its surroundings. In this paper, we approximate three influential views on information: the one at play in ecological psychology, which is sometimes called information for action; the notion of information as covariance as developed by some enactivists, and the idea of information as minimization of uncertainty as presented by Shannon. Our main thesis is that information for action can be construed as covariant information, and that learning to perceive covariant information is a matter of minimizing uncertainty through skilled performance. We argue that the agent’s cognitive system conveys information for acting in an environment by minimizing uncertainty about how to achieve her intended goals in that environment. We conclude by reviewing empirical findings that support our view and by showing how direct learning, seen as instance of ecological rationality at work, is how mere possibilities for action are turned into embodied know-how. Finally, we indicate the affinity between direct learning and sense-making activity.

Carvalho, E. M. (2020).  Social Affordance. Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior. , Cham: Springer Abstractsocial-affordance.pdf

A short entry on Social Affordances. Social affordances are possibilities for social interaction or possibilities for action that are shaped by social practices and norms.

Carvalho, E. (2019).  Socially Extending the Mind Through Social Affordances. Automata's Inner Movie: Science and Philosophy of Mind. , Delaware: Vernon Press Abstractcarvalho, E. Socially_extending_the_mind_through_social_affordances.pdf

The extended mind thesis claims that at least some cognitive processes extend beyond the organism’s brain in that they are constituted by the organism’s actions on its surrounding environment. A more radical move would be to claim that social actions performed by the organism could at least constitute some of its mental processes. This can be called the socially extended mind thesis. Based on the notion of affordance as developed in the ecological psychology tradition, I defend the view that perception extends to the environment. Then I will expand the notion of affordance to encompass social affordances. Thus, perception can in some situations also be socially extended.