Extended Mind

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Carvalho, E. M. (2020).  A tese da mente estendida à luz do externismo ativo: Como tornar Otto responsivo a razões?. Trans/Form/Ação. 43(3), 143-166. AbstractWebsite

The extended mind thesis claims that some mental states and cognitive processes extend onto the environment. Items external to the organism or exploratory actions may constitute in part mental states and cognitive processes. In Clark and Chalmers’ original paper, ‘The Extended Mind’, this thesis receives support from the parity principle and from the active externalism. In their paper, more emphasis is given to the parity principle, which is presented as neutral regarding the nature of cognition. It would be advantageous to maintain that extended mental states and processes do not require a reform of our pre-theoretical view of cognition. In the present paper, I submit that we should give more emphasis on the active externalism, which, I argue, is not neutral regarding the nature of cognition. Cognition is viewed as successful adaptation to a specific task. Although this move may seem at first disadvantageous, it is necessary for the correct understanding and justification of Otto case as an example of extended mental state. Additionally, the parity principle cannot handle Weiskopf’s criticism that information registered in Otto’s notebook is not responsive to reasons. In order to address this criticism, we need to appeal to active externalism and its corresponding view of cognition.

Carvalho, E. (2019).  Socially Extending the Mind Through Social Affordances. Automata's Inner Movie: Science and Philosophy of Mind. , Delaware: Vernon Press Abstractcarvalho, E. Socially_extending_the_mind_through_social_affordances.pdf

The extended mind thesis claims that at least some cognitive processes extend beyond the organism’s brain in that they are constituted by the organism’s actions on its surrounding environment. A more radical move would be to claim that social actions performed by the organism could at least constitute some of its mental processes. This can be called the socially extended mind thesis. Based on the notion of affordance as developed in the ecological psychology tradition, I defend the view that perception extends to the environment. Then I will expand the notion of affordance to encompass social affordances. Thus, perception can in some situations also be socially extended.

Carvalho, E. (2018).  Affordances Sociais e a Tese da Mente Estendida. Proceedings of the Brazilian Research Group on Epistemology: 2018. , Porto Alegre: Editora Fi Abstract

A tese da mente estendida alega que ao menos alguns processos cognitivos se estendem para além do cérebro do organismo no sentido de que eles são constituídos por ações realizadas por esse organismo no ambiente ao seu redor. Um movimento mais radical seria alegar que ações sociais realizadas pelo organismo poderiam, pelo menos, constituir alguns dos seus processos cognitivos. Isso pode ser chamando de tese da mente socialmente estendida. Baseando-me na noção de affordance tal como ela foi desenvolvida na tradição da psicologia ecológica, defendo que a percepção se estende ao meio ambiente. Então, apoiado no fenômeno da atenção conjunta, estendo a noção de affordance para incorporar affordances sociais. Assim, a percepção pode, em algumas situações, ser também estendida socialmente.