Espinosa

Levy, L.  2022.  'Ab placito humanum' and the Normativity of Human Laws in the Theological-Political Treatise. Journal of Spinoza Studies. 1(1):62-81. AbstractLink para acesso gratuito

The few passages in Spinoza’s work in which he focuses on the concept of human law have not received as much scholarly attention as passages focused on other themes, but they have still been very well examined, as evidenced by, for example, the collection edited by André Campos in 2015, which brought together 21 articles written between 1948 and 2010.It is true that most of these studies do not directly aim to determine whether Spinoza adopts a normative conception of human law in the political-legal field or, if he does adopt such a conception, what the conditions under which he could do so could be, given the logical-causal necessitarianism and naturalism of his metaphysics, explicitly reaffirmed in paragraph 3 of Chapter IV of the TTP. However, this problem is unavoidable, and it is precisely to this matter that I would like to contribute, in a rather modest way, by examining the answer that Spinoza himself offers in the passage just cited.

Levy, L.  2021.  Spinoza on Ideas of Affections. Yitzhak Y. Melamed (org). A Companion to Spinoza. : Wiley–Blackwell Abstract

This chapter argues that the Ethics includes versions of the views about sensation and its role in the production of knowledge that are present in the TIE and the KV. ‘Idea of an affection’ replaces the earlier terms for sensation. A sensation is a modification of the mind closely associated with a modification of body and explained in terms of the mind-body relation. In the KV, Spinoza continues to treat sensation as the immediate perception of corporeal modification and continues to take the inference from sensation to the union of mind and body as a valid one. The KV is the earliest source of Spinoza's view that the idea-object model accounts for the mind-body relation. The only occurrence of sensatio in the CM might seem to tell against an account of sensation as something different from imagination. Accounts of reason and imagination in the Ethics considerably advance Spinoza's theory of knowledge.

Levy, L.  2019.  Affectio et Affectus : Commentaires sur l’unité architectonique de l’Éthique. Chantal Jaquet (orgs). La Générosité à l’œuvre. Hommage à Jean-Marie Beyssade. , Paris: Classiques Garnier
Levy, L.  2009.  Les rapports entre l esprit et le corps dans la proposition 23 de la seconde partie de l Éthique. La théorie spinoziste des rapports corps/esprit et ses usages actuels. , Paris: Editions Hermann Abstract

L'article essaye d'avancer l'hypothèse selon laquelle la distinction entre les conceptions cartesienne et spinoziste des rapports esprit/corps se situe dans le niveau plus profond des différents diagnostiques que ces doctrines supposent concernant les conditions d'emergence du probleme éthique por l'être humain.

Levy, L.  2012.  Duas traduções e um argumento - o 'sonho' do livre arbítrio segundo Espinosa. Ética, política e esclarecimento público: ensaios em homenagem a Nelson Boeira. (Fonseca, A. C. da Costa, Pohlmann, E. A, Goldmeier, G., Eds.).:257–278., Porto Alegre: Bestiário Abstractduas_traducoes_e_um_argumento_o_sonho_do.pdf

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Levy, L.  2017.  “Causa Conscientiae” in Spinoza's Ethics. Spinoza's ‘Ethics'. A Critical Guide. (Melamed, Yitzhak Y., Ed.).:187–204., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Abstract

In this chapter, I assess Spinoza’s explanation of his definition of desire at the end of the third part of the Ethics, wherein we find a peculiar expression: “causa conscientiae,” “the cause of consciousness” (E3deffaff1). Surprisingly, this phrase has not been taken into much consideration in the recent revival of interest in Spinoza’s view of this aspect of human experience.2 A careful study of this text will shed some fresh light on Spinoza’s general discussion of consciousness and provide a new answer to the question of why, according to Spinoza, philosophy ought not to start with the indubitable act of thinking of a self-conscious subject.3 This new answer, which differs from the usual – and also undoubtedly correct – one, makes no use of Spinoza’s conception of the true order of understanding, and therefore that of true philosophy, but relies rather on the sense and limits of the conception of consciousness that can be apprehended from the analysis of this passage.

Levy, L.  2013.  Conhecimento humano e a ideia de afecção na Ética de Espinosa. Analytica. 17(2):221-247. AbstractVer artigo

A tese de que o conceito espinosista de ideia de afecção, introduzido na Ética, expressa o sentido mais preciso do que seja, para o autor, o conceito de ideia da imaginação. Este texto pretende problematizar essa leitura, procurando fornecer subsídios para a hipótese de que ela não é nem inequivocamente corroborada pelo texto da Ética, nem exigida pela doutrina aí apresentada.