<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="6.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Faria, Paulo</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Memory as acquaintance with the past: some Lessons from Russell, 1912-1914</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kriterion</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0100-512X2010000100008&amp;nrm=iso</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">51</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">149 - 172</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Russell's theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his definition of acquaintance as the converse of the relation of presentation of an object to a subject. We show how the two views can be made to cohere under a suitable construal of 'presentation', which has the additional appeal of bringing Russell's theory of memory closer to contemporary views on direct reference and object-dependent thinking than is usually acknowledged. The drawback is that memory as acquaintance with the past falls short of fulfilling Russell's requirement that knowledge by acquaintance be discriminating knowledge - a shortcoming shared by contemporary externalist accounts of knowledge from memory.&lt;/p&gt;
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