@article {FARIA2015, title = {Inferential Rationality and Internalistic Scarecrows}, journal = {Manuscrito}, volume = {38}, year = {2015}, note = {n/a}, pages = {5 - 14}, publisher = {scielo}, abstract = {

In a recent paper, Manuel P{\'e}rez Otero attempted to turn the tables on Paul Boghossian{\textquoteright}s claim that content externalism is incompatible with the {\textquoteright}a priority of our logical abilities{\textquoteright}. In reply, Boghossian argued that P{\'e}rez Otero{\textquoteright}s criticism misses the main point of his argument through concentrating on the semantics of singular (as opposed to general) terms. I elaborate on Boghossian{\textquoteright}s reply by showing that even taken on its own terms P{\'e}rez Otero{\textquoteright}s paper fails to engage with internalism through systematically misrepresenting what a truly internalistic account of the semantics of singular terms should be.

}, issn = {0100-6045}, url = {http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext\&pid=S0100-60452015000300005\&nrm=iso}, author = {Faria, Paulo} }