@article {FARIA2015,
	title = {Inferential Rationality and Internalistic Scarecrows},
	journal = {Manuscrito},
	volume = {38},
	year = {2015},
	note = {n/a},
	pages = {5 - 14},
	publisher = {scielo},
	abstract = {<p>In a recent paper, Manuel P{\'e}rez Otero attempted to turn the tables on Paul Boghossian{\textquoteright}s claim that content externalism is incompatible with the {\textquoteright}a priority of our logical abilities{\textquoteright}. In reply, Boghossian argued that P{\'e}rez Otero{\textquoteright}s criticism misses the main point of his argument through concentrating on the semantics of singular (as opposed to general) terms. I elaborate on Boghossian{\textquoteright}s reply by showing that even taken on its own terms P{\'e}rez Otero{\textquoteright}s paper fails to engage with internalism through systematically misrepresenting what a truly internalistic account of the semantics of singular terms should be.</p>
},
	issn = {0100-6045},
	url = {http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext\&pid=S0100-60452015000300005\&nrm=iso},
	author = {Faria, Paulo}
}
