@inbook {RN1,
	title = {Bertrand Russell},
	booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
	year = {2017},
	note = {n/a},
	pages = {519-527},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	organization = {Routledge},
	type = {Book Section},
	address = {London},
	abstract = {<p>Bertrand Russell is widely known for his willingness to change his philosophical mind. He is also now and again saddled with a reputation for carelessness about providing readers with clear and convincing explanations of his turnabouts. This chapter presents and briefly assesses the development of Russell{\textquoteright}s thinking about memory, emphasizing, against the grain of the received view, the continuity in his thought. Russell{\textquoteright}s ideas about memory are no exception to that perceived pattern of progress. The core notion of the early theory is that of acquaintance, by which Russell means a mode of cognition which is both immediate and purely receptive. The main ostensible problem for the theory is that of accounting for retention{\textemdash}specifically, making sense of the idea of being now acquainted with what has been and is no more. The abandonment of direct realism should predictably bring about a further increase in Russell{\textquoteright}s concern over fallibility and error in memory.</p>
},
	isbn = {9781315687315},
	doi = {10.4324/9781315687315},
	url = {https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/routledge-handbook-philosophy-memory-sven-bernecker-kourken-michaelian/e/10.4324/9781315687315},
	author = {Faria, Paulo},
	editor = {Bernecker, S. and Michaelian, K.}
}
