@inbook {RN5, title = {Kant, Raggio e GL}, booktitle = {De Mathematicae atque Philosophicae Elegantia: homenagem a Abel Lassalle Casanave}, year = {Forthcoming}, note = {n/a}, type = {Book Section}, abstract = {n/a}, author = {Faria, Paulo}, editor = {Sautter, F. and Secco, G. and Pereira, L. C.} } @book {RN, title = {Time, Thought, and Vulnerability: An Inquiry in Cognitive Dynamics}, year = {Forthcoming}, note = {n/a}, publisher = {SADAF}, organization = {SADAF}, address = {Buenos Aires}, abstract = {n/a}, url = {https://www.academia.edu/40407988/TIME_THOUGHT_AND_VULNERABILITY_An_Inquiry_in_Cognitive_Dynamics}, author = {Faria, Paulo} } @inbook {RN5, title = {The vagaries of actions and the verities of meanings}, booktitle = {Socratically: a Festschrift for Claudio de Almeida}, year = {Forthcoming}, note = {n/a}, publisher = {Editora da PUCRS}, organization = {Editora da PUCRS}, type = {Book Section}, address = {Porto Alegre}, abstract = {n/a}, author = {Faria, Paulo}, editor = {Alves, E. and Fett, J. and Etcheverry, K.} } @inbook {RN1, title = {Bertrand Russell}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, year = {2017}, note = {n/a}, pages = {519-527}, publisher = {Routledge}, organization = {Routledge}, type = {Book Section}, address = {London}, abstract = {

Bertrand Russell is widely known for his willingness to change his philosophical mind. He is also now and again saddled with a reputation for carelessness about providing readers with clear and convincing explanations of his turnabouts. This chapter presents and briefly assesses the development of Russell{\textquoteright}s thinking about memory, emphasizing, against the grain of the received view, the continuity in his thought. Russell{\textquoteright}s ideas about memory are no exception to that perceived pattern of progress. The core notion of the early theory is that of acquaintance, by which Russell means a mode of cognition which is both immediate and purely receptive. The main ostensible problem for the theory is that of accounting for retention{\textemdash}specifically, making sense of the idea of being now acquainted with what has been and is no more. The abandonment of direct realism should predictably bring about a further increase in Russell{\textquoteright}s concern over fallibility and error in memory.

}, isbn = {9781315687315}, doi = {10.4324/9781315687315}, url = {https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/routledge-handbook-philosophy-memory-sven-bernecker-kourken-michaelian/e/10.4324/9781315687315}, author = {Faria, Paulo}, editor = {Bernecker, S. and Michaelian, K.} } @article {FARIA2015, title = {Inferential Rationality and Internalistic Scarecrows}, journal = {Manuscrito}, volume = {38}, year = {2015}, note = {n/a}, pages = {5 - 14}, publisher = {scielo}, abstract = {

In a recent paper, Manuel P{\'e}rez Otero attempted to turn the tables on Paul Boghossian{\textquoteright}s claim that content externalism is incompatible with the {\textquoteright}a priority of our logical abilities{\textquoteright}. In reply, Boghossian argued that P{\'e}rez Otero{\textquoteright}s criticism misses the main point of his argument through concentrating on the semantics of singular (as opposed to general) terms. I elaborate on Boghossian{\textquoteright}s reply by showing that even taken on its own terms P{\'e}rez Otero{\textquoteright}s paper fails to engage with internalism through systematically misrepresenting what a truly internalistic account of the semantics of singular terms should be.

}, issn = {0100-6045}, url = {http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext\&pid=S0100-60452015000300005\&nrm=iso}, author = {Faria, Paulo} } @inbook {RN2, title = {Temporalismo e eternismo}, booktitle = {Comp{\^e}ndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Anal{\'\i}tica}, year = {2014}, note = {n/a}, pages = {1 - 19}, publisher = {Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa}, organization = {Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa}, type = {Book Section}, address = {Lisboa}, abstract = {

Temporalismo e eternismo s{\~a}o teses sem{\^a}nticas. Segundo a primeira, que prevaleceu ao longo da maior parte da hist{\'o}ria da l{\'o}gica no Ocidente, existem proposi{\c c}{\~o}es completas cujo valor de verdade varia com o tempo (proposi{\c c}{\~o}es temporais), e a investiga{\c c}{\~a}o das rela{\c c}{\~o}es entre tempo e verdade {\'e} parte integral da l{\'o}gica. Para a segunda, que emerge gradualmente na obra dos pioneiros da l{\'o}gica moderna e recebe sua primeira formula{\c c}{\~a}o sistem{\'a}tica na obra de Frege, o que o temporalismo percebe como uma proposi{\c c}{\~a}o com valor de verdade vari{\'a}vel deve ser concebido, antes, como uma fun{\c c}{\~a}o proposicional em que pelo menos uma vari{\'a}vel livre (usualmente inarticulada na express{\~a}o lingu{\'\i}stica da proposi{\c c}{\~a}o) toma como argumentos instantes ou intervalos de tempo. As duas teses t{\^e}m consequ{\^e}ncias importantes, aqui brevemente resenhadas, para a concep{\c c}{\~a}o das rela{\c c}{\~o}es entre tempo e modalidade e para a sem{\^a}ntica das atitudes proposicionais.

}, isbn = {9789898554}, url = {http://compendioemlinha.letras.ulisboa.pt/temporalismo-e-eternismo-paulo-faria/}, author = {Faria, Paulo}, editor = {Branquinho, J. and Santos, R.} } @inbook {RN3, title = {Externalismo sem{\^a}ntico}, booktitle = {Comp{\^e}ndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Anal{\'\i}tica}, year = {2013}, note = {n/a}, pages = {1 - 12}, publisher = {Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa}, organization = {Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa}, type = {Book Section}, address = {Lisboa}, abstract = {

O externalismo sem{\^a}ntico (a tese segundo a qual valores sem{\^a}nticos s{\~a}o, ao menos parcialmente, constitu{\'\i}dos pelas rela{\c c}{\~o}es n{\~a}o-representacionais dos usu{\'a}rios da linguagem com seu ambiente natural e social) {\'e} apresentado aqui em perspectiva hist{\'o}rica. Na reconstru{\c c}{\~a}o proposta, a genealogia da tese exposta e defendida por Hilary Putnam no cl{\'a}ssico {\textquoteright}The meaning of "meaning"{\textquoteright} (1975) remonta {\`a} filosofia da linguagem de Bertrand Russell nos anos 1903-1914 (em particular, {\`a} concep{\c c}{\~a}o russelliana da sem{\^a}ntica dos termos singulares). A tese foi ent{\~a}o gradualmente articulada na cr{\'\i}tica {\`a} compreens{\~a}o dita {\textquoteright}descritivista{\textquoteright} da refer{\^e}ncia que emergiu da obra pioneira de Ruth Barcan Marcus em l{\'o}gica modal quantificada e foi sistematizada por fil{\'o}sofos como Keith Donnellan, David Kaplan e, sobretudo, Saul A. Kripke. A este {\'u}ltimo, em particular, deve-se a introdu{\c c}{\~a}o da no{\c c}{\~a}o de designa{\c c}{\~a}o r{\'\i}gida que, estendida aos designadores de esp{\'e}cies naturais, abriria o caminho, finalmente, para a formula{\c c}{\~a}o madura do externalismo sem{\^a}ntico no {\textquoteright}locus classicus{\textquoteright} de Putnam.

}, isbn = {9789898554}, url = {http://compendioemlinha.letras.ulisboa.pt/temporalismo-e-eternismo-paulo-faria/}, author = {Faria, Paulo}, editor = {Branquinho, J. and Santos, R.} } @inbook {RN4, title = {Abstra{\c c}{\~a}o e evas{\~a}o: nota sobre a pintura moderna}, booktitle = {{\'E}tica, pol{\'\i}tica e esclarecimento p{\'u}blico: ensaios em homenagem a Nelson Boeira}, year = {2012}, note = {n/a}, pages = {425 - 430}, publisher = {Besti{\'a}rio}, organization = {Besti{\'a}rio}, type = {Book Section}, address = {Porto Alegre}, abstract = {n/a}, isbn = {8598802344}, author = {Faria, Paulo}, editor = {Fonseca, A. and Pohlman, E. and Goldmeier, G.} } @inbook {RN5, title = {Sobre o que n{\~a}o temos o direito de n{\~a}o saber}, booktitle = {Consequ{\^e}ncias do ceticismo}, year = {2012}, note = {n/a}, pages = {253 - 271}, publisher = {Alameda Editorial}, organization = {Alameda Editorial}, type = {Book Section}, address = {S{\~a}o Paulo}, abstract = {n/a}, isbn = {9788579391}, author = {Faria, Paulo}, editor = {Silva Filho, W. and Smith, P.} } @inbook {RN6, title = {Anti-individualismo e autoconhecimento: uma exposi{\c c}{\~a}o elementar}, booktitle = {Mente, linguagem e mundo: anti-individualismo e autoconhecimento}, year = {2010}, note = {n/a}, pages = {25 - 35}, publisher = {Alameda Editorial}, organization = {Alameda Editorial}, type = {Book Section}, address = {S{\~a}o Paulo}, abstract = {n/a}, isbn = {9788562115704}, url = {https://www.academia.edu/1491364/Anti_individualismo_e_autoconhecimento_uma_exposi\%C3\%A7\%C3\%A3o_elementar}, author = {Faria, Paulo}, editor = {Silva Filho, W.} } @article {Faria_2010, title = {Existence as a real predicate}, journal = {Veritas}, volume = {55}, year = {2010}, note = {n/a}, pages = {33-41}, abstract = {

The construal of {\textquoteleft}exists{\textquoteright} as a first-order or real predicate is defended against prevailing orthodoxy.

}, doi = {10.15448/1984-6746.2010.2.5554}, url = {https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/ojs/index.php/veritas/article/view/5554/7197}, author = {Faria, Paulo} } @article {FARIA2010, title = {Memory as acquaintance with the past: some Lessons from Russell, 1912-1914}, journal = {Kriterion}, volume = {51}, year = {2010}, note = {n/a}, pages = {149 - 172}, abstract = {

Russell{\textquoteright}s theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his definition of acquaintance as the converse of the relation of presentation of an object to a subject. We show how the two views can be made to cohere under a suitable construal of {\textquoteright}presentation{\textquoteright}, which has the additional appeal of bringing Russell{\textquoteright}s theory of memory closer to contemporary views on direct reference and object-dependent thinking than is usually acknowledged. The drawback is that memory as acquaintance with the past falls short of fulfilling Russell{\textquoteright}s requirement that knowledge by acquaintance be discriminating knowledge - a shortcoming shared by contemporary externalist accounts of knowledge from memory.

}, issn = {0100-512X}, url = {http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext\&pid=S0100-512X2010000100008\&nrm=iso}, author = {Faria, Paulo} } @article {DP17338, title = {Unsafe reasoning: a survey}, journal = {DoisPontos}, volume = {6}, year = {2009}, note = {n/a}, pages = {185-201}, abstract = {

Judgments about the validity of at least some elementary inferential patterns (say modus ponens) are a priori if anything is. Yet a number of empirical conditions must in each case be satisfied in order for a particular inference to instantiate this or that inferential pattern. We may on occasion be entitled to presuppose that such conditions are satisfied (and the entitlement may even be a priori), yet only experience could tell us that such was indeed the case. Current discussion about a perceived incompatibility between content externalism and first-person authority exemplifies how damaging the neglect of such empirical presuppositions of correct reasoning can be. An externalistic view of mental content is ostensibly incompatible with the assumption that a rational subject should be able to avoid inconsistency no matter what the state of her empirical knowledge may be. That fact, however, needs not be taken (as it often is) as a reductio of externalism: alternatively, we may reject that assumption, adding to the agenda of a philosophical investigation of rationality an examination of the vicissitudes of logical luck. I offer an illustration and defense of that alternative.

}, keywords = {Content externalism, Exteriorismo de conte{\'u}do, Inference, Infer{\^e}ncia, Logical luck, Pressuposi{\c c}{\~a}o, Presupposition, Sorte l{\'o}gica}, issn = {2179-7412}, doi = {10.5380/dp.v6i2.17338}, url = {https://revistas.ufpr.br/doispontos/article/view/17338/11401} type = {Journal Article}, author = {Faria, Paulo} } @inbook {RN7, title = {Conocimiento directo, descripci{\'o}n, y tiempo}, booktitle = {Bertrand Russell y el an{\'a}lisis filos{\'o}fico a partir de {\textquoteright}On Denoting{\textquoteright}}, year = {2008}, note = {n/a}, pages = {59 - 95}, publisher = {Universidad Aut{\'o}noma Metropolitana - Iztapalapa}, organization = {Universidad Aut{\'o}noma Metropolitana - Iztapalapa}, type = {Book Section}, address = {Juan Pablos}, abstract = {n/a}, isbn = {9689172441}, author = {Faria, Paulo}, editor = {Pinto, S.} } @inbook {RN8, title = {R{\'e}plica a Lourdes Valdivia}, booktitle = {Bertrand Russell y el an{\'a}lisis filos{\'o}fico a partir de {\textquoteright}On Denoting{\textquoteright}}, year = {2008}, note = {n/a}, pages = {139-151}, publisher = {Universidad Aut{\'o}noma Metropolitana - Iztapalapa}, organization = {Universidad Aut{\'o}noma Metropolitana - Iztapalapa}, type = {Book Section}, address = {Juan Pablos}, abstract = {n/a}, isbn = {9689172441}, author = {Faria, Paulo}, editor = {Pinto, S.} } @inbook {RN9, title = {Trabalhos de escava{\c c}{\~a}o}, booktitle = {Rio Grande em debate: conservadorismo e mudan{\c c}a}, year = {2008}, note = {n/a}, pages = {55-66}, publisher = {Sulina}, organization = {Sulina}, type = {Book Section}, address = {Porto Alegre}, abstract = {n/a}, isbn = {9788529594956}, author = {Faria, Paulo}, editor = {Boeira, N.} } @article {SKEPSIS, title = {A encena{\c c}{\~a}o}, journal = {Sk{\'e}psis}, volume = {1(2)}, year = {2007}, note = {n/a}, pages = {99 - 130}, abstract = {n/a}, issn = {0100-6045}, url = {http://philosophicalskepticism.org/skepsis/revista-skepsis-volume-1-numero-2/}, author = {Faria, Paulo} } @inbook {RN10, title = {Hist{\'o}ria da filosofia anal{\'\i}tica}, booktitle = {Enciclop{\'e}dia de temos l{\'o}gico-filos{\'o}ficos}, year = {2006}, note = {n/a}, pages = {339-346}, publisher = {Martins Fontes}, organization = {Martins Fontes}, type = {Book Section}, address = {S{\~a}o Paulo}, abstract = {n/a}, isbn = {8533623259}, author = {Faria, Paulo}, editor = {Branquinho, J. and Murcho, D. and Gomes, N.} } @article {oqnfp, title = {A preserva{\c c}{\~a}o da verdade}, journal = {O que nos faz pensar}, volume = {15}, year = {2006}, note = {n/a}, pages = {101-126}, abstract = {n/a}, url = {http://oquenosfazpensar.fil.puc-rio.br/import/pdf_articles/OQNFP_20_06_paulo_faria.pdf}, author = {Faria, Paulo} } @article {FARIA2006, title = {Remedios para el v{\'e}rtigo}, journal = {Di{\'a}noia}, volume = {51}, year = {2006}, note = {n/a}, pages = {173 - 188}, abstract = {

El acuerdo del autor con el enfoque de Carlos Pereda sobre las cuestiones que rodean a la llamada {\textquotedblleft}perspectiva de primera persona{\textquotedblright} se matiza aqu{\'\i} se{\~n}alando diferencias en tres aspectos. En primer lugar se plantea que la conciencia de la propia identidad como conciencia de algo que persiste a trav{\'e}s del tiempo es una capacidad independiente del lenguaje, y que las discusiones filos{\'o}ficas de la autoconciencia se volver{\'\i}an m{\'a}s perspicuas si expl{\'\i}citamente lo tomaran en cuenta. En segundo, se expresa una duda acerca de la significaci{\'o}n de los argumentos basados en lo inconcebible, espec{\'\i}ficamente tal como aparecen en la discusi{\'o}n de Pereda sobre lo que {\'e}l describe como tres especies de {\textquotedblleft}razonamientos vertiginosos{\textquotedblright} provocados por la perplejidad filos{\'o}fica con respecto al yo. En tercer lugar se plantea que la idea de la identidad personal como algo que por lo menos en parte es una construcci{\'o}n (como en lo que a menudo se llama {\textquotedblleft}narrativismo{\textquotedblright}) constituye una consecuencia ineludible del reconocimiento de que el contenido intencional de una acci{\'o}n est{\'a} relacionado esencialmente con su descripci{\'o}n.

}, issn = {0185-2450}, url = {http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext\&pid=S0185-24502006000200173\&nrm=iso}, author = {Faria, Paulo} } @book {RN26, title = {L{\'o}gica e Ontologia: Ensaios em Homenagem a Balthazar Barbosa Filho}, year = {2004}, note = {n/a}, publisher = {Discurso Editorial}, organization = {Discurso Editorial}, type = {Edited Book}, address = {S{\~a}o Paulo}, abstract = {n/a}, isbn = {8596590649}, author = {{\'E}vora, F{\'a}tima and Faria, Paulo and Loparic, Andr{\'e}a and Santos, Luis Henrique Lopes dos and Zingano, Marco} } @inbook {RN11, title = {Deconstrucci{\'o}n de la irrealidad}, booktitle = {El giro pragm{\'a}tico en la filosofia}, year = {2003}, note = {n/a}, pages = {190-215}, publisher = {Gedisa}, organization = {Gedisa}, type = {Book Section}, address = {Barcelona}, abstract = {n/a}, isbn = {8474329868}, author = {Faria, Paulo}, editor = {Cabanchik, S. and Penelas, F. and Tozzi, V.} } @article {DIANOIA437, title = {Deconstrucci{\'o}n de la irrealidad}, journal = {Revista de Filosof{\'\i}a Di{\'a}noia}, volume = {47}, year = {2002}, note = {n/a}, pages = {131-155}, abstract = {

El art{\'\i}culo presenta una cr{\'\i}tica a la adopci{\'o}n por Samuel Cabanchik del {\textquotedblleft}irrealismo{\textquotedblright} de Goodman para clarificar y extender las observaciones de Austin acerca del significado de {\textquotedblleft}real{\textquotedblright}. Siguiendo a Cora Diamond, se distingue el realismo metaf{\'\i}sico del {\textquotedblleft}esp{\'\i}ritu realista{\textquotedblright} {\textemdash}una actitud hacia los problemas filos{\'o}ficos que excluye cualquier tesis semejante al irrealismo goodmaniano, y que la obra de Austin ejemplifica. Se rastrea el origen del nominalismo de Goodman acerca de las especies {\textemdash}la fuente de su irrealismo{\textemdash} en su trabajo anterior sobre la inducci{\'o}n; sin embargo, se muestra que dicho nominalismo est{\'a} subdeterminado por la prueba goodmaniana de que el proyecto de una l{\'o}gica formal de la confirmaci{\'o}n (Hempel, Oppenheim) estaba destinado al fracaso. Con base en algunas observaciones de Quine sobre la Paradoja de los Cuervos, se esboza una defensa de la relevancia filos{\'o}fica de cualesquiera restricciones emp{\'\i}ricas pueda haber sobre el atrincheramiento de conceptos. El argumento se cierra con una breve discusi{\'o}n del examen hecho por Austin de las variedades de la irrealidad, con la que se pretende dejar en claro por qu{\'e} el Austin de Cabanchik no podr{\'\i}a ser Austin.

}, keywords = {atrincheramiento, especies, realismo, {\textquoteleft}real{\textquoteright}}, issn = {1870-4913}, doi = {10.21898/dia.v47i49.437}, url = {http://dianoia.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/dianoia/article/view/437}, author = {Faria, Paulo} } @inbook {RN14, title = {Discrimina{\c c}{\~a}o e conhecimento de si}, booktitle = {Ontologia, Conhecimento e Linguagem: um Encontro de Fil{\'o}sofos Latino-Americanos}, year = {2001}, note = {n/a}, pages = {113-128}, publisher = {Mauad/FAPERJ}, organization = {Mauad/FAPERJ}, type = {Book Section}, address = {Rio de Janeiro}, abstract = {n/a}, isbn = {8574730359}, author = {Faria, Paulo}, editor = {Pinheiro, U. and Ruffino, M. and Smith, P.} } @inbook {RN12, title = {Discrimina{\c c}{\~a}o e conhecimento direto}, booktitle = {Subjetividad, representaci{\'o}n y realidad}, year = {2001}, note = {n/a}, pages = {9-29}, publisher = {Universidad Aut{\'o}noma de Puebla}, organization = {Universidad Aut{\'o}noma de Puebla}, type = {Book Section}, address = {Puebla}, abstract = {n/a}, isbn = {9688634751}, author = {Faria, Paulo}, editor = {Hurtado, G.} } @article {FARIA2001, title = {A escuta {\`a} dist{\^a}ncia: a prop{\'o}sito do {\textquoteright}Prometeo{\textquoteright} de Luigi Nono}, journal = {Filosofia Pol{\'\i}tica}, volume = {2(S{\'e}rie III)}, year = {2001}, note = {n/a}, pages = {173 - 188}, abstract = {n/a}, author = {Faria, Paulo} } @inbook {RN15, title = {A l{\textquoteright}{\'e}coute de Russell: de la {\textquoteright}Th{\'e}orie de la Connaissance{\textquoteright} {\`a} la Philosophie de la Psychologie}, booktitle = {Wittgenstein: les mots de l{\textquoteright}esprit. Philosophie de la psychologie}, year = {2001}, note = {n/a}, pages = {129-155}, publisher = {Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin}, organization = {Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin}, type = {Book Section}, address = {Paris}, abstract = {n/a}, isbn = {2711614840}, author = {Faria, Paulo}, editor = {Chauvir{\'e}, C. and Laugier, S. and Rosat, J.-J.} } @inbook {RN13, title = {Le gu{\^e}pier de Moore}, booktitle = {Wittgenstein: m{\'e}taphysique et jeux de langage}, year = {2001}, note = {n/a}, pages = {129-152}, publisher = {Presses Universitaires de France}, organization = {Presses Universitaires de France}, type = {Book Section}, address = {Paris}, abstract = {n/a}, isbn = {213051630}, author = {Faria, Paulo}, editor = {Laugier, S.} } @article {FARIA2000, title = {Tirando o corpo fora}, journal = {Filosofia Pol{\'\i}tica}, volume = {6(S{\'e}rie II)}, year = {2000}, note = {n/a}, pages = {12 - 26}, abstract = {n/a}, author = {Faria, Paulo} } @inbook {RN16, title = {Discrimina{\c c}{\~a}o e afec{\c c}{\~a}o}, booktitle = {Verdade, Conhecimento e A{\c c}{\~a}o: Ensaios em Homenagem a Guido Ant{\^o}nio de Almeida e Raul Landim Filho}, year = {1999}, note = {n/a}, pages = {145-159}, publisher = {Edi{\c c}{\~o}es Loyola}, organization = {Edi{\c c}{\~o}es Loyola}, type = {Book Section}, address = {S{\~a}o Paulo}, abstract = {n/a}, isbn = {8515020661}, author = {Faria, Paulo}, editor = {Marques, E. and Rocha, E. and Levy, L. and Pereira, L. C. and Gleizer, M. and Pinheiro, U.} } @article {FARIA1994, title = {O mundo perdido}, journal = {Analytica}, volume = {1(2)}, year = {1994}, note = {n/a}, pages = {163 - 195}, abstract = {n/a}, issn = {1414-3003}, url = {https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/analytica/article/view/647}, author = {Faria, Paulo} } @article {FARIA1992, title = {A anamnese do pacto no {\textquoteright}Doutor Fausto{\textquoteright}de Thomas Mann}, journal = {Organon}, volume = {6(19)}, year = {1992}, note = {n/a}, pages = {61 - 68}, abstract = {n/a}, issn = {0102-6267}, url = {https://seer.ufrgs.br/organon/article/view/39325}, author = {Faria, Paulo} } @inbook {RN17, title = {Provar e mostrar}, booktitle = {Racionalidade e a{\c c}{\~a}o}, year = {1992}, note = {n/a}, pages = {179-206}, publisher = {Editora da Universidade (UFRGS)}, organization = {Editora da Universidade (UFRGS)}, type = {Book Section}, address = {Porto Alegre}, abstract = {n/a}, author = {Faria, Paulo}, editor = {Rohden, V.} } @article {FARIA1992b, title = {Sur la r{\`e}gle de reconnaissance}, journal = {Cahiers de Fontenay}, volume = {67/68}, year = {1992}, note = {n/a}, pages = {161 - 188}, abstract = {n/a}, issn = {03958418}, url = {http://catalogue-editions.ens-lyon.fr/fr/livre/?GCOI=29021100333510}, author = {Faria, Paulo} } @article {FARIA1985, title = {O caderno de Aquiles}, journal = {Aquiles: Ensaios de An{\'a}lise Filos{\'o}fica}, volume = {1}, year = {1985}, note = {n/a}, pages = {17 - 20}, abstract = {n/a}, author = {Faria, Paulo} } @article {FARIA1992b, title = {O que acontece}, journal = {Estudos Jur{\'\i}dicos}, volume = {11(31)}, year = {1985}, note = {n/a}, pages = {163 - 167}, abstract = {n/a}, author = {Faria, Paulo} }