

Intelligence Professionalism in the Americas

Profesionalismo de Inteligencia en las Américas

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PROFESSIONALIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY IN BRAZIL: CRITERIA, EVIDENCE AND REMAINING CHALLENGES

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ABSTRACT

This discussion focuses on the characteristics of the professional intelligence analyst/collector and the criteria that make it possible to define this activity as a profession. The Brazilian case is analyzed from the viewpoint of the historical institutionalization of intelligence activity and how the country has developed its capacity to recruit, educate and maintain intelligence professionals. Challenges related to the establishment of a governmental career in intelligence are discussed in the text, based on four criteria used to characterize a profession: cognitive requirements, educational system, the career itself and ethical requirements. As background for this study, a survey was administered to 47 members of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN). The text's main conclusion is that intelligence activity may already be considered a profession in the case of Brazil, but important challenges remain with respect to the incentives and sanctions affecting the career of an intelligence analyst or collector. Therefore, reform in professional intelligence education, both in content and method, is recommended for the federal government. However, this conclusion cannot be generalized to other Brazilian intelligence agencies, namely the military and police agencies, because more specific studies are required for those cases.

INTRODUCTION

This essay discusses the problem related to the professionalization of intelligence activity in Brazil and is focused on three main goals. First, to define the conceptual parameters from which it is possible to assess whether the intelligence activity may or may not be considered a profession. Second, to analyze the process of democratic institutionalization of intelligence activity in Brazil and to identify the advances, impasses and challenges found specifically in the professionalization process. Finally, but not of least importance, this study lays the groundwork for a systematic assessment of the professional values and expectations of those employed by the governmental intelligence agencies in Brazil.

As part of a larger comparative study, and aware of the methodological problems inevitably involved, we translated and adapted a survey questionnaire which was applied to a sample of 47 information analysts and managers who work at the headquarters of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency in Brasilia, DF. Due to the peculiarity of the subject — intelligence activities are

legally protected by governmental secrecy — we accepted certain research constraints.²⁰³ The general outline of this opinion research and some of its preliminary results will be discussed in the last part of this work. The authors would like to thank Professors Swenson and Lemozy for their invaluable help in addressing the serious problems involved in determining conceptual and normative, semantic equivalence of the questionnaire, as translated and adapted from Spanish and from English into Portuguese.²⁰⁴

The authors also wish to emphasize the good will and the collaboration of all the managers and employees at the Brazilian Intelligence Agency during the interviews, in the technical visits, and in their answering the self-administered questionnaires. In a context such as the one found in Latin America, where in many places governmental secrecy regimes tend to lose their functionality without losing their power, we appreciate the openness and frankness of the Agency's employees, represented by professor Marisa Del'Isolda e Diniz, the general director of ABIN. Special thanks as well to ABIN's employees who helped directly in making possible this first attempt to identify the values and attitudes of intelligence professionals in Brazil.

DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA FOR INTELLIGENCE AS A PROFESSION

We must begin with some comments on the restrictive use one should make of the term intelligence, herein understood in the context of informational conflict. What we mean is that, for us, intelligence is not only security nor merely information, but the analysis and the search for the necessary information so as to win a conflict involving antagonistic players.

This restricted use of the term intelligence is made necessary for two reasons. In the first place, the relevance of the information flow generated by and within the intelligence activity varies in inverse proportion to the number of areas that we have to approach with scarce resources. In the second place, the risks to democracy — generated by the indiscriminating use of intelligence resources in the field of public policies not directly related to defense, foreign policy and security — grow in direct proportion to a reduced awareness of the conflictive nature of this activity. With this framework in mind, intelligence may be treated the same as any other relevant informational source used in the decision-making process.

At this moment, when the theme of reform and of the role to be played by intelligence services in the democratic context is being explored with respect to the U.S. and to several Latin American countries, it seems suitable to fix some theoretical boundaries that allow a realistic and, at the same time, progressive decision about what to do with this aspect of

²⁰³ To provide for security, the board of directors of ABIN requested that primary data not be made public without their previous approval; also, a preliminary version of this essay was examined by ABIN before its publication. These conditions were accepted by the authors in a letter dated 8 August 2002.

²⁰⁴ Orlando Behling and Kenneth Law, *Translating Questionnaires and Other Research Instruments* (London: SAGE, 2000), 1-16.

State power. One important aspect in this decision refers to the *status* that this activity should have in democratic regimes. Should intelligence activity be valued, should it be tolerated as a necessary evil, should an attempt be made to keep it from being used against entities that challenge the power of the State?

In order to answer questions like that, we discuss in this section the criteria by which it is possible to assess the status of the intelligence activity in contemporary governments, taking as a starting point a restrictive definition of intelligence activity that addresses what its mission is, and what its main goals are. We agree that it is something more complex and broader than what espionage used to be, but not to the point of considering any and every activity related to the production of knowledge, gathering and analyses of information as an intelligence activity. After all, not every issue important for the government's decisionmaking process is best approached from an intelligence point of view. Intelligence activity becomes more relevant the closer the activity comes to the center of the decisionmaking process in the fields of security, defense, and foreign policy. The farther from these issues and the closer to the actions of the contemporary State in social or economic areas, the less relevant the governmental intelligence activity tends to be as a fundamental contributor to the decisionmaking process. For this reason, there are complexities and difficulties related to the professionalization process of the intelligence activity that deserve our attention.

Governmental intelligence activity is defined by a set of methods, techniques and issues of defined relevance. In the first place, intelligence activity favors, in the collection stage, a kind of knowledge — technical ability, methodology, or technology — that is different from the abilities, technologies and techniques used in the second half of the process — analysis and production of the final results. To say it simply, intelligence collectors are specialized in collection “disciplines” and types of sources whereas intelligence analysts are specialized in issues, regions, and types of problems.

There is also a major and complex difference between the kinds of ability and of necessary skills between the areas of positive intelligence and counterintelligence. Moreover, today there is a steady growth of professional subcultures, well identified by specialized literature: criminal intelligence, military intelligence or foreign intelligence. Those subcultures or other specific subdivisions of intelligence activity each have their own types of challenges in terms of intelligence professionalization.

And why use the term “profession” and not just “occupation”? Intelligence activity is not listed in the Brazilian Code of Occupations, nor in the Code of Occupations of the International Labor Organization (OIT). Still, it could be considered an occupation, rather than a profession, with theoretical and practical implications. Therefore, to characterize intelligence activity as a profession, it is necessary to define beforehand what are the general criteria from which we will assess this activity.

What does the sociology of professions define as a profession? How is it different from a mere occupation in the categories of industrial labor? In a single sentence, a profession is defined by the level of standards applicable to it in terms of its cognitive requirements,

values, and social requirements, whereas an occupation is defined by a much more restrictive group of functions, tasks and routine operations. The degree of professionalization of various occupations depends on the type of social stratification and on the degree to which a division of labor is being practiced.²⁰⁵

According to Boudon and Bourricaud, Weber was the one who most emphasized the importance of profession in modern Western societies, as he saw in the process of professionalization the passage from a traditional social order to an order in which the *status* of each person would depend on the tasks one has to perform, and they would be distributed within that order according to rational criteria of skills and specialization.²⁰⁶ A profession would then be an individual vocation in the Weberian sense, but its permanence through time would depend on mechanisms to process conflicts among the diverse individuals who are members. That is why each profession is ruled by its own deontology that controls the relations among individuals and creates mutual obligations among the professionals and their clients.

Although not every occupation can become a profession, there is strong pressure in this direction because professional qualification and bureaucratization (two of the strongest attributes of professionalization) ensure status, monopolistic income (due to the ownership of exclusive knowledge and/or techniques), and job security.

In an approach consistent with the contribution made by Weber to the concept of professions and their importance in the maintenance of a complex social order, Thomas Bruneau has emphasized that a profession combines a specific kind of expertise, knowledge and ability, with a specific kind of *esprit de corps* — a feeling of fraternity within an organization.²⁰⁷ Organizational knowledge and cohesion define a specific kind of collective responsibility regarding goals, and this would basically define what a profession is, in opposition to a mere job or occupation.

Thus, another way to determine whether intelligence activity is a profession, or if it is just an occupation, would involve testing the degree of matching, in terms of the way this activity is carried out, among a *bureaucratic ethos*, which is related to the impersonality of rules; a *meritocratic ethos* in the regulation of careers, which concerns the relation of individuals to the organization; and a *democratic ethos*, which involves social values and the relation between managers and workers within any professional activity. This second way to define a profession places less emphasis on institutional conditions and much more on individual conditions and self-regulation, or, we may say, on professional behavior.

²⁰⁵ Emile Durkheim, *A Divisão do Trabalho Social* (São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1983).

²⁰⁶ Raymond Boudoun e Francois Bourricaud, *Dicionário Crítico de Sociologia* (São Paulo: Ática, 1993), 451-454. [entries “division of labor”, “professions”, “status” and “values”/verbetes “divisão do trabalho”, “profissões”, “status” e “valores”].

²⁰⁷ Thomas C. Bruneau, “Controlling Intelligence in New Democracies,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 14, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 323-341.

In view of the above, a discussion of professionalism and governmental intelligence activities may combine the two ways of approaching the matter, the institutional and the normative. Basically, then, we would have to analyze the following criteria: 1) whether such activity has specific cognitive requirements, differentiated methods, contents or goals pertaining to the gathering, analysis and production of knowledge; 2) whether it involves recruitment, retention, remuneration and retirement mechanisms that define the progression of a professional career; 3) whether it needs its own education and professional development system; and finally, 4) whether it internally generates its own deontology, or its own code of ethics. These are four recognized criteria that can be applied to test whether what we call intelligence activity is appropriately labeled a profession.

The hypothesis suggested in this study is “yes,” one can say that intelligence activity qualifies as a contemporary profession. However, this statement demands, from the very beginning, that some nuances be explored with respect to each of the subcultures previously mentioned, especially concerning the sort of knowledge and abilities that are necessary in information gathering and analysis.

Furthermore, the transformation of intelligence activity into a profession is a rather recent phenomenon, associated with the emergence of an economy based on knowledge of global reach and also on the differentiation and expansion of the typical functions of the contemporary State. The process of creating national intelligence systems did not take place before mid-twentieth century, and there is no evidence for the existence of an intelligence profession in previous centuries, despite mention of espionage as the second oldest profession in the Old Testament and in Chinese texts such as that of Sun Tzu. In fact, although espionage has been a practice since antiquity, it has become something larger — “intelligence activity” — only in the past 150 years.

Having defined the starting point, we shall consider the following four (distilled) criteria: 1) knowledge; 2) career; 3) professional development; 4) code of ethics. In the event that we find intelligence activity requires specific knowledge, has a defined career path and its own educational system, and is capable of engendering its own deontological demands, then one can say that such activity constitutes a profession and not merely an occupation.

1. Type of Knowledge Required in the Areas of Information Collection and Analysis

As noted earlier, intelligence activity is divided into two main working stages (collection and analysis) which demand types of knowledge that are rather different from one another.

The collection of information on the intentions/meanings and capacities/things related to an opponent or conflicting situation demands the ability to obtain such information without the cooperation or even the consent of the target. This sort of conflict over obtaining, or being denied access to, information produces a first crucial difference between the knowledge required for intelligence activity and that related to other types of research or search for knowledge. To obtain information from human resources, for instance, may

require the specific ability to question war prisoners or a civilian population in occupied areas, or the ability to set up a broad and complex espionage network. In the same way, the specific, sophisticated knowledge of how to obtain information from communication and electronic signals that have been intercepted and decoded will hardly find an equivalent, interested set of collectors or consumers in a society. Finally, even though the acquisition of information from visual evidence can be associated with a number of artistic and scientific areas of knowledge, the intelligence discipline of imagery (IMINT), with its utilization of infra-red sensors, synthetic aperture radar, and its exploitation of a wide range of electromagnetic waves, has no equivalent in other areas of knowledge, when IMINT's contribution to intelligence is taken into account.

In analyzing information, the abilities related to research and substantial knowledge about the analyst's areas of concentration (regions, countries, transnational issues) can be closer to those expected from a professional working in any other research center. However, some important, specific aspects remain that are unique to intelligence in terms of the required type of knowledge and in the analysis process. First, the incorporation of data and information obtained from secret sources through equally secret means of collection makes this sort of analysis (all-sources analysis) different from what could be found at any university. Second, having in mind what the production of knowledge in the intelligence arena is aimed at (to defeat an enemy, to anticipatorily advise diplomatic efforts during a crisis, to understand the logistic flow of a criminal organization, to plan national defense, to support military operations, and so forth), the issues on which the analysis and the research need to concentrate would hardly be considered a priority in academic departments. In this sense, the specific aspects of managing the informational cycle within our restrictively defined intelligence activity, as well as the transaction costs related to obtaining such specific knowledge, allows us to say that the first criterion for defining intelligence activity as a profession is clearly fulfilled.

2. Careers in Governmental Intelligence

The existence of a professional career track in intelligence would depend on whether, given the country involved, there is legal recognition of and a reasonably stable designation of status for this activity.

In several countries of Latin America, intelligence officials who are responsible for the collection of information, as well as intelligence analysts themselves, are military, diplomatic or temporarily-contracted civilian personnel, with no expectation with regard to functional progression or recognition. Considering that even the existence of some intelligence agencies was not officially admitted by the respective governments until the mid-1990s, it is easy to acknowledge problems and limitations in the application of this criterion. For the time being, it may be said that in the past few years there has been significant progress in the definition of a career in intelligence in the armed forces and in the public administration bureaucracy of several countries. But uncertainty remains in knowing whether regulation of private intelligence activity would be necessary or even possible (this is true of so-called business intelligence, for instance), once intelligence activity as herein defined becomes part of the monopoly of the State's use of coercive means. In spite

of this conceptual and legal difficulty in the regulation of governmental intelligence activities, it seems to us that in recent years the heavy technological requirements and the degree of specialization in the required knowledge for good performance by collectors and analysts has put some pressure on governments to adopt more institutionalized solutions to the recruitment, selection, education, maintenance, promotion and retirement of the intelligence staff.

Even though it would be of value to describe the many solutions and efforts made toward modernization, and the increasing State capabilities in Public Administration in different countries in the past 15 years, that will not be possible in the limited space here. However, it is crucial to note that these solutions vary according to the constitutional parameters of each country, as well as according to the degree of institutionalization of civil-military relationships and, not least, they vary with the Gross Domestic Product of each country and the percentage of this sum that goes toward public expenses. In general, the solutions that have been found have involved the creation of incentives and sanctions capable of inducing more efficacy, efficiency, effectiveness and responsibility on the part of intelligence teams and organizations.

In general, intelligence activity is moving, both at the national and international levels, toward the fulfillment of this second criterion for intelligence to be considered a profession. A point that is still fraught with difficulty, and that could determine different national rhythms in the regulation of this profession, concerns the definition and the follow-up of performance and productivity indicators suitable for the intelligence arena.

3. Professional Development Systems

Although the existence of self-recognized cognitive requirements germane to the professional practice of intelligence in fact demands some sort of educational system capable of reproducing, storing and transmitting such knowledge on a regular basis, this could be considered an autonomous criterion in relation to professionalization. After all, the existence of specific cognitive requirements in a governmental activity is not a necessary condition to set up a professional formation system and, to an even lesser degree does it constitute a sufficient condition.

Taking the Brazilian case as an example, the federal government's intelligence organizations, both in the armed forces and in the civil sphere (ABIN, the Federal Police, the Treasury Ministry, and so on), acknowledge the need to have their own continuing education and refresher course centers for their collectors and analysts. The two best-known centers of this kind are ABIN's Intelligence School, which offers short courses and specific training to a number of other areas in the federal public administration, and the Army's Intelligence School, that serves mainly the ground forces. Such centers are common in the main national intelligence systems of other countries, but it seems useful to us to point out the case of the Joint Intelligence College of the armed forces of the United States.

The Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) is a specialized college in the university system of the U.S. Department of Defense, originated from the fusion, in 1962, of the

Army and Navy strategic intelligence schools. About to become an Intelligence University, the JMIC offers graduate courses toward a Master's degree in intelligence, which is formally recognized by the education authorities of the country and sanctioned by federal law. Since its approval by Congress in 1980, the Master's degree program in strategic intelligence (MSSI) has professionalized over 1,600 individuals, including civilians as well as military in active and reserve service, conferring degrees to between 60 and 70 percent of full-time students each year. The decision to transform JMIC into a formal education institution forced the transfer of short courses and the preparation of the American military attachés to other professionalizing areas of the Pentagon's Intelligence Agency (DIA). The school is considered vital to providing integrated professional development of the U.S. federal government's intelligence personnel.²⁰⁸

With no intention to compare the case of the United States and the case of Brazil, it is worth noting that the debate on the educational system and the professional formation in the armed forces in Brazil nowadays should include not only the transformation of the *Escola Superior de Guerra* (ESG) but also the schools and training centers of the intelligence area, considering, above all, the positive impact of a greater institutionalization of the education system in intelligence in the professionalization of governmental intelligence in the country (in terms of the evaluation rules used by the Brazilian Ministry of Education and Science and Technology).²⁰⁹

4. Professional Code of Ethics

The fourth criterion used to assess whether intelligence is professional activity is a function of the type of ethics that can be expected in its practice. It is not a matter of discussing the intrinsic superiority of the system of deontological ethics vis-à-vis an ethics based on some theoretically superior virtue. The matter is more prosaic, for it is related to knowing whether intelligence activity tends to generate a code of ethics of its own, similar to professions such as medicine or journalism. After all, it is an activity for which the principal measure of success is obtaining and analyzing information that someone else does not wish to be known.

In general, political scientists tend to be skeptical of suggestions that the behavior of public employees is based on more meritorious individual values than those shared by all the other individuals in a society. Therefore, they tend to prefer institutional safeguards rather than relying on uncertain civic virtues. In this sense, we believe that it is rather important to formulate and implement an adequate structure of incentives and sanctions to produce the desired results in terms of behavior. On the other hand, we know that the adoption of attitudes considered appropriate depends not only on the institutions (rules

²⁰⁸ U.S. Government. Department of Defense. *Catalog Academic Year 2001-2002* (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2002).

²⁰⁹ For a broader analysis of professional education on intelligence themes in universities of Latin America and the United States, see: Russell G. Swenson, "Intelligence Education in the Americas," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 16, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 108-130.

and organizations that ensure that those ethical principles are followed) but also on the internalization of moral norms that guide actions.

A deontological code of ethics for intelligence would be centered on the professional responsibility that these State agents have toward the security of citizens vis-à-vis vital external (sovereignty) and internal (public order) threats. The security of the Constitution, to the extent that the security of the citizens depends on it, is the main element to justify the existence of intelligence services. And the Constitution provides the main parameters outlining the behavior expected of the agents who serve and protect the public.

However, as no government or governmental agency operates as a perfect agent of the public, the external control of intelligence activities is itself a higher value to be cultivated with respect to the code of ethics of those professionals. The specific aspects of intelligence, in relation to the other professions related to the State monopoly over coercive means, have to do, above all, with the central role played by knowledge and secrecy. This element, combined with the growing technological complexity of the operations to collect information, and with the increasing scope of issues that governments want to know about through analysis, make ethical requirements for the practice of intelligence that much more demanding.

The search for truth, the application of skepticism, initiative, independence (in the sense of Kantian *sapere aude*), analytical impartiality, firmness of purpose and opinion, parsimony in the classification of public secrets, application of legal limits to operations, acceptance of the principle of information compartmentalization (need-to-know) and the non-use of information and knowledge for private purposes are some of the values that provide governmental intelligence with social acceptability. Even considering that many of these values are not exclusive features of intelligence, they are exacting, as they demand a commitment that should last an individual's entire lifetime, even after retirement or when that individual no longer occupies an intelligence post.

To sum up, intelligence may be considered a profession because it demands specific knowledge, exhibits career progression, tends to generate a specific deontological code of ethics and requires a professional development system to formulate and transmit knowledge and to socialize key values.

In the next section, we will consider the situation of the intelligence profession in Brazil. After all, to recognize that intelligence is a profession does not mean that it will be manifested in the same way and to the same degree in every country and in each sub-area of specialization.

PROFESSIONALIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE IN BRAZIL

Taking into consideration the group of governmental organizations that make up the three main intelligence systems in Brazil, the available empirical evidence on the degree of professionalization of this activity is restricted to the case of ABIN. Additional research

is necessary so as to assess the situation in the intelligence organs of the armed forces, and in the federal and state police departments.

This gap is significant, as evidenced by a brief institutional description of Brazilian intelligence. The Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) was brought into existence by Law 9,883, of 7 December 1999, the same law that established the Brazilian Intelligence System (SISBIN). In legal terms, ABIN is considered the central organ of this System and has the function of regulating the flow of the information produced by the institutions linked to it. The System was defined in a flexible manner so that, by means of agreements, even private institutions could participate.²¹⁰

In the past two years two important intelligence sub-systems were created in Brazil, the Public Security Intelligence Sub-System (SISP) and the Defense Intelligence System (SINDE).

SISP was established in December 2000, through Executive Decree 3,695, to organize in a cooperative manner the information flow in the areas of criminal intelligence, security (or internal) intelligence as well as counterintelligence. This sub-system is coordinated by the National Public Security Secretary (SENASP) of the Ministry of Justice. SISP's main operational components are the Federal Police Department (DPF) and the Federal Highway Police Department (DPRF), in the Ministry of Justice, in addition to the components of the Treasury Ministry (COAF, COPEI, and SRF), of the Ministry of Regional Integration, the Ministry of Defense (SPEAI), the Institutional Security Office of the Republic's Presidency (ABIN and SENAD), and finally, the civil and military police of the 26 states and of the Federal district. Even being defined as a sub-system of SISBIN, it is not known to what extent the presence of ABIN in the SISP assures a meaningful flow of relevant information and effective integration among the agencies.²¹¹

The Defense Intelligence System (SINDE) was established in June 2002, by means of an administrative act of the Ministry of Defense (regulation 295/MD). This system was created to articulate the intelligence components of the Navy (CIM), Army (CIE), Air Force (SECINT) and the Chief of Staff of Defense (EMD-2) with the Ministry of Defense. For this reason, the coordination of SINDE is a responsibility of the Strategic Intelligence Department of the Defense Ministry (DIE-SPEAI), and is also responsible for the representation of SINDE to SISBIN and to the National Congress.

²¹⁰ In promulgating SISBIN, Law 9,883 established that all the organs and entities of the federal public administration that can produce knowledge that is of interest to and is related to the intelligence area, especially those organs linked to External Defense, Internal Security and Foreign Affairs, would be a part of the System and also that, as necessary, other organs could join. The Law does not establish any degree of hierarchy and did not arrange for any sort of coordination ABIN might have over its components.

²¹¹ In fact, Executive Decree 3,448, of 5 May 2000, established SISP as a part of SISBIN and assigned ABIN itself as a central organ of SISP. Due to operational problems and bureaucratic disputes between ABIN and the DPF, a new Executive Decree (3,695 of 21 December 2000) transferred the coordination of the SISP to the SNSP (Ministry of Justice).

In spite of the nomenclature that is used (reflecting a functional concept of systems), the degree of hierarchical centralization or even of homeostatic balance in SISBIN is rather low, and is even lower in the case of SINDE than it is for SISP. There is an advisory council (NOSINDE) for the Defense Intelligence System, but its aim is, above all, to ensure that the effort to coordinate intelligence activities does not inadvertently cross the chain of command of each Service. To wit, military commanders who manage the intelligence organs of each force cannot be put under the operational control of DIE nor of ABIN (formally SINDE's and SISBIN's central coordination organs, respectively).²¹²

As the intelligence system in Brazil presents an institutional profile of "confederation" more than of "federation," additional research will be necessary to enable one to say anything more definitive about the extant degree of professionalization. Therefore, the analyses and conclusions in this paper will refer only to the case of ABIN.

It is also worth mentioning that any discussion of the professionalization of intelligence analysts in Brazil was being carried out, until December 2002, essentially by the Executive Branch of government, in the person of the Chief-Minister of the Institutional Security Office, General Alberto Cardoso, and of the managers of ABIN and of ABIN's Intelligence School.²¹³

According to documents recently presented by ABIN, professionalization would result from the "development of a group of procedures to obtain and analyze data for the diffusion of processed knowledge." Those actions should, according to ABIN, be carried out with objectivity, security, impartiality, and with an openness suitable to the needs of the user. Suffused throughout such activities should be a level of ethical behavior consonant with the expectations of a Democratic State based on the Rule of Law. In interviews with the present authors, the director of ABIN, professor Marisa Diniz, and general Alberto Cardoso also, suggested three main issues that should guide the whole discussion about professionalization:

a) A cognitive issue: the acquisition of new knowledge implies that a cognitive effort must be made to keep pace with technological advances, as a way to build safe and efficient instruments to perform intelligence functions.²¹⁴

b) The issue of career stability: this brings into consideration the variables of "recognition" and "remuneration." Besides attracting and professionalizing, it is necessary to keep professionals on the job. The attributes of intelligence are many, and include a varied range of required competencies, exacting standards of ethical behavior, anonymity, appropriate reaction to frustration, continuous education, delicate handling of secret issues, all the while knowing that this kind of activity generates incomprehension and suspicion among a public

²¹² Normative Regulation 295/MD, of 3 June 2002.

²¹³ General Cardoso was Chief Minister of the Institutional Security Office (GSI), an organ of the Republic's Presidency to which ABIN was subordinated after being established during Fernando Henrique Cardoso's term of office.

²¹⁴ Director Marisa Diniz, Intelligence Seminar, 2002

not yet ready to understand or accept it. It is mandatory that an intelligence organ have the authority and resources to implement a tailored personnel policy that would ensure that employees may expect some security in their professional future.²¹⁵

c) An ethical issue: the intelligence professional is an employee of the Brazilian State, that is, he should be “above” all interests related to political parties and concerned with the production of documents supportive of the exercise of power and not of the maintenance in power or of access to it.²¹⁶

Before further comments on these three issues, let us present some background to the debate on the professionalization of intelligence in Brazil.

1. Historical Antecedents

In Brazil, the matter of professionalization of intelligence activities has been discussed since the 1950s. As early as in the democratic administration of Juscelino Kubitschek, there were exchanges among Brazil, France and England about the development of intelligence services, above and beyond the great doctrinal influence from North America that was felt in the formation of information analysts.²¹⁷

After the military takeover in 1964 and the creation of the National Information Service (SNI), the intelligence services of the Brazilian military regime expanded and began to demand a specialized institution to bring professional development to its personnel. However, until the foundation of the National School of Information (ESNI) in 1972, all the courses for civilians related to “information” were offered inside the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG). According to João Valle, there was almost nothing in the curriculum of the ESG about information collection operations or about what is now called counterintelligence.²¹⁸

A study carried out by Samantha Quadrat asserts that the professionalization of intelligence in this period of Brazilian history involved only “the sum of experience acquired in ‘information’ courses, of knowledge acquired through professional military education, and by attendance at courses oriented to military promotion.”²¹⁹ Hence, in describing the historic antecedents of professionalization of intelligence in Brazil, we should emphasize the mainstream professional development regime of that time. In the case of the Army, it was through the Army Study and Personnel Center (CEP) that all the specific information

²¹⁵ Director Marisa Diniz, Intelligence Seminar, 2002.

²¹⁶ Minister Alberto Cardoso, Intelligence Seminar, 2002.

²¹⁷ Priscila Antunes, *SNI and ABIN: Between Theory and Practice. A look at the Actions of Brazilian Secret Services Through the 20th century/O SNI e ABIN: entre a teoria e a prática. Uma leitura da atuação dos Serviços Secretos Brasileiros ao longo do século XX* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2002), 46-50.

²¹⁸ João Vale, *A Study of the SNI/Um estudo sobre o SNI* (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Sociologia e Política da PUC/RJ, 1998).

²¹⁹ Samantha Viz Quadrat, *Power and Information: the intelligence system and the military regime in Brazil/Poder e Informação: o sistema de inteligência e o regime militar no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Programa de Pós-Graduação em História Social da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 2000).

courses for officers and non-commissioned officers were created. This was true as well for the courses that started to professionalize, on a regular basis, specialists to staff the information organs such as SNI and the Army Intelligence Center.

However, as both ESG and CEP dealt with rather shaky knowledge in terms of intelligence, the leaders of the military regime and the SNI itself started to demand a type of professionalization in intelligence more in keeping with their perception of threat, which at that time was related to the opposition to the regime. Therefore, in the hope of solving the problems involved in the development of the National Information Doctrine and in the qualification of agents in the field of information or intelligence, the government authorized the creation of the National Information School. Through Decree 68,448 of 31 March 1971, ESNI was established, having its headquarters in Brasilia and being directly subordinate to the Republic's Presidency. ESNI took in all the courses and training related to the information area of CEP and of ESG. What was at the time a huge budget was devoted to the ESNI, in addition to curriculum support from North America.²²⁰

There were language courses (English, French, German, Italian, Chinese, and Russian) at the ESNI and also three specific courses in the intelligence field: A, B, and C. The first lasted 41 weeks, was aimed at military and civilians that have posts as managers and analysts. Recruiting targeted senior officials of the Armed Forces who had completed the Command and General Staff Course, and civilian university graduates. Course "B" was aimed at civilians and military who would take up information posts of medium level or become commanders in intermediate military ranks of the National Information System. The lower level was course "C", for the training and education of sergeants in the planning and direction of information operations. Students would enroll after having been nominated by ministries and by the Armed Forces, and the candidate was obligated to fulfill all the requirements set by the School.²²¹

ESNI also offered training in the fields of information collection, counterinformation and information analysis, besides a two-day course for ministers and state secretaries, which taught them how to deal with the information they received. The concern at that time was how to make public the means of waging psychological warfare against communists, which required establishing the pattern of concepts and language constructs to be used.²²²

Another center for developing intelligence personnel during the Brazilian military regime was the School of the Americas, where around 450 Brazilian military officials were sent, according to data found by Quadrat, mainly in the years 1967 and 1968.²²³ From the ESNI, the ESG and also the School of the Americas, the National Security Doctrine (DSN) began to be refined and put into effect, with the aim of establishing an apparatus responsible for combatting "subversion" in Brazil. The Internal Operations

²²⁰ Antunes, 2002, 58-61.

²²¹ For further information on the recruitment of analysts, please see: Quadrat, 2000, 95-118.

²²² According to Samantha Quadrat, a way to achieve these goals was to produce dictionaries of the vocabulary related to the war on communism (Quadrat, 2000, 96).

²²³ Quadrat, 2000, 112.

Detachment (DOI) and the Internal Operations and Defense Centers (CODIs) began to send their staff to be trained in interrogation techniques in England.

The formation of a whole generation of intelligence analysts and operators during the Cold War, and at the peak of the military dictatorship cycle in South America, decisively contributed to making any serious discussion of intelligence activities anathema, even well after the authoritarian regimes had themselves been left behind.

As an example of the changes that took place in the Army right after the end of the Cold War, we may examine the case of the establishment of the Army Military Intelligence School (EsIMEx), subordinate to the Army Chief of Staff. The creation of the school was part of a process, begun in the 1980s, to reformulate the intelligence services. The school presently is situated in Brasilia's Urban Military Sector, and counts among its students intelligence officials from the other two military Services as well as personnel from the highway police. Its teaching faculty is made up entirely of Army officials.

In regard to civil professionalization, we can say that there was a gap in intelligence education during the years that followed the demise of the National Information Service (SNI) in 1990. A new interest in this aspect of professionalization only appeared after 1996, when the information course at the *Escola Superior de Guerra* was again being offered, and debate had resumed, spearheaded by General Alberto Cardoso, about the creation of new intelligence legislation. During the first half of the 1990s, although the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs (SAE) had taken on the functions and the staff of the former General-Secretary of the National Security Council and of the National Information Service, its Human Resources and Training Center (CEFARH), established only in 1993, was not able to turn around the crisis in confidence surrounding the intelligence function. After the official establishment of ABIN in December of 1999, CEFARH was transformed into what is now ABIN's Intelligence School, the main center for professional development of intelligence analysts in the Brazilian government.²²⁴

2. Profile of an Intelligence Career at ABIN

Even though ABIN is not yet supported by the National Congress in terms of its requiring or recognizing an information (or intelligence) analyst career track, the Agency has chosen to value continuous education as the basis for professionalizing personnel until further parameters for career intelligence personnel have been established by law. According to Marisa Del'Isola Diniz, the director of ABIN, the teaching and learning strategies adopted at the Intelligence School are aimed at the production and the preservation of specific knowledge in the organization, the socialization of values, and the acquisition of specific abilities for the individual's ultimate assignment.²²⁵

In ABIN's present structure and in the scope of the proposed intelligence career, two functional personnel categories have been created: the information analyst, which

²²⁴ For more on the experience of CEFARH, see Decree 782, of 25 March 1993.

²²⁵ Marisa Diniz, *Intelligence Seminar*, 2002.

requires a university degree, and the information assistant, for whom a high school diploma is necessary. Some 1,600 individuals will be selected for those functional positions, in accordance with Provisional Act 42, which regulates Intelligence Careers.²²⁶

The selection process has been carried out by ABIN in partnership with the University of Brasilia and is composed of two parts. The first, both classificatory and eliminatory, is divided into three phases: a general knowledge test, an interview, and an individual background investigation.²²⁷ The second part is an Intelligence Familiarization Course that lasts twenty weeks. To pass this course requires a grade of 60 percent. In accordance with item 2 of the edict issued on 24 December 1999 — and the first-ever regulation concerning personnel — the function of an intelligence professional:

involves specialized technical work that demands theoretical-practical instruction in the methodology for obtaining data and producing knowledge; involves the creation of reports that provide follow-up on interconnected issues, and includes research in information networks, interviews in Portuguese and foreign languages, text interpretation and the collection of data through secret techniques and means, with full observance of individual guarantees and rights, and fidelity to institutions and to the ethical principles that guide the interests and the security of the State.²²⁸

In brief, the evaluation of candidates during the selection phase focuses on: analyzing the capacity to do research, reading, analysis and interpretation of texts in Portuguese and other languages, the capacity to elaborate reports, to utilize information networks for communication, to memorize names, concepts and oral and written instructions and, among other things, the capacity to endure the daily working routine, and to perform under pressure and in unpredictable situations.

In the case of candidates who have been selected to take part in the Intelligence Familiarization Course, they have the right to financial aid that corresponds to 50 percent of the initial salary paid to the employees of the Brazilian Federal Public Service who have a university graduation. Candidates may be expelled from the Familiarization Course if they commit serious disciplinary breaches, show themselves to be incompatible with what is expected of them, exceed the absenteeism limit (15 percent), have low grades in any of

²²⁶ Candidates who hold a university degree may have graduated in any academic field and, in addition to general and specific topical knowledge, they must also have proficiency in at least one foreign language.

²²⁷ It is required that the candidate give authorization to have his background investigated. This investigation will only be carried out if the candidate is approved through the second phase of the selection process. This second phase is made up of a personal questionnaire, and the review of official documents: negative criminal and civil records maintained in the candidate's residential region in the previous five years, as well as negative records from the Federal and Military Justice Ministry and a personal declaration made by the candidate stating that he/she is not the subject of any police inquiry at either the state or national level.

²²⁸ Edict 1/99 - AI/SI, of 24 December 1999.

the subjects of the Course or reveal physical inability for the thorough fulfillment of curriculum requirements. The final grade in the Course is the average obtained during the Intelligence Familiarization Course.

In the selection carried out in December of 1999, according to the information provided by ABIN, there were 9,064 candidates for 120 vacancies, but in the following year this number increased to 10,546 candidates for 61 vacancies. By the end of the Familiarization Course, there was a 20 percent completion rate among selected candidates, a rate that, according to the Ministry of Planning, is within the norms for the federal professional employee selection process in Brazil.

As an analysis made by the board of directors of ABIN points out, the candidates approved through the selection process can be divided into three groups. The first is made up of people who are simply looking for a job and a salary. The second group includes people who have sought information on the intelligence analyst profession before the selection process, for the purpose of being well prepared. The third group, in contrast to those in the second group, consists of those who know nothing about the intelligence area, but who have tried to adapt themselves to the requirements of the new profession.²²⁹

In regard to the analysts approved in the selection process, Professor Marisa Diniz points out that most of them are 25 or 26 years old, but ages range from 23 years to 60 years. The older candidates are those who, above all, are looking for stability, and usually are people with no background in the intelligence area. The youngest, most of them with no clue about intelligence, bring value to the Agency due to their university education. An important contribution of those young candidates is in the technology fields, as there has been a major deficit in the technical capability of Agency personnel, since the early 1990s.

Personnel data provided by the Agency show that there has been an increase in the number of women in the Agency. In 1999, ABIN had 299 women in its staff, representing 24.51 percent of all analysts. In 2002, there were 480 women, accounting for 27.08 percent of ABIN's intelligence analysts.²³⁰

In addition to the young university graduates who are recruited and hired with no previous experience in the field of intelligence, "reformed" military intelligence officials are also brought on. The hiring of these former military personnel is meant to fill gaps that are unique to intelligence. The view is that these individuals, who have gone through an entire

²²⁹ Interview with Professor Marisa Diniz, August 2002.

²³⁰ The pressures exerted toward the professionalization of intelligence activity come not only from different sectors of society and the parliament but also from the public employees themselves. In April 2002, the Agency Employees Association (ASBIN) was created and in October of that same year had two-thirds of the active employees as members. According to ASBIN, the discussion in the National Congress of a process to create a Career Plan had not been discussed with the employees and that fact raised ABIN's analysts' awareness of the need to have an association for the administrative and legal defense of those professionals' interests.

military career, including the Army Staff Course, will bring value to strategic analysis due to their analytical skills.

In regard to budget-related matters, the remuneration offered to ABIN employees is lower than that of many other categories of State personnel, and that has led to the loss of some recently selected young candidates. That meant the loss of specific public investment, besides the lack of continuity in the process of formation of new staff and of the renewal of the old staff, even to the point of jeopardizing security.²³¹

One means of resolving this salary gap is to leave open some leeway for negotiation, in accordance with rules set by the Ministry of Planning. For example, one tactic makes it possible to supplement the minimum monthly salary with a bonus of up to 50 percent, granted according to the employee's performance and his/her qualifications obtained in courses.

The Career Plan established by Provisional Act 42 (remembering that this Act has not yet been approved by the National Congress as this essay was written) defines the educational and promotion criteria for the intelligence career, and also addresses the concerns of those who retire from ABIN. The plan for career development rests on job progression and promotions. The initial education of analysts in the field of intelligence is through the Profession Familiarization Course. This course is oriented toward candidates who hold a university degree, and is meant to qualify them for specific functions and to provide them with the chance to begin to adopt the values essential to the career. The three years that follow the introductory course correspond to the mandatory training in which the analyst must be approved so as to become a part of the Agency's staff and to share the stability it represents. He/she is subjected to a specific evaluation and approval, which leads to his/her first functional advancement. The proposal of the Career Plan is that, after eight years of formation, the analyst goes through a Post-Qualifying Course. However, participation in this course will be subject to an internal selection process, and it requires that the candidate has demonstrated success in a post at ABIN. After a period of seven years, the analysts who pass through the Post-Qualification Course can take part in the Advanced Course. This course is aimed at the preparation of the analyst to formulate strategic analysis of the highest level, "including the strategic management of intelligence for the sake of the security of the State and of the society."²³²

The performance of information analysts and assistants is evaluated periodically and, depending on their performance, they do or do not receive a Performance Bonus in

²³¹ After the publication of Provisional Act 42 (25 June 2002), seven analysts resigned their posts.

²³² According to an interview given by the director of the Intelligence School, Colonel José Olavo Coimbra de Castro, the Post-Qualification and Advanced Courses would be considered by ABIN, respectively, as equivalent to a master's and doctoral degree, *stricto sensu*. To achieve equivalence *latu sensu* (by extension), students who take post-graduate courses at the School, following the order of the Agency's General Director, will have to declare a disciplinary specialization to have those courses count toward a degree. After the process of incorporation of such arrangements into the career plan, the analysts will take a complementary course focused on issues of interest to the intelligence field. See article 5, clause III, Provisional Act 42.

the Information Group (GDAGI). The specific criteria and procedures used in this evaluation are promulgated by ABIN's General Director him/herself. There is an individual evaluation and an institutional evaluation. In accordance with article 13 of Provisional Act 42, those bonuses will later be part of retirement and other pensions depending on the average of points received by the employee in the previous sixty months of activity. Another bonus they have the right to is the Intelligence Complementary Bonus (GCI), available to information analysts and assistants who perform certain types of duties related to their position in ABIN's units. It is worth mentioning that it is forbidden to any career professional to perform any other kind of activity, paid or not paid, due to the nature of this occupation.

As a way to assure the return of the investments made in the professionalization of its analysts, the Agency forbids the transfer of its career members to any other organ of the public administration, at any level, during a period of ten years. The only possible exception occurs when the transfer provides outstanding value for the State and the society. Another way to avoid investment loss is to oblige the Agency's employees to reimburse the Treasury for what was spent on his professional development, both in Brazil and abroad, in case an employee seeks to be discharged or resigns before a period of the same length covered by the investment has passed by, in the same way as reimbursement of investment must be made to the State in the case of the professional development of university researchers.

Although the quality and the effectiveness of the educational processes inside ABIN are not known, the organizational expectations manifested by ABIN itself suggest that the professional preparation through those courses has as a purpose to prepare information analysts for the planning, execution, coordination and control of the production of intelligence knowledge that interests the State for the safeguard of issues considered sensitive, and for other research activities and scientific and technological development.²³³

3. Education of the Intelligence Staff at ABIN

One of the main challenges faced by ABIN's Intelligence School has been precisely to bring feasibility to the education of its projected 1,600 new public employees, and a special effort is underway to qualify the analysts who hold a university degree. This is considered one of the greatest needs of the Agency, according to the present Director of the Intelligence School.²³⁴

The education of intelligence professionals at the ABIN School tries to emphasize the methods and techniques that develop specific abilities in the employees, and that complement academic knowledge already acquired by these personnel. This development of operational techniques does not apply, according to information provided by the Agency, to "tactical knowledge" (an expression used to refer to the search for operational information utilized by the police); instead, the methodology is used just for the production of

²³³ Article 29 of Provisional Act 42.

²³⁴ Interview given by Colonel Castro, Director of ABIN's Intelligence School.

strategic knowledge with the purpose to orient or re-orient public policies. In this teaching and learning process, the employee's ability to analyze certain information is valued, as well as is the capacity to summarize it, to think logically, and the capacity to work under pressure, and to remain loyal and carry out responsibilities. These are requirements that are being observed from the beginning of the selection process.

The curriculum at the Intelligence School is considered secret, and only those directly involved are familiar with it. According to Agency officials, ABIN does not make its curriculum public because the courses are not open to the public in general. However, the information obtained by the authors makes it possible to divide the courses into two areas. The first set of courses is related to methodological matters typical of intelligence, and the second set is made up of general knowledge courses, among them foreign languages. From what can be inferred, only the specific courses in the intelligence area undergo systematic evaluation, and the general knowledge courses are given by means of lectures. Instructors in courses that are specific to intelligence are all employees of the school, whereas general knowledge courses are presented by instructors invited by the Agency, many times through agreements with other institutions.

There is a noticeably high level of participation by professors from the University of Brasilia in ABIN's school, and that is justified by the agreement made between this University located in the Federal District and ABIN's Central Agency. One specific and rather important contribution of the University of Brasilia to the Agency is in the development of new pedagogical resources for the teaching and learning process. Together with the University, ABIN has been developing distance-education methods, trying to broaden its teaching process to the whole of the national territory. This approach helps to meet the need for continuing education in intelligence and lowers the always-increasing costs of education. Other innovations employed by the Agency are "case studies," the formulation of scenarios, and the development of courses that simulate reality as a way to prepare for situations that analysts face in their daily working routine.²³⁵

A number of institutions devoted to the formation of professions for the federal administration (among them the Advanced School of Treasury Administration and the National School of Public Administration, to note two examples) collaborate with the professionalization process at ABIN. In the case of the *Escola Superior de Guerra*, there is even an exchange on a regular basis, and so some instructors from ABIN's Intelligence School instruct in the Advanced Strategic Intelligence course at ESG.

ABIN also promotes symposia and gives courses to private and public companies about how to protect sensitive information, as occurs with the Financial Intelligence Course at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, as well as in a course given at the National Council of Attorneys General.²³⁶

²³⁵ Brazilian Intelligence Agency, October of 2002.

²³⁶ Interview given by Colonel Castro.

4. Values and perceptions of Intelligence Professionals in Brazil

In terms of values, the preliminary results of an international survey administered to 47 permanent high-level employees of ABIN show a significant consistency between the values considered to be desirable and the values they indicate as being presently experienced in the organization. Respondents included 25 managers, 12 senior analysts and 10 intelligence analysts selected in the past seven years.

The survey asked about the type of professional needed (in terms of personal qualities, attitudes, capacities and intellectual abilities), and also about the products of intelligence (nature of the information, kinds of problems) and the status of the profession (profile of tasks, degree of institutionalization, relations between decisionmakers and analysts). Although the large number of variables resulting from this research (373) will require a more thorough analysis than possible at this time, a greater perceptual distance between “where intelligence professionals are” compared with where they “should be” was noticed in the group of questions about the status of the profession in comparison to the other groups of questions. A greater perceived distance between “where we are” and “where we should be” was also evident among younger analysts than among senior analysts and managers in regard to personal qualities and attitudes expected of intelligence professionals, perhaps reflecting the idealism common to younger professionals.

In general, these results are also consistent with the hopes and expectations that Brazilian intelligence managers have for the role to be played in the professionalization process by a Code of Ethics. In the words of General Alberto Cardoso, ex-chief-minister of the Institutional Security Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Brazil, “the code of ethics is an aid to the intelligence professional who has feelings of doubt about personal attitudes — whether their attitude is “right,” whether it fits into what the entire society believes as the proper thing to do, in terms of timeliness, impartiality...”²³⁷

Among the values pointed out as desirable by the managers we find not only the performance of lawful duties, tasks and responsibilities, as required of federal public employees, but also the duty to practice “intelligence” with sound judgment, security awareness, and impartiality. These respondents also see intrinsic value in the search for truth as a basic element of analyst behavior, expect discretion when employees deal with issues related to work, and they presuppose that professionals will not make use of the information they have access to as public agents for private purposes. These expressions of behavioral expectations on the part of intelligence professionals of the Brazilian government imply their *adoption* of a group of beliefs and values that guide attitudes and behaviors, contributing to the necessary confidence in personal and professional actions, even after they retire or leave intelligence service.

Considering that respondents to the survey had on average spent 17 years in the intelligence field as of October 2002, the degree of cohesion around the values expressed by ABIN managers seems to be rather meaningful. Naturally a more refined statistical

²³⁷ Interview given by General Cardoso on 1 August 2002.

assessment of the differences among the different categories of individuals and/or groups of issues will be necessary so as to qualify this initial perception. We expect to explore further not only the magnitude but also the direction of the differences that appear in terms of how various aspects of intelligence “are” perceived to be, compared to how they “should be.”

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The dual conclusion of this essay is optimistic: Intelligence is coming to be professionalized at what we may consider the international level, and trends in the professionalization of governmental intelligence in Brazil are positive.

However, this second part of the conclusion should not be accepted uncritically. We must remember that ABIN’s Career Plan has not been passed by the National Congress, that the internal Code of Ethics is not yet in effect, that the mechanisms of external control still are very precarious, and so there is still a “long way to go.” Of course many of these areas of potential improvement depend on political and administrative decisions taken by the President and the National Congress, but this is precisely why we believe that the Brazilian intelligence services should concentrate on professional development in areas that depend less on external resources and decisions; namely, reforming and strengthening training and education systems.

Besides requiring more time to come into its own, the professionalization of intelligence activities in Brazil still depends on what goes on in the armed forces and in the police forces, and not only on what takes place at ABIN. In the case of the military and police sub-systems, almost nothing about the criteria and the indicators that have been discussed in this text is known. We hope that the Mixed Commission for the Control of Intelligence Activities (CCAI) at the Brazilian National Congress can soon return to this issue and contribute decisively in the coming years to the improvement of intelligence professionalization in the Brazilian government.

Although intelligence activity is still a function with problematic *status* in the police and armed forces in Brazil, since the mid-1990s a process of re-evaluation and revision of this function in many national agencies has been joined. As an example, since 1995 there has been a public selection process to recruit intelligence analysts that today form a significant part of the ABIN staff. The public selection process incorporates a background investigation that clearly demonstrates the concern for integrity in this governmental career. Another aspect that demands attention is the discussion of personnel promotion mechanisms that begin to incorporate criteria based on merit, rather than just time on the job. Finally, an indicator that could point to the professionalization of intelligence activity in Brazil would be the legal establishment of an “information analyst” career, currently under discussion in the National Congress. This indicator, once in place, would go far toward signaling that intelligence exists as a profession in Brazil.

To sum up, there is a lot to be done if the aim is to produce in Brazil the kind of synergy between rules and institutions that could guarantee a greater relevance to intelligence

in governmental decisionmaking processes, specifically in the areas of foreign policy, national defense and public order — a kind of synergy that Robert Jervis claimed for the North American case more than fifteen years ago.²³⁸

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²³⁸ Robert Jervis, "Improving the Intelligence Process: Informal Norms and Incentives," *Intelligence: Policy & Process*, James Keagle, Alfred Maurer and Marion Tunstall, eds. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 113-124.