Bosses and Gatekeepers: A Network Analysis of South America's Intelligence Systems

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Comparing intelligence services meets three recurrent challenges. Getting to know what is unique about specific organizations in different countries is always a powerful research driver. The general preference, then, is for insightful descriptive case studies. Second, the intricacy of the international security context and its dual level dynamics tend to drive off comparative studies. Third, the legal and practical impediments for researching organizations with secrecy and deception as constitutive features make evidence-based comparative assessments difficult. Indeed, intelligence might well be an odd subject for comparatists. Nonetheless, intelligence systems in different countries do undertake a similar set of missions and functions. They vary in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy according to the institutional history, political culture, and relative power and wealth of each country.[1] Hence,

> In its way, intelligence is a subject especially well-suited to comparative analysis. Unlike many areas of government, which may depend on

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> profoundly different basic forms of social organization, the various
> functions and principal logical components or steps of intelligence field
> tend to provide a relatively common set of activities that can be identified
> and differing implementations that can be examined methodically. In its
> way, intelligence bears a closer resemblance to the study of very concrete
> public policy tasks like road building and national accounts than to
> conceptually subtler issues such as constitutions or judiciaries.[2]

In Latin America, several studies conducted in the past fifteen years have
compared different aspects of the intelligence activity and its
organizations.[3] As part of this collective effort, the organization of the
National Intelligence Systems of six countries of South America are
analyzed here, as are the implications of their varying institutional designs.
The selected countries are Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay,
and Peru. Each country's distinctive way of organizing its National
Intelligence System may indicate greater or lesser adaptability and
resilience in facing current and prospective strategic challenges.

Such strategic challenges are both international and national. The
international security context in South America is best described by strong
U.S. leverage—sustained by considerable force projection capabilities,
combined with a low priority in the U.S. diplomatic agenda. Such
predominance is softly contested. All considered, however, the United
States still significantly beacons economic, political, and ideological
alignments within each country.[4] Since the 1990s the United States has
promoted a security agenda in Latin America that is highly focused on
such issues as drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism.[5] This
doctrinal offering (a "'gendarmization' of the armies, militarization of the
police forces")[6] meets a demand in a region where high levels of violent
crime are prevalent and the incidence of inter-state wars and militarized
disputes is relatively low. In contrast, the diplomatic agenda remains in
flux and disputed, but since 2000 it has been focused primarily on the
construction of a Union of South American Nations.[7] In recent years,
political tensions and the international economic crisis, as well as an
uncertainty about the overall regional security framework, have combined
to increase the requirements of an improved analytical quality and
strategic sense for the National Intelligence Systems.[8]

These internal challenges are, in turn, of two complementary varieties. The
first deals with a continuation of the process for overcoming authoritarian
regimes and the improvement of accountability.[9] Since the late 1980s a
crucial aspect of this effort has been the attempt to improve civil-military
relations. The legal and administrative restructuring of the region's
defense, security, and intelligence apparatuses has repeatedly revolved
around issues of legitimacy.[10] The 2000s have brought an increasing

complementary concern about the collection effectiveness, managerial efficiency, and analytical quality of the intelligence communities of the different countries.[11]

INTELLIGENCE AND POWER

Peter Gill and Mark Phythian have offered a definition of intelligence as being simultaneously the production of specialized knowledge and a form of power exercise.[12] If intelligence is an important instrument through which nation states, private firms, and various groups obtain security and maximize relative gains, its study as a social phenomenon must also take into account how power is distributed among the various organizations, groups, and individuals that make up a contemporary National Intelligence System.[13] In fact, this background issue emerges whenever discussions develop about tensions between collectors and analysts, managers and policymakers, or intelligence personnel and their external overseers.[14]

Therefore, intelligence systems can be defined as networks composed of nodes (organizations) and links (hierarchical relationships and information flows).[15] Also, a relational concept of power is here adopted. This takes into account positional resources (wealth, weapons, people, knowledge, reputation, etc.), but the asymmetries in terms of authority and information control are assumed here to be paramount.[16] As Thomas Bruneau has warned, "It is hard to be definitive about anything beyond their formal structures."[17] Network Analysis is here employed to go one explanatory step beyond the description of such formal structures.

To accomplish that, three questions will be answered by comparing the cases of Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia.[18] They are: (1) How are the National Intelligence Systems organized in the six countries? (2) How is power distributed among specific organizations in each National Intelligence System? and (3) What are the implications of a given distribution of power to the system's overall organizational risk?[19]

To describe each system, three types of organizations were considered: supervising (government), coordinating (collegiate bodies), and executing (agencies).[20] To evaluate power distribution (who are the bosses and the gatekeepers?), both authority relations (Degree Centrality Index–DCI) and the control over information flows (Betweenness Centrality Index–BCI) were observed for each organization in any given country.[21] To estimate organizational risk caused by the difficulty to adapt, two additional indexes of centralization are used, but this time for the national system as a whole. The closer to zero (0.00), the more resilient, or less prone to fragmentation is a network. Likewise, the closer to zero (0.00), the better the information is distributed. One important caveat is the fact that being more resilient can also mean being less able to adapt to new strategic

challenges. But the closer to one (1.00) in terms of Betweenness Centralization, the higher the risk that a single node organization can retain all the information (gatekeeper).[22]

ARGENTINA

Argentina's National Intelligence System includes nine supervising organizations, no collegiate body for coordination, and nine intelligence agencies. The main legal basis is Law 27,126/2015, which amended the National Intelligence Law (25,520/2001), creating the Federal Intelligence Agency. Also relevant for intelligence are the National Defense Law (23,554/1988) and the Interior Security Law (24,059/1992).[23]

In terms of authority, the President (16.97) is the central node. The *Ministerio de Defensa,* another key element, formally subordinates the Armed Forces and the *Direccion Nacional de Inteligencia Estrategica Militar* (7.62), thereby forming a military-related intelligence cluster. The *Ministerio de Seguridad* subordinates the *Direccion Nacional de Inteligencia Criminal* (3.38), but only through the *Secretaria de Seguridad* (4.24). Finally, the *Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos* subordinates the *Unidad de Información Financiera* (2.51).[24]

As for the control of information flow, the *Direccion Nacional de Inteligencia Estrategica Militar* (DNIEM) (11.60) shows the highest index in the system. Two factors may explain this. First, the DNIEM coordinates intelligence agencies of the military cluster. Second, it also intermediates the relations between that cluster and such government authorities as the *Ministerio de la Defensa* (7.29). The new *Agencia Federal de Inteligencia* (5.24) has a relatively low level of control over the information running throughout the system, probably a direct result of what Eduardo Estévez has called a "sequence of tribulations and improvements." In this situation, the President (5.47) does not stand out as a potential gatekeeper.

Three overlapping processes explain the current configuration of Argentina's intelligence system. The first is a decisive but punctuated process of strengthening civilian power since the last transition towards democracy back in 1983.[25] The second relevant process is Argentina's engagement in South America's integration process since the prolonged economic crisis began in 2001. The third is the continuing struggle to reduce politicization and to increase coordination and legitimacy throughout the intelligence system. Whether the last attempt, the 2015 reforms authorized by Cristina Kirchner shortly before the end of her presidential term, will contribute to the third process remains to be determined. These elements reflect Argentina's uniqueness in South America in terms of a clear distinction between national (strategic) and departmental (defense or criminal) intelligence, at least in legal terms. That seems

consistent with the centralization indexes obtained in the study (see Table 1), mainly because, although systemic roles of the President and the DNIEM are prominent, they are neither sufficiently dominant as bosses or gatekeepers to be able to retain all relevant information.

CHILE

Chile's National Intelligence System includes seven supervising organizations, two collegiate coordination bodies, and ten intelligence agencies.[26] The Chilean system underwent its last major reorganization in 2004, with Law 19,074. Back then the *Agencia Nacional de Inteligencia* (ANI) was established as a successor to the *Dirección de Seguridad Pública y Informaciones* (DISPI). The reform process in Chile, begun in 2001 in the aftermath of the 11 September terrorist attacks in United States, sought to increase coordination and centralization in the intelligence system.[27]

As in Argentina, Chile's President (13.87) is the central node of the intelligence system with regard to authority. Two ministries also stand out: the *Ministerio de Defensa Nacional* (MDN) (7.33) and the *Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Public* (MISP) (9.01). Even more central are the *Dirección de Inteligencia de Defensa* (DID) (8.22) and the *Estado Mayor Conjunto* (EMCO) (9.81). Those results indicate the influence of the armed forces in the system and the importance of both clusters (military and constabulary). Compared to them, the *Agencia Nacional de Inteligencia* (ANI) has a Degree Centrality Index of just 3.27, mainly because, despite having a system-coordinating role, it does not exercise direct authority over other units in the system.

In terms of information control, the MDN shows the highest index among all organizations examined in the six countries (31.58) primarily because this ministry connects the military cluster to the rest of the system. Another highlighted ministry, the MISP (10.02), fulfills the same role as the MDN, but for the police intelligence cluster. In fact, the *Policia de Investigaciones* (PDI) shows a Betweenness Centrality of 15.45, due to its strong role in combatting drug trafficking and its intense exchange of information with other components in the intelligence network. Finally, the ANI's Betweenness Centrality (6.11) is significantly lower than those of the others, indicating its inability to operate as a strong gatekeeper for the entire system.

Chile's National Intelligence System exhibits the most stable configuration in the study. Two main features define the system. First, the strong influence of the military, especially the Army. Second is its tendency towards insularity, whether civilian or military agencies are concerned.[28] Both features help to explain why no overall authority controls the system. The President's Degree Centrality is higher when compared with other elements, but not enough to describe him as an overarching boss. In addition, the two features affect the

Table 1. National Intelligence Systems in South America

Country	Unit types			Unit indexes				Network indexes	
	SUP	COO	AGE	Highest degree centralities		Highest betweenness centralities		Degree centralization	Betweenness centralization
				Unit	Value	Unit	Value		
AR	9	0	9	PR	16.97	DNIEM	11.60	0.148	0.167
CH	7	2	10	PR	13.87	MDN	31.58	0.109	0.224
CO	9	2	7	PR	19.39	PR/MD/CGFM	16.72	0.189	0.083
EC	7	2	6	PR	30.93	SENAIN	16.77	0.280	0.050
PA	8	2	10	PR/CCFFAA	14.46	SNI	21.14	0.140	0.161
PE	9	2	9	PR	17.20	PNP	13.12	0.152	0.177

Source: Authors.

dynamics of the information flow controls. In this sense, the MDN is a potential gatekeeper, due to high levels of information control exerted by the military intelligence agencies. Chile has been able to sustain a stable democratic political system since the 1990s, one to which the intelligence system is part and parcel. But even so, in such areas as intelligence, Chilean democracy still features feeble external control mechanisms.[29] Considering the Centralization Index aspect (see Table 1), the Chilean intelligence system would likely experience difficulty in adapting to a major contextual change in its security environment.

COLOMBIA

Colombia's National Intelligence System includes nine supervising organizations, two collegiate bodies for coordination, and seven intelligence agencies. In 2013, the enactment of Law 1,621 established the legal framework for the country's intelligence and counterintelligence activities.[30]

Regarding authority relations, as elsewhere the President (19.39) plays a central role in the system. In turn, the *Ministerio de la Defensa* (12.95) is another relevant government organization considering the authority dynamics, since it subordinates the military and police structures. In this sense, its privileged position comes from the centrality of the *Comando General de las Fuerzas Militares de Colombia* (10.48) and the *Dirección General de la Policía Nacional* (4.87). While the military cluster comprises four government organizations and four agencies, the police cluster includes only one government bureau and one agency. Notably, the least central organization is the *Unidad de Información y Análisis Financiero* (1.65), which is subordinate to the *Ministerio de la Hacienda* (4.04).[31]

The flow of information is controlled by three organizations: the President (16.72), the *Ministerio de la Defensa* (16.72), and the *Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Militares* (16.72), thereby reinforcing the importance of the military cluster in the intelligence system. The *Dirección General de la Policía Nacional* (DGPN) is another important stakeholder (13.88) mainly because it is responsible for maintaining communications between military and security forces.[32] Finally, despite their coordinating roles, both the *Junta de Inteligencia Conjunta* (JIC, 4.42) and the *Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia* (DNI, 4.10) show a relatively low level of information control. The DNI was established in 2011–2013 to replace the country's infamous *Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad* (DAS).[33]

The current structure of Colombia's National Intelligence System reflects a long process of combating internal threats (i.e., armed groups, illegal drug trafficking), as well as the waxing and waning influence of the United States over the years. As in Argentina, complaints about politicization and

wrongdoings by the main intelligence agencies are recurrent. Noteworthy is the large scale of the 2009 intelligence crisis during President Alvaro Uribe's second term, in contrast with the reform process implemented by President Juan Manuel Santos from 2011 to 2013.[34] The reforms have tried to reduce politicization by increasing the President's institutional authority and control of the information flow. But, at least in terms of information control, the military intelligence cluster continues to stand out. The extent to which the current negotiations between the Colombian government and the country's armed revolutionary groups will alter the strategic context of the intelligence system remains to be determined.[35] So far, no overall gatekeeper has been established and the main leadership according to Law 1,621/2013 remains with the President.

ECUADOR

The National Intelligence System in Ecuador comprises seven supervising organizations, two collegiate bodies for coordination, and six intelligence agencies.[36] In 2008, following the Angostura case, a restructuring process oriented towards democratization and more effectiveness was put in place.[37] Decree No. 1,768/2009 extensively reformed the organizational, doctrinal, and legal frameworks of the country's intelligence services. It created the *Secretaría Nacional de Inteligencia* (SENAIN) and the National Intelligence System, changing its focus towards a new approach derived from a citizens' security perspective.[38] As per Article 5 of the Decree No. 1,768/2009, the system comprises the SENAIN, along with the subsystems of military intelligence, police intelligence, as well as the financial intelligence unit (UAF), the Presidential Protection Service (SPP), and the Presidential internal security office (UGSI/PR), among others.[39]

Concerning authority relations, the Ecuadorian system is comparatively more centered on the President (30.93) than those of the other five countries. The main intelligence agency (SENAIN, 5.98) has considerably less centrality than the President, to whom it is subordinated. The *Ministerio Coordinador de Seguridad* (MICS, 3.59) has a coordinating role over security matters, including the SENAIN.[40] Noteworthy also are the relatively low centrality indexes of the *Ministerio del Interior* (8.28), that subordinates the *Policia Nacional* and its directorate of intelligence, and the *Ministerio de Defensa Nacional* (8.28), which subordinates the *Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas*. Since 2010, the intelligence branches of the Navy, Army, and Air Force have been combined into a unified *Comando de Inteligencia Militar Conjunto* (COIMC).[41] But the important *Unidad de Análisis Financiero* (UAF) is not directly linked to any other component of the intelligence system.

In terms of information control, the *Secretaria Nacional de Inteligencia* (SENAIN, 16.77) is the system's most central organization, closely followed by the *Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas* (15.16). The President has the third highest index (13.55), with the *Ministerio Coordinador de Seguridad* (MICS, 11.94) next in line. In a sense, the network centrality of the President and the SENAIN are inverted when moving from authority relations to the exchange of information. By statute, the SENAIN is legally the central organ of the *Sistema Nacional de Inteligencia* established in 2009. And, as in Colombia, there is no single intelligence gatekeeper in Ecuador.

In 2008, the Ecuadorian government created a commission to investigate military and police intelligence wrongdoings after the so-called *Operación Montecristi* (domestic spying on the National Constituent Assembly) incident.[42] The following year, motivated by the Angostura case, President Rafael Correa created the Commission on Transparency and Truth. Its final report was issued in 2010, after the initiation of the reorganization of the intelligence and security sectors. The police rebellion that physically threatened President Correa on 30 September 2010 was a significant watershed. In its aftermath came the enhanced role of the military intelligence in preserving the public order and state security.[43] The modernization of a longstanding and very problematic (in many senses) intelligence system, though proven to be difficult, has so far not been interrupted.

PARAGUAY

Paraguay's National Intelligence System includes eight supervising organizations, two collegiate bodies for coordination, and ten intelligence agencies. The system was established by Law 5,241/2014.[44] This was the first law enacted to specifically address the country's intelligence activities. Along with the Decree 2,812/2014, it established a formal *Sistema Nacional de Inteligencia* (SINAI) and the *Secretaría Nacional de Inteligencia* (SNI). This process, earlier initiated by President Fernando Lugo (2008–2012), was concluded during Horacio Cartes's term (2013–), but only after the political crisis that followed the parliamentary coup that ousted Lugo.[45]

The new organizational structure seems to place the President (14.46) and the *Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas* (14.46) as the central authorities in the SINAI. The President directly oversees the SNI, as well as the *Secretaría de Prevención de Lavado de Dinero o Bienes* (SEPRELAD), and the *Secretaría Nacional Antidrogas* (SENAD). Besides those agencies with intelligence roles, the President is also in charge of the supervising organizations, including the *Ministerio del Interior* (MI), the *Ministerio de Defensa Nacional* (MDN), and the *Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas* (CCFFAA). In turn, the CCFFAA exercises a certain level of

authority over the military intelligence agencies, which are also subordinate to the Navy, Army, and Air Force commands. Finally, concerning public security, the MI oversees its own intelligence agency (*Dirección de Inteligencia*, DIMI) as well as the police cluster, meaning the *Policía Nacional* (PN) and its agencies *Departamento de Inteligencia* (DIPN), and *Secretaría de Prevención e Investigación del Terrorismo* (SEPRINTE).[46]

The SNI (21.14) is the central organization in the information flow throughout the SINAI. According to Law 5,241/2014, the SNI coordinates the system and presides over the *Consejo Nacional de Inteligencia* (CNI). Likewise, the *Consejo de Defensa Nacional* (CDN) is the second most central intermediary. According to Law 1,337/1997, its membership consists of the President, the Ministry of National Defense (MDN), the Ministry of Interior (MI), the Ministry of External Affairs (MRE), the SNI, the CCFFAA, and the most senior general of the armed forces.[47] The CNI (7.72) is not as central as the CDN because its membership is more restricted, and the SNI index is already significantly high.

The current Paraguayan National Intelligence System emerged slowly after the end of the Alfredo Stroessner dictatorship in 1989.[48] As its legal basis is too recent (2014), any assessment about the distribution of power among the units comprising the formal SINAI structure is necessarily provisional. Since the United States decisively influences the security sector in Paraguay and its threat perceptions, the assumption is that resources and power are likely to follow accordingly. From the American standpoint, the main threats in Paraguay would seem to be terrorism (Triple Border) and narcotrafficking, as well as organized crime involving counterfeiting, money laundering, and smuggling.[49] Nonetheless, the *Secretaría Nacional Antidrogas* (SENAD),[50] the *Secretaría de Prevención de Lavado de Dinero o Bienes* (SEPRELAD),[51] and the *Secretaría de Prevención e Investigación del Terrorismo* (SEPRINT)[52] are not characterized by significant indexes of either authority or betweenness (information control). In this regard, even the President cannot be considered an all-commanding boss. In terms of information control, the SNI's position is higher, but not up to a point where it could be considered a true gatekeeper.

PERU

Peru's National Intelligence System includes nine supervising organizations, two collegiate bodies, and nine intelligence agencies. The legal basis for the current formal structure of the *Sistema Nacional de Inteligencia* (SINA), the *Consejo Nacional de Inteligencia* (COIN), and the *Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia* (DINI) as its central agency was provided by Legislative Decree 1,141/2012.[53] The DINI was a successor to the intelligence service disbanded in 2000 led by Vladimiro Montesinos, who had used the service

to oppress the public and engage in corruption during the administration of Alberto Fujimori, who served from 1990–2000. The difficult institutionalization process of intelligence under Peru's new democratic regime was vividly exemplified by the shutdown of DINI in February 2015.[54] At that time the president of the Council of Ministries announced the temporary closure (for 180 days) of the agency in order to seek restructuration and transparency.[55]

Concerning the distribution of authority, here again the President (17.20) has the highest centrality. Notably, an explicit aim of the 2006 reforms was to reduce the President's direct power over the intelligence system in order to curb the risks of politicization. Indeed, the presidential power in Peru is now similar to that of other countries in the region (with the exception of Ecuador). The *Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas* (CCFFAA, 10.16) and the *Ministerio de la Defensa* (MD, 8.55), as might be expected, are important nodes in terms of authority. Both have links with the Armed Forces and their military intelligence agencies, the *Segunda División del* CCFFAA (J2), and the *Dirección de Inteligencia* of the Navy, Army, and Air Force (DIM, DIE, DIFAP, respectively).[56] As in other countries, the Peruvian intelligence system features a powerful military cluster. While this research did not include the lower levels of the police structure in any country, the existence in Peru of both the *Dirección General de Inteligencia del Ministerio del Interior* (2.31) and the *Dirección de Inteligencia de la Policía Nacional* (2.31) seems to indicate the presence of a police intelligence cluster. Also very relevant and consistent with other countries' institutional development is the *Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera* (UIF). An autonomous body similar to the one in Ecuador, its Centrality Index is therefore not significant.[57]

In contrast with those of other nations, the Peruvian system is the only one where a component from the police cluster (the *Policía Nacional*, 13.12) has the highest control of information flow. Also important in controlling information exchanges is the *Ministerio del Interior* (8.89), to which the national police reports. In turn, the *Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia* (6.40) has a relatively low control of information flow, a largely unexpected result given its formal role as the system's main intelligence agency. According to Legislative Decree 1,141/2012, the *Consejo de Inteligencia Nacional* (11.35) has only a consultative role, meaning that, although composed of representatives of the established agencies, it is not a supervising organization. Notably, Peru includes at least one office from its Foreign Ministry in the intelligence system. Actually, both the *Ministerio de las Relaciones Exteriores* (10.25) and its *Dirección General de Asuntos Multilaterales y Globales* (11.09) have important positions in terms of controlling information flow. Also noteworthy is that none of the military cluster components appears with a relevant index, indicating the need for additional research.

The Peruvian National Intelligence System has experienced an almost continuous institutional crisis since the end of Fujimori's authoritarian government. After the dismantlement of the *Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional* (SIN), a new intelligence system slowly emerged in response to recurrent scandals and many instances of politicization.[58] Even after the publication of Law 28,664 in January 2006, the feebleness of the new SINA was evidenced by vestiges of the DINI's lack of strategic analysis capabilities, low legitimacy, and the many legacies from the past. In contrast, the military and police intelligence components seem to have been more stable throughout this period, but they also tend to be more operationally and tactically oriented. The Peruvian case vividly demonstrates the limits of a strict institutionalist approach, since the formal features of the intelligence system are the same as those found in other South American countries. Organizational culture and informal operational rules might help to explain this, but they are not the focus here.[59] What can be said for sure is that Montesinos and Fujimori, acting within the context of a fierce counterinsurgency campaign against the Shining Path, made extensive use of the civilian intelligence service for political and personal purposes. One result of this misuse was to have damaged the reputation of the country's national intelligence service and made it seemingly beyond repair until recently.[60]

Finally, a summary of the results obtained in the six cases is found in Table 1.

CONTINUED REFORMATION NECESSARY

This survey aimed at answering questions relating to three aspects of national intelligence systems in South America: organization, distribution of power, and the implications of both.

After examining the situations in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru, the findings can be summarized as follows: (1) South American intelligence systems tend to be organized around two semi-autonomous clusters (military, police) and an emergent intelligence capability (financial). All countries have a nominal central agency subordinated to each country's presidency. Four out of the six countries have experienced major intelligence reorganizations within the last five years. (2) Consequently, power inside the intelligence systems is divided between the President (authority) and the organizations controlling each cluster (information flow). (3) The overall organizational risk is moderate in the cases of Argentina and Colombia. The system-wide levels of authority concentration and information control in Paraguay and Ecuador are similar to those of their respective neighbors Argentina and Colombia, despite significant differences at the unit level. Measured by the actual record of recurrent crises, the overall organizational risk in the case of

Peru is the highest among the countries examined. Authority and information centralization indexes cannot explain that risk due to their similarity to those in the other countries. Therefore, additional causes such as organizational culture and the lasting damage produced by the authoritarian period under Fujimori, will have to be factored in. Chile is also an important outlier, due to its featuring the highest levels of information gatekeeping exerted by the military intelligence cluster.

All intelligence reforms attempted since 2000 in the six countries have purposely tried to create National Intelligence Systems compatible with those of democratic political regimes. By creating or bolstering "central" agencies in the system, those reforms have called for a better-coordinated, civilian-led strategic intelligence capability. But the results have been mixed. While the emergence of both police and financial intelligence agencies is probably a positive development, there is a caveat. They tend to reinforce an already excessive orientation towards tactical goals, which might prove detrimental to the development of a more robust analytic, externally-oriented, and strategic concept of intelligence. In fact, the indexes presented here clearly show a clustering tendency (military, police, and financial) of the South American National Intelligence Systems. Although this may be surprising for those promoting the reforms, it seems in line with the reality of intelligence elsewhere. At the moment, legislation and external controls are still relatively few and weak in terms of regulating intelligence-gathering or repressive operations against citizens and residents in each country. The same is true regarding politicization, both from Presidents trying to use the intelligence services and from the intelligence agencies autonomously advancing their own agendas. Even more worrisome is the continuous and controversial engagement of the military intelligence agencies in terms of producing intelligence against "internal enemies." In this sense, what Carlos Maldonado Prieto has called modern dilemmas (*e.g.*, renewed United States meddling, remilitarization, privatization, and failed reforms) remains firmly in place in 2017.

The next round of comparative studies on South American intelligence needs to tackle additional problems. Among them is the inclusion of the other six countries of South America, especially Brazil and Venezuela. Also, more attention should be given to the coordinating (collegiate) bodies. System-wide intelligence councils are present in Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru, but their concrete roles and strength were hard to assess at this time. Likewise, the external control bodies in the legislative, judiciary, and even in the executive branches of government, need to be considered. In Ecuador, despite the 2010 crisis, the media and civil organizations seem to be more aware of the intelligence component in modern democratic governments due to the role played by transparency and external control mechanisms. Next, the potential for effective regional intelligence

cooperation adds another layer for further research.[61] Finally, specific attention should be given to strategic intelligence analysis and how to comparatively assess its quality.

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[1] Comparative efforts in Intelligence Studies have long been required. From Glenn P. Hastedt, "Towards the Comparative Study of Intelligence," *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol. 11, 1991, pp. 55–72, to Gregory F. Treverton and Wilhelm Agrell, *National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) and many others, the prospects of a more robust intelligence theory have been linked to comparative endeavors. See also Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Phythian, *Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates* (New York: Routledge, 2009).

[2] Philip H. J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson, *Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), p. 7.

[3] Examples include, among others, José Manuel Ugarte, *Legislación de Inteligencia: Legitimidad y Eficacia* (Ciudad de Guatemala: WOLA/SEDEM, 2000); Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy, *Profesionalismo de Inteligencia en las Américas* (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College's Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, 2004); Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy, *Democratización de la Función de Inteligencia: El Nexo de la Cultura Nacional y la Inteligencia Estratégica* (Washington, DC: NDIC Press, 2009); Laura Chamorro, *Sistemas de Inteligencia Comparados: Aportes al Caso Peruano* (Lima: IDEPE, 2010); Priscila Brandão, *Serviços Secretos e Democracia no Cone Sul: Premissas para uma Convivência Legítima, Eficiente e Profissional* (Niterói, RJ: Impetus, 2010); José Manuel Ugarte, *Actividad de Inteligencia y Democracia en América Latina* (Madrid: Editorial Académica Española, 2011); Fredy Rivera Vélez, *Inteligencia Estratégica y Prospectiva* (Quito: FLACSO/SENAIN/AECID, 2011); José Manuel Ugarte, "El Ámbito Normativo de la Inteligencia Interior em América Latina," *Varia Historia*, Vol. 28, 2012a, pp. 119–160; Peter Gill, "Alguns Aspectos da Reforma de Inteligência na América Latina," *Varia Historia*, Vol. 28, 2012, pp. 99–118; José Manuel Ugarte. "La Actividad de Inteligencia en América Latina: de las Reformas Formales a las Reformas Reales," *AA inteligencia*, no. 3, Ano 9, 2012b, pp. 06–36; Eduardo E. Estévez, "Comparing Intelligence Democratization in Latin America: Argentina, Peru and Ecuador Cases," *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 4, 2014, pp. 552–580; Marco Cepik and Christiano Ambros, "Intelligence, Crisis and Democracy: Institutional Punctuations in Brazil, Colombia, South Africa and India," *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 4, 2014, pp. 523–551; Russell G. Swenson and Carolina

Sancho Hirane, eds., *Intelligence Management in the Americas* (Washington, DC: NI Press, 2015).

4 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, United States, and the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Monica Hirst, *Understanding Brazil-United States Relations* (Brasília: FUNAG, 2013).

5 Tom Farer, *Transnational Crime in the Americas* (New York: Routledge, 1999); Wolf Grabendorff, *La Seguridad Nacional en las Américas: Enfoques Críticos y Conceptos Alternativos* (Bogotá, DC: FESCOL/Fondo Editorial CEREC, 2003); Marco Cepik and Pedro Borba, "Organized Crime, the State and International Security," *Contexto Internacional*, Vol. 33, 2011, pp. 375–405.

6 We owe this synthetic expression to Fabrício S. Ávila.

7 David R. Mares, *Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Rafael D. Villa and Maria del P. Ostos, "As Relações Colômbia, Países Vizinhos e Estados Unidos: Reflexões em torno da Agenda de Segurança," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, Vol. 2, 2005, pp. 86–110; Graciela De Conti Pagliari, *O Brasil e a Segurança na América do Sul* (Curitiba: Juruá Editora, 2009); Marco Cepik and Carlos Arturi, "Tecnologia de Informação e Integração Regional: Desafios Institucionais para a Cooperação Sul-Americana na Área de Segurança," *Dados*, Vol. 54, 2011, pp. 113–154; Carolina Sancho Hirane, "Intelligence Cooperation in the Framework of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)," in *Intelligence Management in the Americas*, Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane, eds.

8 See Carlos Maldonado Prieto, "Dilemas Antiguos y Modernos en la Inteligencia estratégica en Sudamérica," *Security and Defense Studies Review*, Vol. 9, Nos. 1–2, 2009; José Gabriel Paz, "Perspectivas de Cooperación en Inteligencia Estratégica: Un Aporte para la Consolidación de la Integración Regional," in *Inteligencia Estratégica Latinoamericana: Perspectivas y Ejes Predominantes para la Toma de Decisiones Estratégicas ante un Mundo en Cambio*, José Gabriel Paz, ed. (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Defensa, 2015); Mariano Bartolome, "Strategic Intelligence Requirements for the Security of Latin America," Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane, eds., *Intelligence Management in the Americas*.

9 Peter Gill, *Alguns Aspectos da Reforma de Inteligência na América Latina*, pp. 99–118; Michael M. Andregg and Peter Gill, "Comparing the Democratization of Intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 29, 2014, pp. 487–497; Eduardo E. Estévez, *Comparing Intelligence Democratization in Latin America: Argentina, Peru and Ecuador Cases*, pp. 552–580.

10 E.g. Pablo G. Floria, *Derechos y Garantías en la Actividad de Inteligencia* (Buenos Aires: Escuela Nacional de Inteligencia, 2003); Thomas C. Bruneau, "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited," *Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad*, Vol. 19, 2005, pp. 111–131; Gregory Weeks, "A Preference for Deference: Reforming the Military's Intelligence in Argentina, Chile and Peru," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 29, 2008, pp. 45–61; Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy, *Democratización de la Función de Inteligencia: El Nexo de la Cultura Nacional y la Inteligencia Estratégica*;

Joanisval Gonçalves, *Políticos e Espiões: O Controle da Atividade de Inteligência* (Niterói, RJ: Impetus, 2010); Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2012); José Manuel Ugarte, *El Ámbito Normativo de la Inteligencia Interior em América Latina*, pp. 119–160; Eduardo E. Estévez, *Comparing Intelligence Democratization in Latin America,* pp. 552–580.

11 See, among others, Marco Cepik, "Regime Político e Sistema de Inteligência no Brasil: Legitimidade e Efetividade como Desafios Institucionais (1999–2004)," *Dados*, Vol. 48, 2005, pp. 67–113; Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, "Intelligence in the Developing Democracies: The Quest for Transparency and Effectiveness," in Loch K. Johnson, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane, eds., *Intelligence Management in the Americas*.

12 See Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2006), pp. 29–38; Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

13 Gregory F. Treverton and Wilhelm Agrell, *National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects*.

14 See the corresponding chapters in Loch K. Johnson, *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*.

15 Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, pp. 39–61.

16 According to Steven Lukes, "Poder y Autoridad," in Tom Bottomore y Robert Nisbet [compiladores], *Historia del Análisis Sociológico* (Buenos Aires: Amorrotu, 1988), pp. 718–767, from Weber to Dahl the relational conceptions of power emphasize control, dependence, and inequality as components of the material and ideational bonds between the actors involved.

17 Thomas C. Bruneau, "Comments on the Essays in Section Three," in Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane, eds., *Intelligence Management in the Americas*, p. 261.

18 To clarify terminology across the region, see Antonio M. Díaz Fernández, ed., *Diccionario LID Inteligencia y Seguridad* (Madrid: LID Editorial, 2013).

19 By organizational risk, we mean a range of effects from mild difficulties in achieving cooperation to severe difficulties to adapt to new strategic challenges, resulting in potential fragmentation of the network.

20 At this point we are still collecting data regarding a fourth type, namely external control organizations (Parliamentary committees, special courts, etc.). Meanwhile, we shall refer to the literature mentioned in note 3, which deals mostly with external control and democratization.

21 The authority and information links between each pair of organizations in a network were classified according to their intensity using an interval scale (0, 3, 6, 9). To be able to classify intensity, we have grounded our judgment on the specific laws of each country, specialized literature, news, and interviews with country experts. Finally, in order to measure the overall power distribution, we have relied upon two additional mathematical indexes for each organization (node): Degree Centrality (authority) and Betweenness Centrality

(information). For further detailing of the methodology used, we recommend Marco Cepik and Gustavo Möller, "National Intelligence Systems as Networks: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa," paper presented for Intelligence Studies Panel, at the International Studies Association's 56th Annual Convention, New Orleans, Louisiana, February 2015.

22 See Ian Mcculloh, Helen Armstrong, and Anthony Johnson, *Social Network Analysis with Applications* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2013).

23 Law 27,126, enacted on 5 March 2015, and regulated by the Decree 337/2015, modified Law 25,520/2001 in the following matters: (1) the dissolution of the Secretaria de Inteligencia (SI) and the creation of the Agencia Federal de Inteligencia (AFI) to occupy the former's place; and (2) to transfer responsibility for legal approved wiretappings from the *Dirección de Observaciones Judiciales* (DOJ)—which was subordinated to SI—to the *Procuración General de la Nación*.

24 Regarding terminology used across the region to describe criminal, police, and public security intelligence (as it is known in Brazil), see the Preface by José Manuel Ugarte in Priscila Brandão and Marco Cepik, *Inteligência de Segurança Púbica: Teoria e Prática no Controle da Criminalidade* (Niterói, RJ: Impetus, 2013). Also see Alvaro Jose Venegas Gonzales, "Economic Intelligence: An Examination of Its Status in the Andean Countries," in Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane, eds., *Intelligence Management in the Americas*.

25 See Priscila Brandão, "Institucionalização, Controle e Profissionalismo no Sistema de Inteligência Argentino," in *Serviços Secretos e Democracia no Cone Sul: Premissas para uma Convivência Legítima, Eficiente e Profissional*, Priscila Brandão, ed. (Niterói, RJ: Impetus, 2010), pp. 53–122; Eduardo E. Estévez, "Intelligence Community Reforms: The Case of Argentina," in Philip H. J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson, eds., *Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere*, pp. 219–238. About the external control in Argentina, see also Priscila Brandão, "Establishing Democratic Control of Intelligence in Argentina," in *Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness*, Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz, eds. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), pp. 195–218.

26 For a general description of Chilean intelligence, see Carlos Maldonado Prieto, "The Professionalization of Intelligence Personnel: The Chilean Case," in *Profesionalismo de Inteligencia en las Américas*, Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy, eds.; Carlos Maldonado Prieto, "Cultura Política e Inteligencia Estratégica en Chile," in *Democratización de la Función de Inteligencia: El Nexo de la Cultura Nacional y la Inteligencia Estratégica*, Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy, eds.; Carolina Sancho Hirane, "Reflexión en Torno a la Comunidad de Inteligencia en Chile a Partir de la Cultura de Inteligencia Nacional: Los Desafíos Pendientes," in *Democratización de la Función de Inteligencia: El Nexo de la Cultura Nacional y la Inteligencia Estratégica*, Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy, eds.; Priscila Carlos Brandão, "Institucionalização, Controle e Profissionalismo no Sistema de Inteligência Chilena," in *Serviços Secretos e Democracia no Cone Sul: Premissas para uma Convivência Legítima, Eficiente e Profissional*, pp. 179–254.

[27] André Gómez de la Torre Rotta, "Servicios de Inteligencia y Democrácia en América del Sur: Hacia una Segunda Generácion de Reformas Normativas?," *Agenda Internacional*, Vol. 16, 2009, pp. 119–130.

[28] Gregory Weeks, "A Preference for Deference: Reforming the Military's Intelligence Role in Argentina, Chile and Peru," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 29, 2008, pp. 45–61.

[29] According to the Law 19,974 of 2 October 2004, which regards the use of wiretapping, any of the agencies could make use of it, as long as they had the legal authorization of the *Corte de Apelaciones*, in which jurisdiction the procedure will be fulfilled. In order to infiltrate agents and recruit informers, no legal authorization is required. An Intelligence Control Commission has been established in the Chamber of Deputies. It seems to meet periodically, but the content of its sessions is, by law, secret. Cf. Fredy Rivera Vélez, *Inteligencia Estratégica y Prospectiva* (Quito: Flacso, 2011).

[30] For a general description of Colombian intelligence, see Andrés F. Sáenz and Ismael Idrobo, *Formulando Preguntas: Evoluciones de la Inteligencia*, in *Profesionalismo de Inteligencia en las Américas*, Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy, eds.; Steven C. Boraz, "Colombia," in *PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches*, Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro, eds. (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008); Douglas Porch, "Taming a 'Dysfunctional Beast': Reform in Colombia's Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 22, No. 3, Fall 2009, pp. 421–451; Alexander Arciniegas Carreño, "Inteligencia en Democracias: La Crisis del Servicio de Inteligencia Colombiano," in *Inteligência Governamental: Contextos Nacionais e Desafios Contemporâneos*, Marco Cepik, ed. (Niterói, RJ: Impetus, 2011), pp. 73–89; Marco Cepik and Christiano Ambros, *Intelligence, Crisis and Democracy: Institutional Punctuations in Brazil, Colombia, South Africa and India*, pp. 538–541; Janiel David Melamed V, "Inteligencia estratégica y postconflito en Colombia: Escenarios y Desafios," in *Inteligencia Estratégica Latinoamericana: perspectivas y ejes predominantes para la toma de decisions estratégicos ante un mundo en cambio*, José Gabriel Paz, ed. (Ministerio de Defensa de Argentina, Buenos Aires, 2015), pp. 235–244.

[31] It is important to emphasize the legal existence of the Unidad de Información y Análisis Financiero (UIAF). It is the economic and financial intelligence organization, which aims to combat money laundering, mainly related to the international narcotics trafficking. The UIAF, as well as the Ministerio de la Hacienda (to which it is subordinated) are officially contained in the Colombian intelligence system, pursuant to Law 1288 of 2009. See Alvaro Jose Venegas Gonzales, "Economic Intelligence: An Examination of Its Status in the Andean Countries," in *Intelligence Management in the Americas*.

[32] Presidential Decree No. 4179 of 3 November 2011.

[33] The DNI was created in the aftermath of the dismemberment of the sturdy Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS). Its primal objective was to replace it as the central coordinating agency of the system, counting, however, with a more limited accountability. The DNI is provided by Decree 4179 of

2011, which deliberates about the legal framework of its functioning, as well as the control organs that supervise this new agency. According to Shaw (2012), the downsizing of personnel represented a reduction of 6500 employees that acted on DAS to 300 acting on the first months of the DNI. Besides that, important information concerning the real operation of the DNI in the last few years were not found.

[34] Marco Cepik and Christiano Ambros, "Intelligence, Crisis and Democracy: Institutional Punctuations in Brazil, Colombia, South Africa and India," pp. 538–539; Russell G. Swenson and Alvaro J. Venegas Gonzales, "Assessing the Democratic Legitimacy of Columbian National Intelligence." *Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence*, Vol. 7, No. 1, June 2016, pp. 125–158.

[35] Janiel David Melamed V, "Inteligencia estratégica y postconflito en Colombia: Escenarios y Desafios," pp. 235–244; Steven C. Boraz, "Intelligence Reform in Colombia: Transparency and Effectiveness against Internal Threats," *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 6, 2007, p. n/a; Steven C. Boraz, *Colombia*; Law No. 684 of 13 August 2001; Presidential Decree No. 3600 of 21 September 2009; Presidential Decree No. 4179 of 3 November 2011; Statutory Law No. 1621 of 17 April 2013; Jim Rochlin, *Plan Colombia and the Revolution in Military Affairs: The Demise of the FARC*, pp. 715–740; SHAW, 2012.

[36] For a more contextualized perspective concerning the Ecuadorian case, see Fredy Rivera Vélez, "La Inteligencia Ecuatoriana: Tradiciones, Cambios y Perspectivas," in *Inteligencia Estratégica y Prospectiva*, pp. 47–76; Jaime Castillo, "La Cultura Nacional y su Influencia en la Estructura de Inteligencia Nacional en el Ecuador," in *Democratización de la Función de Inteligencia*, pp. 91–112; Eduardo E. Estévez, *Comparing Intelligence Democratization in Latin America: Argentina, Peru and Ecuador Cases*, pp. 552–580.

[37] In March 2008, the Colombian government carried out an attack to eliminate a FARC column inside the Ecuadorian territory (crossing the Putumayo river into the Sucumbíos province, in the Angostura locality). After the ensuing diplomatic dispute and altercation, President Correa created through Decree 1,080/2008 a committee of "Investigación de los servicios de inteligencia militares y policiáles ecuatorianos." Based upon the critical assessment of Ecuadorian intelligence performance and its lack of counterintelligence capabilities that was produced by that committee, a complete overhaul of the security sector was proposed. See: Fredy Rivera Vélez, *Inteligencia Estratégica y Prospectiva*, pp. 57–62; Eduardo E. Estévez, *Comparing Intelligence Democratization in Latin America: Argentina, Peru and Ecuador Cases*, pp. 568–570.

[38] The SENAIN replaced the former *Diretório Nacional de Inteligencia* (DNI). The new intelligence dispensation was later consolidated with other security related changes through the Law on Public and State Security of September 2009. This very law was further regulated by Presidential Decree 486 of September 2010.

[39] The Presidential protection service was not present in the original text of the Decree, which permitted the later inclusion of additional agencies in the intelligence system. However, we considered it at the time we established our database and calculations. Two additional services (the internal revenues and the customs service) do appear in the SENAIN website as components of the

intelligence system, but were not included in our calculations. See: http://www.inteligencia.gob.ec/, accessed 14 May 2016.

40 According to the Law on Public and State Security (2009) and later regulations, SENAIN provides intelligence to the President, as well as to the Ministry of Security Coordination (MICS). The main role of this ministry is to coordinate Ecuador's internal and external security institutions. The main organs under its umbrella are the *Ministerio de Defensa*, the *Ministerio del Interior*, the *Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana*, the *Ministerio de Justicia Derechos Humanos y Cultos*, the *Secretaría de Inteligencia*, the *Secretaría de Gestión de Riesgos*, and the *Servicio Integrado de Seguridad*.

41 Such restructuring was also triggered by the recommendations of the Commission that investigated the Angostura crisis of 2008. The main goal of the reform was to better integrate scarce resources and to improve intelligence strategic analysis capabilities. See "Comando Conjunto de FF.AA. asumió control del Sistema de Inteligencia," *El Universo*, 18 October 2010, available at http://www.eluniverso.com/2010/10/18/1/1355/comando-conjunto-ffaa-asumio-control-sistema-inteligencia.html.

42 Decree 1,080/2008. See Eduardo E. Estévez, "Comparing Intelligence Democratization in Latin America: Argentina, Peru and Ecuador Cases," pp. 569; Carlos Maldonado Prieto, "Dilemas Antiguos y Modernos en la Inteligencia estratégica en Sudamérica," p. 58.

43 SENAIN has had six different directors in seven years (2009–2016), of whom three were civilians, two were non-active duty Navy officers, and the current director, at the time of writing Rommy Vallejo, is a Lieutenant Colonel of the National Police.

44 The full text of Law No. 5241 of 22 August 2014 is available at http://www.bacn.gov.py/NDYyMA==&ley-n-5241, accessed 11 May 2016.

45 In 2015, the implementation of SNI was still in process. It had neither an appointed director nor its own budget. See "SNI: aún sin resultados," *ABC Color*, 4 February 2015, available at http://www.abc.com.py/nacionales/sni-aun-sin-resultados-1333250.html. For a more detailed description of Paraguayan intelligence prior to Law 5241, see: Derlis Chamorro, "El Sistema Nacional de Inteligencia y sus Implicancias en la Defensa y el Desarrollo Nacional" (Tesis doctoral, Universidad Metropolitana de Asunción, Asunción, 2006). To provide context regarding the political system in Paraguay, see: Paul C. Sondrol, "Paraguay: Precarious Democracy," in *Latin American Politics and Development*, Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, eds. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000, 5th ed.), pp. 312–330.

46 The national police in Paraguay was part of the repressive apparatus during Stroessner's dictatorship. In this sense, it has had a negative public image. See: JANE's, *Paraguay*—Country Profile, 2009; FLACSO Chile, *Informe Nacional: Paraguay*, Reporte del Sector Seguridad en America Latina y El Caribe, 2006, available at http://www.flacsochile.org/publicaciones/reporte-del-sector-seguridad-2006-informe-nacional-paraguay/, accessed 13 May 2016.

47 Although the *Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores* (MRE), according to Law 1,337 of 1997, is a member of the *Consejo de Defensa Nacional* (CDN), it is not a

member either of the *Consejo Nacional de Inteligencia* (CNI) or of *the Sistema Nacional de Inteligencia* (SINAI) according to Law 5,241 of 2014.

48 In 1989, a military coup ended the embattled Stroessner dictatorship. Since then, there has been considerable political instability in the country in comparison with its neighbors. The Colorado Party won successive presidential elections, dealing with attempts at military coups. In 2008, Fernando Lugo's Liberal Party alliance won the presidential election, interrupting 61 years of Colorado Party preponderance. In 2012, the Congress controversially impeached him, and his Vice President Frederico Franco took over the presidency. In 2013, the Colorado Party elected Horacio Cartes as President, returning to the executive branch. See JANE's, *Paraguay*—Country Profile, 2009; "Senate's Vote Ousts Leader of Paraguay After a Clash," *The New York Times*, 22 June 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/world/americas/senates-vote-ousts-paraguay-president-after-clash.html.

49 For a thorough evaluation of the security context in Paraguay, see Germano Ribeiro Fernandes da Silva, "Paraguai: Desafios para a Integração da América do Sul," Graduation Thesis, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, 2011; Arthur Bernardes do Amaral, *A Tríplice Fronteira e a Guerra ao Terror* (Rio de Janeiro: Apicuri, 2010).

50 SENAD was created by Law 108 of 27 December 1991 to coordinate actions among the governmental bodies that work on programs to fight narcotrafficking.

51 SEPRELAD was created by Law 1015 of 1997 to obtain and analyze all information related to money laundering.

52 See República del Paraguay, "Plan Estratégico del Estado Paraguayo: de Combate al Lavado de Activos, Financiamiento del Terrorismo y la Proliferación de Armas de Destrucción Masiva," Presidencia de la República del Paraguay, Assunción, 2013.

53 Legislative Decree 1,141 of 14 December 2012 revoked Law 28,664 of 6 January 2006. While this Decree is much more detailed in regulating intelligence activities in Peru, it has changed the status of the *Consejo de Inteligencia Nacional* (COIN) from a supervising role to a consultive one. Against this decree, a legal plea has been considered since 2013 by the Peruvian Constitutional Court regarding its constitutionality and the role of the Congressional Commission on Intelligence.

54 André Gómez de la Torre Rotta and Arturo Medrano Carmona, "La reorganización de Inteligencia en el Perú: aspectos jurídicos, políticos y comparativos en la región," in *Inteligencia Estratégica Latinoamericana: Perspectivas y Ejes Predominantes para la Toma de Decisiones Estratégicas ante un Mundo en Cambio*, José Gabriel Paz, ed. (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Defensa, 2015), pp. 177–189; André Gómez de la Torre Rotta, *Servicios de Inteligencia y Democrácia en América del Sur: Hacia una Segunda Generácion de Reformas Normativas?*, pp. 119–130; Eduardo E. Estévez, *Comparing Intelligence Democratization in Latin America: Argentina, Peru and Ecuador Cases*, pp. 552–580.

55 Supreme Decree 013/2015. Such a drastic measure was a consequence of the accusations made by national media that the DINI could have conducted

irregular investigations on former government members, opposition members, and national entrepreneurs. The intense political crisis culminated with the destitution of the President of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister Ana Jara) by parliamentary decision in April 2015. See: Ana Jara, "Costo Político de Denuncias Contra la DINI lo Pagué con la Censura," *Peru 21*, 6 April 2015, available at http://peru21.pe/politica/ana-jara-costo-politico-denuncias-contra-dini-lo-pague-censura-2216061; Fernando Rospigliosi, "La DINI: Una Alternativa," *El Comercio*, 12 April 2015, available at http://elcomercio.pe/opinion/mirada-de-fondo/dini-alternativa-fernando-rospigliosi-noticia-1803570.

Besides the reorganization commission established by Supreme Decree 013/2015, other investigations are being conducted by the National Congress Intelligence Commission, the National Prosecutor's office, as well as by the Office of the Comptroller General. When we finished this article (May 2016), the restructuring process was still in place, which made inconclusive a comprehensive analysis of the causes and consequences of such reform. The last news was about a report the Congress had decided to forward to both the National Prosecutor's office (*Ministério Público*) and to the High Level Reorganizing Commission of the DINI asking for further investigations. See: "Congreso aprobó informe sobre seguimientos que hizo la DINI," *El Comercio*, 9 December 2015, available at http://elcomercio.pe/politica/congreso/congreso-aprobo-informe-sobre-seguimientos-que-realizo-dini-noticia-1862687?ref=flujo_tags_37290&ft=nota_1&e=titulo.

[56] Hugo Palma and Alejandro San Martín, *Seguridad, Defensa y Fuerzas Armadas en el Peru* (Lima: CEPEI, 2003).

[57] See Supreme Decree 0018/2006.

[58] For this period, see Alberto Bolívar Ocampo, "Cultura, Períodos Culturales y Servicios de Inteligencia en el Perú 1960–2007," in Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy, eds., *Democratización de la Función de Inteligencia: El Nexo de la Cultura Nacional y la Inteligencia Estratégica*, pp. 257–274.

[59] Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy, eds., *Democratización de la Función de Inteligencia: El Nexo de la Cultura Nacional y la Inteligencia Estratégica*.

[60] Gregory Weeks, *A Preference for Deference: Reforming the Military's Intelligence Role in Argentina, Chile and Peru*, p. 59; André Gómez de la Torre Rotta and Arturo Medrano Carmona, "La reorganización de Inteligencia en el Perú: aspectos jurídicos, políticos y comparativos en la región," pp. 188–189; Eduardo E. Estévez, *Comparing Intelligence Democratization in Latin America: Argentina, Peru and Ecuador Cases*, p. 565.

[61] See Carolina Sancho Hirane, "Intelligence Cooperation in the Framework of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)"; Carlos Maldonado Prieto and Carolina Sancho Hirane, "Cooperación en Inteligencia Estratégica de Defensa en el CDS de UNASUR: Posibilidades, Limitaciones y Desafíos," in Jose Gabriel Paz, ed., *Inteligencia Estratégica Latinoamericana: Perspectivas y Ejes Predominantes para la Toma de Decisiones Estratégicas ante un Mundo en Cambio*, pp. 309–327.