



CEGOV

CENTRO DE ESTUDOS INTERNACIONAIS
SOBRE GOVERNO

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
COUNTERTERRORISM
PEACEKEEPING

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MAIN CLAIM

This General Circumstance



Predictably leads to



This General Consequence



More Knowledge



Better Decision Making



As a valid instance...

Ceteris Paribus



As a valid instance...



More Strategic Intelligence



Better Security Decision Making



This Specific Circumstance

Let us infer



This Specific Consequence

Acknowledge Limitations to Claim:

- Strategic Intelligence Analysis (SIA) to reduce, no eliminate uncertainty from the decision making process.
- Intelligence is one information flow, but humans devise many other social mechanisms to cope with asymmetries and uncertainties involved in collective decision.
- Intelligence is knowledge AND power. Truth serves victory and survival in this realm.

Within these boundaries:

- **Strategic Intelligence Analysis (SIA) is important because it supplies synthetic evaluations (probabilistic estimates and structured scenarios) about medium to long term trends involving conflictive interactions between multiple actors, structures, and contexts.**

Two questions arise:

- 1. Why non-government groups, firms, national governments, and international organizations face tradeoffs between strategic and tactical uses of intelligence?**
- 2. What are the potential consequences of neglecting strategic intelligence analysis?**

First hypothesis:

1. Collective actors face time and resources constraints to decide and act upon perceived threats. Therefore, they have a strong incentive to **trade long term interpretative knowledge for more hard evidence based, actionable intelligence** of tactical and operational nature. Current technology trends still favor collection capabilities. But, even if strong artificial intelligence (AI) change it in favor of analysis, the tradeoffs between short and long term will remain.

Second hypothesis:

2. International security is not governed by automatic processes of mutual adjustment, like security dilemmas or arms races. Choice and chance are pervasive, given structural and contextual frameworks for continuous interactions as time passes unstopably. Each actor has to care for their own survival and goal achievement, but the actual results of peaceful and violent interactions are intrinsically hard to predict. In Clausewitzian terms, since combat remains the essential activity in war, tactical and operational intelligence are always in great demand. **However, the political nature of war and peace makes strategic intelligence analysis a requirement for any actor. To neglect it amounts to reducing the chances of being relevant, winning, or surviving.**

Research Design:

- The hypotheses can not be directly tested.
- Instead, the article does three things:
 1. Offers brief definitions of security, threat, intelligence and SIA
 2. Provides additional reasoning and corroborative evidence from three areas of contemporary international security (nuclear deterrence; terrorism; peacekeeping).
 3. Recommends how to assess the analytical quality of SIA.

Why these three areas:

Steinbruner (*The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*, 2002):

- All experimental evidence in Cognitive Psychology and the adaptive processes in evolution seem to contradict the assumed use of analytic logic in human interactions, including in international security.
- However, analytic logic is a better shared belief than faith, so people fall back to it to solve problems and, therefore, it becomes a stable basis for collective behavior.

Why these three areas:

- More important, there are many scenarios in which uncertainty is so radical that counting only on adaptive processes for survival becomes impossible. In these situations, the most decisive element for evolution is the degree of cooperation reached.
- Other things been equal, the level of the cooperation varies according the knowledge actors have about their own standing, as well as about each others'.
- Nuclear deterrence between Great Powers, international terrorism and counterterrorism, and multidimensional UN peacekeeping were selected **because they strongly challenge cooperation, presenting higher global risks to collective security in the next decades.**

2

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Problem:

- Nuclear deterrence and Mutual Assured Destruction as peaceful *status quo ante*.
- End of Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and implementation of National Missile Defense (NMD) widely perceived as a revisionist move.
- After the New START:
 - USA: 54% to 93% of strategic arsenal mobile
 - RUSSIA: 60% of strategic arsenal based in air and sea
 - CHINA: 44 missiles (92 warheads) to hit USA
- Who would start a nuclear war with USA?

Intelligence Issue?

- Since Cold War: how to find ICBMs/SLBMs/ALBMs ?
- Lieber; Press (2006): Nuclear Primacy is the goal
- Li Bin (2006): conceal and decoy to assure survival
- Long; Green (2014): RQ-170/UGS/TTL/SATS got it
- NMD to succeed requires SEAD and NIA/D3
- Lieber; Press (2013): strategic primacy (nuke/conv.)
- Biddle; Oelrich (2016): force projection to what?

Risk to neglect SIA?

- Etzioni (2013): dissociation of political and military operation formulations; lack of accountability
- Christensen (2012): potential for nuclear escalation
- Montgomery (2017): China's aggression in Asia?
- Triangular relations between United States, China, and Russia are not a strategic intelligence problem only for them, but for the whole world
- To neglect SIA about it amounts to increase risks of being entangled in a conflict without serious preparation

3

COUNTERTERRORISM

Problem:

- Terrorism features preeminently in all lists of contemporary non-traditional threats, even along with different nature phenomena, like organized crime (“predator x parasite”).
- Pape; Feldman (2010): from 350 suicide attacks (1980-2003) to 1,833 (2004-2009), 92% anti-American.
- Start (2016): 37,752 terrorist attacks in 1986-2000, against 72,434 in 2001-2015.

Intelligence Issue?

- Focus is to anticipate attacks and defeat groups.
- Is there a regional and target type concentration in this increased occurrence of terrorist attacks?
- Are there any causal relations between the military interventions and the increasing in terrorist attacks?
- Is prevention working? Is GWAT working?
- Europol (2016): 1,077 arrests charged of terrorism
- How wide is the gap between threat perception and actual risk due to the nature of terrorist use of force?

Risk to neglect SIA?

- Keep fighting the next group endless.
- Either overspending or underestimating the threats.
- Further imbalance freedom and security in democratic countries
- End up with more authoritarian regimes worldwide
- Accept terrorism as a component of “civilization clash”
- Elect people who believe that terrorism results from alternative facts: “Muslims hate western way of life”.

Search Google Scholar Feb 20 2017

- “Terrorism” anywhere in the document:
1,130,000 results in 0.07 seconds
(goo.gl/GZawC4).
- “Terrorism / “Strategic” / “Intelligence” /
“Analysis” together, anywhere in the document:
258,000 results in 0.11 seconds (goo.gl/zjoOJc).
- “Terrorism” in the title: 93,800 results in 0.07
seconds (goo.gl/TZFQx5).
- “Terrorism / “Intelligence” / Analysis” in the title:
35 results in 0.06 seconds (goo.gl/NbeXid).
- When “Strategic” is added to the three words in
the title: **Zero** results (goo.gl/5a4yuW).

4


PEACEKEEPING

Problem:


A dangerous mission

Since 2013, 118 peacekeepers have been killed in Mali, making it the deadliest ever U.N. mission. The country is plagued by several groups linked to al-Qaeda.

U.N. peacekeeper fatalities since 2013



Deaths in terrorist attacks since 2013



Sources: IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Center, United Nations

TIM MEKO/THE WASHINGTON POST

Intelligence Issue?

- **Brahimi Report (2000):** how to avoid new failures like Somalia (UNOSOM I and II, 1992-1995), Ruanda (UNAMIR, 1993-1994), and Bosnia (UNPROFOR, 1992-1995).
- **Doctrine and organizational changes to deal with new operational realities:** Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) at the operational level. Research and Liaison Unit (RLU) of the Situation Centre (SITCEN- DPKO/DSF), and the UN Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC), in New York. Limited capabilities due to political sensitivities.

Risk to neglect SIA?

- As shown by MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, and MINUSMA, multidimensional missions with robust mandates (offensive combat requirements) are the new normal. Due to demographic, climate, and energy transitions, operational scale will probably increase to deal with hundreds of thousands of blue helmets and tens of millions of civilians.
- The new UN Secretary-General António Guterres has called for a boost in preventive diplomacy and mediation efforts, as well as for a strategy to address root causes of such conflicts in the world (United Nations, 2017). How?

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CONCLUSION

- **Strategic Intelligence Analysis matters**
- **From nukes to terrorism and peacekeeping...**
- **Education and Cooperation to strength SIA**
- **Analytic quality and hypotheses tests**
- **Start with public documents and evidence based SATs validation (Coulthart, 2017).**

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS: THREE PUBLIC REPORTS

	NUCLEAR DETERRENCE	COUNTERTERRORISM	PEACEKEEPING
REPORT TITLE	Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces	European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT)	A more secure world... Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
YEAR	2004	2016	2004
ACTOR	USA	EU	UN
ORGANIZATION	NIC	EUROPOL	UNOOC

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS: THREE PUBLIC REPORTS

	NUCLEAR DETERRENCE	COUNTERTERRORISM	PEACEKEEPING
INTELL-POLICY SEGREGATION LEVEL	HIGH	LOW	MEDIUM
INTELL-POLICY MUTUAL INTEREST	MEDIUM	HIGH	LOW
INTELL-POLICY COOPERATION LEVEL	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
PERIODICITY (DECLARED)	ANNUAL	ANNUAL	OCCASIONAL
PERIODICITY (<i>DE FACTO</i>)	INTERMITTENT	ANNUAL	UNIQUE
EPISTEMOLOGICAL ORIENTATION	DESCRIPTIVE	EXPLICATIVE	PRESCRIPTIVE

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS: THREE PUBLIC REPORTS

	NUCLEAR DETERRENCE	COUNTERTERRORISM	PEACEKEEPING
SOURCE OF INTELL	IMINT/SIGINT	HUMINT	OSINT
QUALITY EVALUATION	YES	NO	NO
FEEDBACK TO ANALYSTS	NO	YES	NO
LEGAL UNFOLDING	YES	YES	NO
POLICY UNFOLDING	YES	YES	YES

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