

The relationship between the members states of the European Union and the United States have been strained in recent years as a result of shifts in U.S. global strategy, as well as important changes in the international economic, political, and security environment. The tensions in US-EU relations, the growing challenges to both US and EU interests represented by a resurgent Russian Federation as well as the Islamic world, and dramatic shifts in the economic and political capabilities of countries from East Asia to Latin America all contribute to a much more complex international environment than that envisaged in the wake of the end of the Cold War. The current volume will examine the implications of these changes for the future of international politics.

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THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE IN A CHANGING WORLD

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REGIONAL SECURITY AND INTEGRATION IN SOUTH AMERICA:

*What UNASUR Could Learn from the OSCE and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization*

The central purpose of this chapter is to compare the institutional design, operations and strategic rationales of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), in order to evaluate in a prescriptive manner how useful and applicable those experiences would be for South America. Since the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) was conceived to absorb and transcend previous regional organizations such as the MERCOSUR and the Andean Community (CAN), it has potential security roles in addressing common regional ills like organized crime and high rates of interpersonal violence. A more institutionalized regional order is also supposed to provide more room of manoeuvre for the South Americans facing global centripetal forces such as the recent U.S. primacy push and neoliberal globalization. Although UNASUR is still a fledgling union, there are theoretical and political reasons to avoid modelling it exclusively after the European Union or Western Hemispheric security institutions.

In reality the Brazilian proposal to create a regional Security and Defence Council in South America was the most controversial issue in the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR signed in May 2008 by twelve South American Heads of State and Government in Brasilia. The first concerned party that attempted to hinder the process by refusing to take part in it was Colombia, watchful of how its neighbouring countries would perceive the illegal armed group FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia). Colombia also expressed its concerns about the nature of the

¹ An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Second Global International Studies Conference, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 23–26 July 2008. This research was supported by the National Scientific Research Council of Brazil (CNPq). The author wishes to express his appreciation for the research contributions made to this work by Helena Jornada, Luiza Schneider, Paula Lazzari, Christiano Ambros, Thabita Abraham, Lucas Sangalli and Felipe Machado, research assistants at the Strategy and International Relations Center (NERINT – www.ufrgs.br/nerint).

decisional process of the Defence Council. During the visit of the Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva to Colombia in July 2008, both concerns were addressed. Following negotiations, the Colombian President Alvaro Uribe declared that Colombia would be a partner in the security institutional building of the UNASUR. Finally, after a settlement to the main political obstacles to the Council seemed to have been found, the real conceptual work should begin.²

We part from the assumption that the already existing collective security system in the Americas, the Organization of American States (OAS), is not sufficient for the current challenges and threats that are present in the continent. In this sense UNASUR draws a different approach from that which has already been assessed by the OAS: aiming at a more autonomous policy, it excludes the United States from South American security affairs by replacing the conflict resolution mechanisms of the OAS, therefore optimizing the recognition of South American interests.³

As pointed out by Kelly,⁴ most of the academic and political debate related to security in the so called 'non-critical regions' of the world, such as Africa and South America, are commonly driven by a normative approach for regional integration. I personally do not think this is necessarily wrong or bad in itself. Explicitly assuming the normative desire for a robust UNASUR to be built in South America, I have tried here to examine the efficacy of two alternative models of security cooperation and integration in realist terms.⁵ And by 'realist terms' I mean: 1) that international institutions are created by states in pursuit of their power interests; 2) institutionalized cooperation in the international realm is difficult in any case; 3) there are distributional conflicts ('unequal relative gains') regardless of the amount of information provided by the international institutions; and 4) institutional design can reduce, but not eliminate, the difficulties associated with the ultimate objective of security cooperation and integration. Therefore, in order for UNASUR to be functional in

² As one can read in the Preamble of the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR: 'CERTAIN that integration is a decisive step towards the strengthening of multilateralism and the rule of law in international relations in order to achieve a multipolar, balanced and just world, in which the sovereign equality of States and a culture of peace prevail and in a world free of nuclear weapons and of weapons of mass destruction', the Union is not designed as a tool for balancing, but has balance and justice as core values.

³ The Organization of American States (OAS) it is made up of 35 member states: the independent nations of North, Central and South America and the Caribbean.

⁴ Robert E. Kelly, 'Security Theory in the "New Regionalism"', *International Studies Review*, vol. 9, no. 2 (2007), pp. 212–215.

⁵ See David Mares, *Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, and Barry Buzan and Ole Waver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

realist terms, it must be designed as being part of a larger process of multinational regional state building in South America.

The resulting analysis is organized as follows: the first section contains a brief description of the main present-day security threats in South America. Then, in the second section, the recently constituted South American Union is presented, including the controversial proposal for a South American Security and Defence Council. In the following two sections, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) are discussed in order to evaluate, in the concluding section, how useful and applicable their experiences would be for South America.

SOUTH AMERICA: UNANSWERED THREATS AND SECURITY CONCERNS

Although contemporary South America is recognized by its low incidence of interstate warfare or overt civil war, given that it has experienced just one conventional war since the end of Cold War – between Peru and Ecuador in 1995 –, and a total of three wars since World War II, it shall nevertheless be considered a violent region. And even considering that the internal armed conflict in Colombia is rarely described as a civil war in the same way that contemporary African and Asian violent conflicts are, that does not indicate that South America could by any means be considered a peaceful zone or a sort of 'security community'.⁶

In this sense at least four types of threats and risks to South-American security can be identified in any bird's eye view of the region. First, as pointed out by David Mares, the apparent paradox that he identified in South America requires a proper conceptual framework to explain this region. Hence he adopts the term 'violent peace' upon which to build such a framework, *i.e.*, the '*officially sanctioned use of military violence across national boundaries when war is not the intended result*'.⁷ That is to say that war might occur as the result of a dynamics often unwanted by actors, originating from a miscalculation that escapes their control. The decision to use military force must, therefore, be understood more as a bargaining tool for the states' constituencies than as just the desire to solve a dispute through interstate war. Violent peace among countries will remain a pervasive feature of South America's security equation as

⁶ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998. For further elaboration, see Monica Herz, 'Latin America Security Perspectives'. Paper presented at the Second Global International Studies Conference, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 23–26 July 2008.

⁷ Mares, *Violent Peace*, p. 7.

far as territorial disputes and other structurally induced concerns about relative gains are present in the region.

Second, South American countries face important internal threats related to narcotrafficking, and localized urban and rural violence. Furthermore, the region was ranked as the second most violent in the world because of the increasing crime rates in the mid 1990s. Countries like Colombia, Brazil, and Venezuela have crime rates three times higher than the world average, as they present high levels of violence related to street crime, car accidents, drug trafficking, social clashes and organized crime.⁸

Third, the incapacity to deal with present internal security threats is amplified by the persistence of problems that are common to developing countries, which can be exasperated by increasing levels of inequality of income distribution, and therefore may lead to further erosion of the state legitimacy among citizens with raising expectations regarding their social and economic welfare.⁹

Finally, a fourth type of risk is related to the regional role of the United States after 2001 and the commercial and diplomatic presence of other great powers in South America. There is no serious competition for military presence or security leverage in the region among Russia, China and the United States, but the growing assertiveness of these three countries as they protect their respective interests across the world cannot be dismissed as totally unrelated to the security status of South America.¹⁰ Therefore, great power politics is part of the regional security equation in South America, whether we like it or not.

Moreover, besides the four types of structural risks pertaining to the region, one must point out the recent substantive crises involving important regional actors. First of all, tensions between Venezuela and Colombia have their origins in the Venezuelan opposition to the Colombian counterinsurgency strategies supported by the U.S. The Colombian government led by President Uribe, along with general Colombian public opinion, were all very critical towards Venezuela's government, as Chavez's anti-imperialist discourse fiercely attacked the Colombian alliance with the

⁸ According to the Health Ministry of Brazil, for instance, out of 125,816 deaths by external causes in 2005, 37.1% were caused by homicides, 28.4% by car accidents, and 6.8% by suicides. Cf. www.saude.gov.br.

⁹ Francisco A Rojas, 'El riesgo de La superposición entre las políticas de defensa y seguridad', *Nueva Sociedad*, N° 213, enero-febrero 2008, p. 36.

¹⁰ It is important to bear in mind that this situation is evolving quickly, as the Russian presence in South America increases mainly through its relations with Venezuela. Moscow is present not only through joint military exercises with Venezuelan troops, but also through commercial accords and arms sales to the Venezuelan government. The Russian move might be a reaction to the U.S. involvement in Georgia and Ukraine, but since this is a continuing strategic interaction it will trigger another set of U.S. responses in South America and elsewhere.

United States under President Bush. Moreover, the Colombian offensive against the FARC on Ecuador's territory resulting in the killing of Raul Reyes (FARC's spokesman and second-in-command) prompted President Hugo Chavez to mobilize troops to the Colombian frontier. The March 2008 crisis has been diplomatically resolved, but the Colombian internal security problem, essentially related to the FARC and to the paramilitaries, still poses a significant threat to the whole region.¹¹

For its part Bolivia is currently the core of the crisis and the place where the future of the South America integration process is being decided.¹² The Eastern territories, where the main mineral and energy resources are located, have initiated a struggle for greater autonomy, which generated an escalation of the tension in mid-September 2008. The long-term Bolivian division between a minority of wealthier Bolivians, who live in the prosperous and gas-rich lowlands, and the indigenous people concentrated in the impoverished high plains has become violent since the announced electoral victory of President Evo Morales in the August 2008 Referendum. Mr. Morales easily won the Referendum, mainly due to his decision to augment state control over energy supplies and, consequently, to expand the government's anti-poverty programs. Although the opposition governors in the Eastern provinces also maintained their power, the strengthening of Mr. Morales led the opposition to instigate some right-wing groups to engage in acts of violence against the indigenous population and to claim their independence. The Eastern governors supported youth unions across the provinces of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Sucre and Tarija in violent actions initiated on September 10th. In the aftermath the clashes between these groups, the indigenous population in general and the armed forces resulted in approximately 30 deaths.

Through the mediation of UNASUR escalation of the conflict has been avoided, and stability in Bolivia has been preserved. The efforts undertaken by UNASUR, as well as their consequences for the organization itself, will be addressed later. Although pacified for now, the conflict in

¹¹ Rafael Duarte Villa and Maria del Pilar Ostos, 'As relações entre Colômbia, países vizinhos e Estados Unidos: visões em torno da agenda de segurança', *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* (RBPI), vol. 48 (2), (2005), pp. 86-110; and Rafael Duarte Villa, 'Quatro teses sobre a política de segurança dos Estados Unidos para a América do Sul', Thesis prepared for the public admission exam at the Political Science Department at the Faculty of Philosophy and Human Sciences of the University of São Paulo, 2007.

¹² See Marco Cepik, 'A Crise Andina e o Futuro da Unasul. OPISA.', *Andise de Conjuntura* n°4, April 2008. Available at: http://observatorio.iuperj.br/pdfs/45_analises_AC_n_4_abr_2008.pdf. Last Accessed: 04/07/08; and Fernando Dall'Onder Sebben, 'Separatismo e Hipótese de Guerra Local na Bolívia: Possíveis Implicações para o Brasil', Porto Alegre, Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. Monograph for obtaining a bachelor's degree in International Relations, 2007.

Bolivia represents one of the main obstacles to regional stability in South America, and its determinants are deeply related to the high rates of poverty and inequality in that country. In this sense a strong institutional and socio-economic alternative has to be developed inside Bolivia, with strong support from countries like Brazil and Argentina, in order to escape from the polarization between right wing and left wing radicals.

Considering the four previously addressed types of threats and risks, as well as these two major recent crises – the Colombian-Ecuador conflict and the Bolivian civilian unrest –, it is clear that South American governments require an integrated strategy and basic institutional and operational resources to effectively face those problems.¹³ Therefore, the necessity for greater coordination and cooperation on security and defence issues is not only associated with new transnational threats posed by non-state actors, but may also be related to the possibility of interstate conflicts. In this way UNASUR, as the newest integration program in South America, needs to develop mechanisms of peaceful resolution of conflicts and stronger security coordination.

SOUTH AMERICA'S UNION AND THE SECURITY AND DEFENSE SECTORS

The establishment of the South American Defence Council, as proposed by the Brazilian president, even though initially rejected by Colombia, turned out to be an auspicious attempt to solve the institutional vacuum from which the region suffers. Nevertheless, it is necessary to go even further than the Security and Defence Council itself, thus strengthening coordination mechanisms, implementing common public policies in areas such as border control and policing, applying distributive justice and building effective democratic controls.

Paradoxically, in light of what has been mentioned in the previous section, just a few lines have been devoted to analysing the role of security and defence in institutional arrangements designed to advance the integration process in South America, from MERCOSUR and CAN¹⁴ to the OTCA¹⁵ and UNASUR. The Union of South American Nations is characterized by its intrinsic intergovernmental nature. It was designed as an attempt both to converge and transcend the two main blocks of the South American subcontinent (the CAN and MERCOSUR), as well as to

¹³ Paulo Luiz Estevez, ed., *Instituições internacionais: comércio, segurança e integração*. Belo Horizonte: Ed. PUCMinas, 2003.

¹⁴ Comunidad Andina. Available at: <http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/institutional.htm>. Last Accessed: July 6 2009.

¹⁵ *Organización del Tratado de Cooperación Amazónica*. Available at: www.otca.org.br/. Last Accessed: July 6 2009.

incorporate the singular experiences of Chile, Guyana and Suriname, in a much more robust solution, without necessarily replicating all the steps and features of the European Union.

The origins of UNASUR can be traced back to the South American Presidential Summits in progress since 2000, where the countries' presidents continuously reaffirm their commitment to the integration of South America. As a result the South American Community of Nations (CASA) was born in the third Presidential Summit, held in Peru in 2004, as stated in its basic constitutive documents, the Declarations of Ayacucho and Cusco. CASA envisaged the consolidation of South America in a single bloc, hence strengthening the regional links and increasing the bargaining power and international capacity of its member states to resist foreign pressures. CASA's intentions were extensive, ranging from political and diplomatic coordination to physical integration through new transport routes, energy exchange and communications improvement. It also aimed at the creation of a free trade area, with the adoption of a common currency and a regional parliament.¹⁶

This new institutional framework was renamed UNASUR in 2007 at the South American Energy Summit held in Isla Margarita, Venezuela, with the agreement of all member states. In that same meeting significant additional agreements including the creation of the Energy Council of South America were signed, based on the principle that energy integration is an essential tool for the region's economic and social development.

Then, on May 23, 2008 a Constitutive Treaty signed in Brasilia formalized the establishment of UNASUR. The treaty resulted in the creation of an entity with international juridical character, based on the declarations of Cusco (2004), Brasilia (2005) and Cochabamba (2006).¹⁷ Topics such as energy integration and the development of a regionally articulated infrastructure are highlighted as part of UNASUR's goals, where economic and commercial motivations are also used as a justification for regional integration. The security aspects of the regional integration are mentioned in the treaty's three final objectives, which establish measures

¹⁶ Jorge d'Escagnolle Taunay Filho, 'Comunidade Sul Americana de Nações - CASA'. In: *América do Sul: Anais da II Conferência Nacional de Política Externa e Política Internacional*. Brasília, FUNAG, 2008, pp. 11–32.

¹⁷ These three declarations reiterated the South American governments' good will about its integration process, highlighting important issues in both of them. The Declaration of Brasilia was made public among several other documents by the South American countries, in September 30th, 2005. It asked the Secretaries from ALADI, MERCOSUR, CAN and CARICOM to prepare analysis about the possibilities of complementing economic accords among South American countries, with the presence of Chile, Guyana and Suriname. The Declaration of Cochabamba, by its turn, stated the conclusions achieved by two years of dialogue about regional integration, as, for example, infrastructure, guidelines for political dialogue and for external dialogue.

for *coordination* among the member states' specialized agencies in order to invigorate the struggle against narcotics, corruption, human trafficking, small and light weapons trafficking, terrorism, transnational organized crime and other threats. In this sense, UNASUR aims at the promotion of cooperation among the judicial authorities of its member states, as well as the exchange of information and experiences in matters of defense and, finally, more extensive protection for civilians.

As for UNASUR's structure, the highest governing body of the union is represented by the Council of Heads of State and Government, which meets annually. The Pro Tempore Presidency of UNASUR is to be held successively by each of the member States, in alphabetical order, for a one-year mandate. In addition, UNASUR has two other mechanisms of regular meetings: the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which meets every six months, and the Council of Delegates, with bimonthly meetings. Furthermore, there are subject-specific Working Groups that are set up by the Council of Ministers and coordinated by the Council of Delegates. The General Secretariat is currently the only permanent body of the organization, with its headquarters located in Quito, Ecuador. Moreover, the Secretary General is appointed by the Council of Heads of State and Government, following a proposal submitted by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for a two-year term that can only once be renewed. Besides that, the institutional development of UNASUR is characterized by meetings of the Councils (at the Ministerial level) and related Working Groups. Other institutional levels may be convened as required on a permanent or temporary basis, in order to accomplish the mandates and recommendations of the competent bodies. These bodies will report on their activities through the Council of Delegates, which will present its findings to the Council of Heads of State and Government or to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as deemed appropriate.

All the norms adopted by UNASUR shall be agreed upon by consensus. However, any member state may completely or partially refrain from implementing an approved policy, whether for a period defined beforehand, or for an indefinite period, without preventing it from later joining the total or partial implementation of that policy. In the case of the creation of institutions, organizations or programs, any member state may participate as an observer, or refrain from participating fully or partially for a definite or indefinite period.

On the subject of territorial claims, since UNASUR has no specialized body to address border dispute settlements, any dispute that may emerge between member states shall be settled through direct negotiations. If negotiations fail, the dispute will be submitted to the consideration of the Council of Delegates and, if that proves ineffective, the complaint will be addressed to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which will have the final word in the matter.

The treaty underlines the fact that one of the main objectives of UNASUR is the development of political, social and economic coordination among the region's different countries. Despite the deepening levels of interaction those countries have experienced over the last years, few objectives have been achieved and a significant number of challenges remain in the economic and social fields. For instance, the economic asymmetry in the region is a real problem. Brazil alone has a GDP of nearly half of the entire UNASUR's, but could hardly afford to finance all of the investments required to elevate the *per capita* income in South America or to reduce poverty and inequality significantly.¹⁸ Besides, the infrastructural integration, the strengthening of production chains and the establishment of trade regulations are issues that must be resolved, since they have important security implications. For that reason Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela are trying to convert their defense policies and defense industrial basis in a more propellant engine for the regional integration process.¹⁹ In this sense the proposed Security and Defense Council would promote joint military training, improved defense bases, and military industrial cooperation. Dissuasive defense would be the aim of this strategy, mainly by means of the exchange of information, joint training for peacekeeping, the holding of joint military exercises and the participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations.²⁰

At the beginning of March 2009 the South American Defense Council was officially instituted, bringing together the Ministers of Defense of the twelve member states. At that meeting, a plan of action was approved, envisaging the consolidation of a common military and regional security doctrine, as well as the creation of an information system comprising both an inventory of the states' military capabilities and reports on their military expenditures.²¹ There are already a few existing initiatives to develop effective mechanisms for security coordination in South America, although not fully institutionalized. The peace mission in

¹⁸ The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean reported that the GDP of the twelve South American countries \$2.5 trillion in 2006. Brazil alone had a GDP of \$1.06 trillion in 2006 and \$1.3 trillion in 2007.

¹⁹ Carlos Malamud, ALAMUD, Potenciales focos de conflicto bélico en América Del Sur (introducción). ARI N° 27/2008. Available at: <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/lu/>. Last Accessed: 15/07/08.

²⁰ Cf. www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/reporterbbc/story/2008/04/080415_jobimvenezuela_cj_ac.shtml.

²¹ Through the South American Defense Council, Brazil has been trying to disseminate the guidelines of the National Defense Strategy, announced in December 2008. Aiming at a joint military doctrine, as to integrate national defense policies, reduce the possibilities of conflicts among member states, as well as to promote the defense industry complex, the Brazilian government has been trying to promote itself as the mentor of the process of establishing a new security agenda for the region.

Haiti, for example, shows that interoperability and joint action are possible. Despite having faced various difficulties, the mission helped in advancing policy coordination and cooperation through a 2x9 scheme, *i.e.*, through the engagement of the Ministers of Defense and of Foreign Affairs of the countries involved (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Guatemala and Uruguay). Moreover, other important steps were taken in the Southern Cone between Argentina and Brazil, and mainly between Argentina and Chile. For instance, the workings of the Standing Committee of Argentine-Chilean Security (Comperseg), as well as the creation of a combined peace force²² in the region, are both examples of mutual confidence-building measures. Notwithstanding, the first and most important event for UNASUR's consolidation was its participation in the Bolivian conflict in September and October 2008. Alarmed by the possible split in its most central country, South America soon reacted by invoking UNASUR for the first time. On September 15th the twelve member states assembled in an emergency meeting in Chile to declare their support for Mr. Morales. As the rebels directed the attacks towards the gas infrastructure, Brazil and Argentina, which have important pragmatic interests linked to their Bolivian gas supplies, became apprehensive. Nonetheless, the utmost South American concern was undoubtedly the possible split in Bolivian territory, which could destabilize the whole continent, as well as could compromise the continent integration plans.²³ In line with this concern the mediation supported by UNASUR successfully achieved important peacemaking steps. On 17 October 2008 the South American leaders, in another effort to support Bolivia and the regional integration process as a whole, constituted a working group to discuss the creation of UNASUR's Parliament, to be based in Bolivia, demonstrating once again the intent of consolidating the Union. As a lesson from that experience, the agility of the South American reaction signaled to other countries that South America would not accept any separatism, as well as any external intervention in the continent. As Emilio Menendez del Valle states, for the first time South America has constituted itself as a guarantor of democracy and has avoided the mediation of the United States, solving its problems by its own capabilities. UNASUR's support for Mr. Morales represented thus for the first time the voice of South America as a whole, undivided in Andean or Southern countries.²⁴

In conclusion, although successful, the conflict resolution mechanism needs be more institutionalized through a robust and security-focused

²² Rojas, 'El riesgo de La superposición', p. 41.

²³ 'Separatismo e Hipótesis de Guerra Local na Bolivia'.

²⁴ Emilio Menéndez del Valle. *Bolivia: el ejemplo positivo de UNASUR*. Available at: <http://www.comunidadandina.org/prensa/articulos/elpais15-10-08.htm> Last access: 12/11/2008.

UNASUR. In this sense government officials, scholars and citizens should discuss more explicitly in both normative and analytical ways the role of security and defense in the ongoing South America integration process. To address these questions thinking outside the European Union framework, in the next two sections I will provide an analysis of two specialized regional arrangements (OSCE and SCO) designed to address contemporary security issues.

The OSCE Comprehensive Approach towards Security

The Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has its roots on the Helsinki Process of the 1970s, which resulted in the Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The fall of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe created a new dynamic to the security cooperation in the European continent, and the basic agreements celebrated on the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 were improved on the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, signed in 1990. Only in 1995, though, the CSCE would be renamed as OSCE, receiving a new institutional framework. Today, it counts 56 members from Europe, North America and Asia.²⁵

The highest-level bodies of the Organization are the Ministerial Council, which meets every year, the Permanent Council, meeting weekly at the Secretariat in Vienna, and the Forum for Security Co-operation. Summits with the presence of heads of State may also be scheduled, but they do not happen regularly. Additionally, the OSCE has a Secretariat and a Parliamentary Assembly, intended for facilitating the inter-parliamentary dialogue. This Assembly should further discuss the subjects dealt during the Ministerial meetings and assess the functioning of the Organization by issuing resolutions and recommendations.

The OSCE takes a comprehensive approach to security, dealing with it in three dimensions: political/military, human, and economic/environmental. Within the political-military dimension, the OSCE deals with classic security issues, such as arms and border controls, but also with conflict prevention, terrorism, combat of illicit narcotics and arms trafficking, as well as other kinds of transnational criminal activities. The human dimension of the OSCE works in fields such as democratization, education, electoral activities, minority rights and free media, tolerance and non-discrimination, environmental activities and gender equality. The economic and environmental dimension, in which the OSCE works in close cooperation with other international organizations, includes combating corruption and money laundering, as well as the management of natural resources.

²⁵ For a list of member states, see Table 1.

In order to deal successfully with all those issues, aside from the aforementioned bodies, the Organization depends on a High Commissioner on National Minorities, a Representative on Freedom of the Media and an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. It also includes several missions and field activities throughout Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia in order to monitor stressful situations and to facilitate early warning and conflict managing.

The OSCE is a model for other regional security organizations, since it was the first to deal with security problems using a multi-dimensional approach; it is also the most comprehensive regional security organization, both in scope and membership from different continents. This Organization (including its predecessor, the CSCE) has established an alternative way of treating security problems by not remaining restricted only to politico-military questions, which were so present during the Cold War, and by being able to address the problems that reached the European continent during the 1990s in a more global way.

In the context of the end of the Cold War, the CSCE was the first Organization to understand the necessity of systemic and institutional co-operation for the combat and prevention of threats, and to develop mechanisms to deal with them more adequately, from informal mechanisms to treaties and other institutionalized procedures. A good example of these mechanisms was the concept of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), which aim at guaranteeing a more transparent relationship between countries – especially when military activities are concerned. Although these measures are not established through a formal treaty and do not imply judicial constraints, they have a relevant pedagogical effect, working as an important tool to enhance cooperation among countries and to establish the fundamental ground for further security cooperation.²⁶

The CBMs are designed to help control military activity and to provide early warnings when any country starts to develop unusual military activities. A few examples of CBMs that have proven to be effective include the annual meetings of Ministers of Defense; the exchange of defense-related information; the publication of Defense White Papers; prior notification of major military maneuvers; exchange of observers; exchange of military personnel by formal invitation, including visits by foreign delegations; exchange of information on existing forces, including their structure, deployment, peacetime authorized forces and major weapons and equipment systems down to brigade/regiment level; exchange of information about the deployment of major weapons and equipment systems; and the publication of annual military budgets, among others.

²⁶ Marcel de Haas, 'The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the OSCE: Two of a kind?' *Helsinki Monitor: Security and Human Rights*, 2007, no. 3.

Although the latest developments within the OSCE and the European context in general have culminated in the establishment of the concept of *comprehensive security*, which states that the management of security issues should not be restricted to the politico-military dimension, but also includes the economic, environmental and human dimensions, the basis for the OSCE still is the establishment of better military and political relations, as regularly experienced by every existent security organization. In this sense the OSCE is a pioneer organization and could be seen as a model to be followed by other regional organisations that expect to play a similar role.

However, precisely because of the wide range of aspects and activities featured by the OSCE, and mainly because of the vast number of countries that take part in the Organization, it has seen its scope of action and the very effectiveness of its activities diminish. First of all, there are other organizations that deal with the same subjects addressed by the OSCE in Europe competing with it. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most important of them, even if it does not work in the same way or follow the same principles as the OSCE. As for the issues of human rights and the rule of law, the European Union relies on the Council of Europe with its charter. The first signs of failure and weakness of the OSCE can be traced back to the mid- and late 1990s during the Yugoslav wars, where the Organization was overshadowed by the aforementioned structures. Besides, as 56 countries form the OSCE, with the rise of new security concerns, it is getting harder to find common ground among countries that participate in specific regional structures such as those from Central Asia.²⁷

Although the OSCE is an important model for other regions wishing to establish similar structures, the European experience has to be adapted in order to suit other continents. Although it is important to expand the dimensions of security for the South American continent, as the OSCE managed to achieve, this could be a very delicate matter, especially because imposing a too broad agenda to South American political leaders who face very specific threats and risks could lead to the disintegration of this initiative. The complexity of the OSCE structure is another point that has to be viewed with some criticism, although some important aspects, such as the creation of different branches of activities, could be adapted to South America. The same caveat is obviously valid for the next organization to be considered here.

²⁷ P. Terrence Hopmann, 'Can the OSCE Be Saved?' Paper presented at the Second Global International Studies Conference, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 23–26 July 2008. See the revised version of the paper in this volume.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its Security Focus

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a permanent inter-governmental organization, which was established in 2001 by the governments of Kazakhstan, China, Kirghizstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Its current institutional design evolved from the 'Shanghai Five', an initiative comprised by five of the aforementioned countries, with the sole exception of Uzbekistan, and which dates back to 1996. According to Marcel de Haas,²⁸ the institutional development of the SCO could be divided in three phases:

1) *Confidence and security building measures (1996–2001)*, when the basic objectives were to increase trust in border territories in general, as well as to reduce military forces in borderlands of countries that used to be hostile to each other throughout most of the Cold War (for instance, China and the former Soviet Union).

2) *Regional security against terrorism, separatism and extremism (2001–2004)*, when the Shanghai convention was signed, the first cross-border anti-terrorist exercises were conducted, and the two permanent bodies of the OCS, which will later on be reassessed, were established.

3) *Comprehensive international organization (2004–present)*. During the third phase, SCO evolved into an organization that pursued international recognition and cooperation with similar organizations (for example, forwarding initiatives such as the Memorandum of Understanding with UN, ASEAN, OCSE, CIS etc). Likewise, the number of states that held the status of observers of the SCO was raised from one (Mongolia) to four (India, Pakistan and Iran). Since then, the organization has developed military exercises almost on a yearly basis, including the 2005 Russian-Chinese Peace Mission, the 2006 'East Antiterror' mission, and the 2007 'Issik-Kul Antiterror' operation, conducted in the northern Kyrgyzstan.

In general terms the SCO's institutional design is organized in the form of two basic mechanisms of interaction: one of periodic meetings, and a permanent structure. The first mechanism comprises the meetings of the Council of Heads of State, and the Council of Heads of Government, as well as meetings carried on by the official representatives of other sectors – Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Culture, Economy, Defense, Transportation, and the Council of National Coordinators.²⁹

²⁸ Marcel de HAAS, ed., *The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Towards a Full-Grown Security Alliance*. The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations/Clingdael, 2007, p. 10.

²⁹ There are some areas of cooperation and disagreement between the SCO and OSCE, as well as between SCO and the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), or even between SCO and NATO, but this is not the focus here. For a preliminary assessment, see Haas, ed., *The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation*.

THE STRUCTURE OF SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION




Figure 1. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Main Structures

Source: Russia's Presidency of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2008–2009 <http://en.sco2009.ru/docs/sco/scheme.html> (accessed 27 August 2009)

The SCO's Council of Heads of State is the higher decision-making body in the organization, followed by the Council of the Heads of Government, which annually discusses multilateral cooperation in Central Asia. The latter is also responsible for approving the Organization's annual budget. Furthermore, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs holds regular meetings to discuss the present international situation and the interactions between SCO and other international organizations. Finally, the Council of National Coordinators co-ordinates the multilateral cooperation of the member states under the scope of SCO's charter.

The second mechanism of interaction, namely the permanent structure, is composed by the two permanent bodies of the organization – the Secretariat, established in 2004 and located in Shanghai (China), and the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS), created in 2002 and located in Tashkent (Uzbekistan). SCO's Secretariat is the main executive body of the Organization. It implements organizational decisions, projects and documents (such as statements and agenda), functioning as the documental

depository of the Organization and also managing all the activities addressed by the SCO.

Through the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS) the SCO member states also take part in the Shanghai Convention on terrorism, separatism and extremism. Bearing in mind the objectives and principles of the United Nations related to peace and international security, good relations with neighbouring countries and cooperation among states, as well as perceiving that terrorism, separatism and extremism are a threat to peace and security of nations, Kazakhstan, China, Kirghizstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan decided to create a mechanism of joint control. Therefore, convinced of the necessity of coordinating actions of common interest so as to ensure territorial integrity, security and stability, and to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism, RATS was established. This structure has been successful in acquiring the capacity to deal with groups that oppose to the governments of the member states.

In a broader sense the SCO contributes to stability in the vast Central Asian region, which comprises not only reserves of natural resources, but also includes conflict areas. A common strategy among great powers is to carefully incorporate new actors as minor partners, either for the purpose of tactical convenience or due to the necessity of reflecting new power realities, originated by the ever changing international dynamics. As a part of the Chinese-Russian strategy of coopting neighbouring countries to their sphere of influence, China and Russia intend to bring economic growth and cooperation to their regional partners – in that sense a Chinese credit fund was established to facilitate the SCO members' access to financing. Furthermore, one could also mention the cooperation between China, Russia and Kazakhstan in the energy field, as well as the economic and commercial cooperation among the organization's six members.³⁰

In the security field the SCO promotes the stability of the governments that take part in it, thus combating domestic and foreign insurgent groups that contest the central governments' authority. Security is the key issue in SCO, since the main problem faced in the region is the low level of control in border relations, as well as the presence of alleged terrorist or extremist groups in their territories. For that reason the SCO has adopted very precise and rigid definitions for terrorism, separatism and extremism, which is somewhat rare among international organizations. In practical terms, SCO nations seek to contend terrorism by combating separatism and religious (Islamic) extremism. The region's emphasis on security matters is, therefore, an effort that aims at guaranteeing the

³⁰ The only Central Asian country that is not a SCO member is Turkmenistan, although its president Gurbanguly Berdimukhammedov did attend the SCO Bishkek Summit (August 2007) and might be interested in joining the so called SCO 'Energy Club'. *Ibid.*, p. 10)

territorial integrity of each country and the maintenance of secular regimes in Central Asia.

Another growing security concern with which the SCO deals is drug-related, notably the rise in the production of poppies in Afghanistan and the illegal transnational commerce in heroin. On that matter, SCO's members signed in 2004 an Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Illegal Turnover of Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances and the Precursors Thereof.

Despite SCO's tradition in addressing matters of security, it has been pointed out that the future of the organization depends on its members' ability to cooperate in the economic field, as well. Since the region is extremely rich in resources that are increasingly necessary, but tend to be scarce in the near future, the absence of cooperation in economic affairs could induce a level of competition that would obliterate any integration initiative. Formally, the organization already works toward that type of cooperation, although the approved projects have yet to come to full implementation.

In short, the 'Shanghai Spirit' symbolizes a new type of international security cooperation model, less bureaucratic, less comprehensive and much more practical for countries that are not among the richest ones. On the less positive side, the authoritarian nature of the political regimes involved in the SCO process could hardly serve as a model for South America, where one of the biggest challenges for reform in the security field is exactly to find a balance between state effectiveness in providing safety and security to all citizens and strong legitimacy achieved by accountability and democratic control of institutions.

CONCLUSION

As one compares even briefly the institutional design, types of operations and the strategic rationales of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a couple of recommendations can be made for South America. From the OSCE experience, a too broadly defined mission based upon a comprehensive concept of human security should be avoided. It was important for OSCE at some point, in order to focus on citizens instead of states as well as to provide a common agenda for very different types of states and regional security contexts. Missions of this type, 'with a relatively low profile, have played a central role in managing all of the conflicts that have emerged in the broad European regions following the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the large multinational states of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia'.³¹ With the renewed conflicts between

³¹ Hopmann, 'Can the OSCE Be Saved?' p. 10.

secessionists and central governments, civil wars and militarized interstate disputes in different parts 'east of Vienna' over the last fifteen years, the very same comprehensiveness that was so useful in the beginning became dysfunctional, and the OSCE has lost appeal for most stakeholders, including Russia, the United States, and the European Union.

Many of those non-traditional security concepts dealt with by the OSCE are already in the existing agenda of an institution from the American continent, the OAS. One of the central purposes of the Organization was 'to strengthen the peace and security of the continent'. The OAS was supposed to act on a number of today's transnational security threats in the Western Hemisphere, such as arms trafficking, human trafficking, drug trafficking, terrorism, territorial disputes, landmines and natural disasters. With the purpose of effectively dealing with those issues, the OAS has established several organs and conventions, such as the 1997 Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials (CIFTA), the 2006 Meeting of National Authorities on Trafficking in Persons, the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), The Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) and the Inter-American Committee on Natural Disasters Reduction.

Following the September 2001 attacks the OAS struggle against terrorism was enlarged with the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism (2002), following the 1999 Inter-American Committee on Terrorism (CICTE). The CICTE programs offer technical and legal assistance, as well as specialized training in areas as port security, airport security, and customs and border security. Since the United States' and the Colombian governments did claim that a major terrorism problem existed in Colombia, the OAS held a Special Conference on Security in 2003, expressing solidarity with the people and government of Colombia 'in their fight against terrorism and other destabilizing threats and the defence of their democratic institutions'.³² Since then, the counter-terrorism agenda in the region has developed in such a way that the OAS was perceived as just another diplomatic tool of the U.S. government in the region. In short, the OAS cannot provide a complete and more balanced framework for security cooperation in South America because it lacks legitimacy, resources, and focus on the real problems as defined by the South American governments and the local citizens. It may have a complementary role mediating South and North, but even that remains to be seen.

For a loose comparison, the areas where the OSCE is still making a difference in Eurasia (namely border control cooperation, education programs, and law enforcement assistance) are largely complementary or

³² http://www.oas.org/key_issues/eng/Keyissue_Detail.asp?kis_sec=10

compatible with the less 'soft' security agenda of SCO. Created in order to lessen the tensions between China and the former Soviet republics in its surroundings, the SCO structures and *raison d'être* changed dramatically after 2001. Built upon a strong base of confidence measures on border issues and counter-terrorism, the SCO is slowly expanding its cooperation agenda towards more conventional defence and military themes, as well as economic issues, energy, and general state capacity building.

As mentioned before, although UNASUR is still being built, there are theoretical and political reasons to avoid modelling it exclusively after the European Union or North America's security institutions. Theoretically, most of the critics of the SCO model wrongly assume that from 'state weakness flows the internal security dilemma and from that, in turn, the sovereignty-reinforcing international organizations'.³³ The link between the weakness or strength of a state apparatus and its alliance pattern seems to be just the opposite, not to mention the inherent problems with the concept of weak state.³⁴ Politically, the same sort of criticism just assumes naively that the European Union ought to be superior for some hidden moral reason. The thinking goes like this: 'Regional security organizations do not pool sovereignty so much as amass it for joint, coordinated repression. Weak-state regional international organizations are mutual sovereignty reinforcement coalitions, not integrationist regional bodies like the European Union. The joint strategy regionalizes not sovereignty but domestic conflict and elite pushback'.³⁵ It does not seem necessary that regional security organizations in the Third World will inevitably work that way.

Even taking these somewhat disarranged caveats into full consideration, it does not exempt us from at least thinking about alternatives to the European Union model, which would be costly, heavily bureaucratic, technologically underdeveloped and too regulated to work properly in a context like South America. As for the Defence or Security Council now under study in South America, a sort of combination between a 'thin' and broad normative basis similar to the 'spirit of the OSCE' pre-2001 (focusing on the civil rights of the citizens and confidence building measures) and the effectiveness and priority (SCO style) rendered to the actual security threats of the region (in opposition to a generic 'Global War on Terrorism' type of agenda) might prove worth of trying. Hopefully this text will help to foster the debate about the options and timing.

³³ Kelly, 'Security Theory in the "New Regionalism"', p. 218).

³⁴ The under balancing behavior in South America can and should be explained in realist terms as well. For a first attempt, see: Randall Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power*. Princeton-NJ, Princeton University Press, 2006.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 219).

Table 1. Comparing UNASUR, OSCE, and SCO

| | UNASUR | SCO | OSCE |
|--|--|--|--|
| Year of Formation | 2008 | 2001 | 1995 |
| Year of Previous Initiative | 2004 | 1996 | 1973 |
| Region | South America | Asia | Europe-Asia-North America |
| Number of Member States | 12 | 06 | 56 |
| State Members | Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela | China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan | Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Vatican City, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan |
| Observers/Partners | Panama and Mexico attended the inaugural meeting | Iran, Pakistan, India and Mongolia | Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Japan, South Korea, Mongolia, Thailand USA, Russia, France, United Kingdom |
| Nuclear Powers as State Members or observers partners | NONE Tlatelolco Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean | Russia and China; Pakistan and India | |

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Table 1. Continued

| Related Organizations | UN, OAS, CAN, MERCOSUR, OTCA | UN, CIS, CSTO | UN, EU, NATO, CIS |
|----------------------------------|--|--|---|
| Primary Focus | Economic Integration | State Security Cooperation | Comprehensive Security Dialogue |
| Objectives and Activities | Equitable social and human development, the eradication of illiteracy, the universal access to quality education and the regional recognition of courses and titles; energy integration; infrastructure for the interconnection of the region; financial integration; protection of biodiversity, water resources and ecosystems; cooperation in the prevention of catastrophes; consolidation of a South American identity; universal access to social security and health services; migratory regularization and harmonization of policies; reduction of poverty; industrial and productive integration; cooperative research and technological development; promotion of cultural diversity; fight against corruption, the global drug problem, trafficking in persons, trafficking in small and light weapons, terrorism, transnational organized crime and other threats; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; cooperation among the judicial authorities of the Member States of UNASUR, and the exchange of information and experiences in matters of defense. | Strengthening mutual trust, friendship and good neighborliness; enhancement of military security by promoting dialogue, transparency, cooperation and commitments on military conduct; disarmament and arms control; border security and management; police and other law enforcement assistance programs; conflict prevention; combating terrorism; combating transnational organized crime such as drugs, human beings and arms trafficking; supporting economic growth and cooperation; education interchanges; counteracting separatism and extremism; counteracting illegal immigration; regional cooperation in culture, sports, tourism, science and technology, trade, energy, transport, credit, finance and health care. | Anti-trafficking, arms control, border management, combat terrorism, democratization, economic growth, education programs, election assistance projects, environmental activities, gender equality, human rights, media freedom, military reform, conflict prevention, minority rights, policing and police reform, as well as promotion of the rule of law, tolerance and non-discrimination based upon racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and so on. |

Source: Adapted from Haas (2007:259) and complemented with information obtained at <http://www.sectesco.org>; <http://www.osce.org> and <http://www.mre.gov.br>.

Table 2. Armed Forces in South America

| Country | Total | Army | Air Force | Navy |
|-----------|---------|---------|-----------|--------|
| Argentina | 72,700 | 42,500 | 13,200 | 17,000 |
| Bolivia | 33,500 | 25,000 | 4,000 | 4,500 |
| Brazil | 293,500 | 195,000 | 50,000 | 48,500 |
| Chile | 81,000 | 45,000 | 13,000 | 23,000 |
| Colombia | 210,300 | 180,000 | 7,300 | 23,000 |
| Ecuador | 457,000 | 47,000 | 4,000 | 6,500 |
| Guyana | 1,630 | 1,500 | 100 | 30 |
| Paraguay | 18,600 | 14,900 | 1,700 | 2,000 |
| Peru | 110,000 | 70,000 | 14,500 | 25,500 |
| Suriname | 3,140 | 2,800 | 100 | 240 |
| Uruguay | 23,500 | 14,500 | 3,000 | 6,000 |
| Venezuela | 79,000 | 34,000 | 7,000 | 15,000 |

Notes: Reserves not included.

Including National Guard.

Source: Jane's Information Group, 2007 (www.janes.com)

Table 3. Defense Expenditure in South America

| Country | Defence expenditure (USD billions) | Percent of GDP | Per head of population (USD) | Per member of armed forces (USD) |
|-----------|------------------------------------|------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Argentina | 1.53 | 1.04 | 40.2 | 21,309 |
| Bolivia | 0.12 | 1.6 | 15 | 3,700 |
| Brazil | 16.43 | 1.7 | 87.4 | 56,000 |
| Chile | 1.44 | 1.75 | 92 | 17,777 |
| Colombia | 4.0 | 3.9 | 95.23 | 10,816 |
| Ecuador | 0.7 | 1.7 | 51 | 12,174 |
| Guyana | 0.017 | 2.2 | 23.1 | 5,766 |
| Paraguay | 0.52 | 1.2 | 15 | 4,166 |
| Peru | 0.9 | 1.35 | 33.6 | 8,181 |
| Suriname | 0.03 | 2.0 | 15.0 | 9,790 |
| Uruguay | 0.17 | 1.5 | 50.45 | 6,824 |
| Venezuela | 1.2 ¹ | 1.8 ¹ | 50 ¹ | 15,227 ¹ |

Note: 1— Latest available figure

Source: Jane's Information Group, 2007 (www.janes.com)

Table 4. Economic and Social Indicators

| Country | GDP (US\$b) | GDP Growth (annual %) | GDP per capita (US\$) | Population (millions) | Population growth (average annual) | 2005 UN Human Development Index ranking |
|-----------|-------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|---|
| Argentina | 153 | 8.9 | 7,482 | 38.7 | 1.1 | 34 |
| Bolivia | 8.7 | 3.6 | 1,036 | 9.0 | 2.1 | 113 |
| Brazil | 794 | 2.3 | 3,596 | 183.9 | 1.5 | 63 |
| Chile | 115.3 | 6.3 | 5,747 | 16.1 | 1.3 | 37 |
| Colombia | 122.3 | 5 | 7,304 | 44.9 | 1.7 | 69 |
| Ecuador | 30.3 | 6.9 | 1,459 | 13.0 | 1.5 | 82 |
| Guyana | 0.79 | -0.65 | 951 | 0.75 | 0.3 | 107 |
| Paraguay | 7.3 | 3.0 | 1,361 | 6.0 | 2.5 | 88 |
| Peru | 79.4 | 6.4 | 2,650 | 27.6 | 1.6 | 79 |
| Suriname | 1.1 | 4.6 | 2,369 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 86 |
| Uruguay | 16.7 | 6.6 | 4,653 | 3.4 | 0.7 | 46 |
| Venezuela | 138.8 | 9.33 | 4,939 | 26.3 | 2.0 | 75 |

Note: World Health Organization figures. All figures from World Development Indicators. Ranked out of 177 countries (1-575: high human development; 58-145: medium human development; 146-177: low human development). Source: 2007 Jane's Information Group