@inbook {Levy2017,
	title = {{\textquotedblleft}Causa Conscientiae{\textquotedblright} in Spinoza{\textquoteright}s Ethics},
	booktitle = {Spinoza{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteleft}Ethics{\textquoteright}. A Critical Guide},
	year = {2017},
	pages = {187{\textendash}204},
	publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
	organization = {Cambridge University Press},
	address = {Cambridge},
	abstract = {<p>In this chapter, I assess Spinoza{\textquoteright}s explanation of his definition of desire at the end of the third part of the Ethics, wherein we find a peculiar expression: {\textquotedblleft}causa conscientiae,{\textquotedblright} {\textquotedblleft}the cause of consciousness{\textquotedblright} (E3deffaff1). Surprisingly, this phrase has not been taken into much consideration in the recent revival of interest in Spinoza{\textquoteright}s view of this aspect of human experience.2 A careful study of this text will shed some fresh light on Spinoza{\textquoteright}s general discussion of consciousness and provide a new answer to the question of why, according to Spinoza, philosophy ought not to start with the indubitable act of thinking of a self-conscious subject.3 This new answer, which differs from the usual {\textendash} and also undoubtedly correct {\textendash} one, makes no use of Spinoza{\textquoteright}s conception of the true order of understanding, and therefore that of true philosophy, but relies rather on the sense and limits of the conception of consciousness that can be apprehended from the analysis of this passage.</p>
},
	keywords = {conatus, consci{\^e}ncia de si, Espinosa, sujeito},
	doi = {10.1017/9781316339213.010},
	url = {http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9781316339213A018},
	author = {Levy, Lia},
	editor = {Melamed, Yitzhak Y.}
}
