@article {ARTICLE13,
	title = {Hume, Liberty and the Object of Moral Evaluation. Kriterion,},
	journal = {Kriterion},
	volume = {44},
	year = {2003},
	note = {<p>} pages = {191-208</p>
},
	abstract = {<p>Hume{\textquoteright}s project concerning the conflict between liberty and necessity is "reconciliatory". But what is the nature of Hume{\textquoteright}s project? Does he solve a problem in metaphysics only? And when Hume says that the dispute between the doctrines of liberty and necessity is merely verbal, does he mean that there is no genuine metaphysical dispute between the doctrines? In the present essay I argue for: (1) there is room for liberty in Hume{\textquoteright}s philosophy, and not only because the position is pro forma compatibilist, even though this has importance for the recognition that Hume{\textquoteright}s main concern when discussing the matter is with practice; (2) the position does not involve a "subjectivization" of every form of necessity: it is not compatibilist because it creates a space for the claim that the operations of the will are non-problematically necessary through a weakning of the notion of necessity as it applies to external objects; (3) Hume holds that the ordinary phenomena of mental causation do not preempt the atribuition of moral responsibility, which combines perfectly with his identification of the object of moral evaluation: the whole of the character of a person, in relation to which there is, nonetheless, liberty. I intend to support my assertions by a close reading of what Hume states in section 8 of the first Enquiry.</p>
},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1590/S0100-512X2003000200004},
	author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}}
}
