@article {ARTICLE11,
	title = {Indetermination of the Mental in Anomalous Monism and Particularism in Agency},
	journal = {Phil{\'o}sophos},
	volume = {12},
	year = {2007},
	note = {<p>} pages = {33-54</p>
},
	abstract = {<p>Anomalous Monism is characterized by two major theses: (1) that the mental is indeterminate (anomalous) and (2) that rationalizations are causal explanations, more specifically though, of a sort that depends on the identification of mental particulars {\textendash} events {\textendash} which possess causal efficacy. This paper criticizes the thesis of the indetermination in a limited way, only in so far as it is based on the conception of rationalizations connected with a specific metaphysics of action: particularism. I try to show that the explanation of actions in terms of the explanations of the occurrence of particulars in mistaken. Positively, I propose that the agent is the causer, not of her actions, but rather of the results of her actions. Consequently, actions may be conceived as the causations of events by an agent, they will then be the causations of the results of the actions of the agent. This proposal clearly explores the possibility that actions themselves are not events. I intend only to bring to the fore of the philosophical discussion of action this possibility, because I see it as the unexplored theme of much of the current discussion of the topic.</p>
},
	url = {https://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/3377},
	author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}}
}
