@article {ARTICLE3,
	title = {Hume on pleasure and value and the Kantian challenge},
	journal = {Filosofia Unisinos},
	volume = {19},
	year = {2018},
	note = {<p>} pages = {140-149</p>
},
	abstract = {<p>In this paper I examine Hume{\textquoteright}s claims about the nature of moral sentiments (mainly in T 3.1.2) using as a foil the Kantian challenge to all material practical principles: they are all of the same type, being based on self-love and making all choices, including moral ones, hedonically fungible. The paper explores Hume{\textquoteright}s views on pleasure as constitutive of moral sentiment as an answer to that challenge arguing that for him only pleasure is essentially valuable for beings like us. It thus grounds a notion of value which, through a {\textquotedblleft}progressive or dynamic{\textquotedblright} view of human nature, informs a conception of moral pleasure {\textendash} a {\textquotedblleft}taste in character traits{\textquotedblright} {\textendash} as a distinctive type of pleasure that is not amenable to a mere quantitative criterium to guide moral choice.</p>
},
	url = {http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/16283},
	author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}}
}
