@article {KLAUDAT2019, title = {Motiva{\c c}{\~a}o e realismo na filosofia moral de Hume}, journal = {Kriterion}, volume = {60}, year = {2019}, note = {

n/a

}, pages = {7 - 21}, publisher = {scielo}, issn = {0100-512X}, url = {http://ref.scielo.org/7ndmkw}, author = {Klaudat, Andr} } @article {ARTICLE2, title = {Prudence, Happiness and Wisdom in Kant{\textquoteright}s Moral Philosophy: the case in the Groundwork}, journal = {Studia Kantiana}, volume = {17}, year = {2019}, note = {

} pages = {85-99

}, abstract = {n/a}, url = {http://www.sociedadekant.org/studiakantiana/index.php/sk/article/view/375}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}} } @article {ARTICLE3, title = {Hume on pleasure and value and the Kantian challenge}, journal = {Filosofia Unisinos}, volume = {19}, year = {2018}, note = {

} pages = {140-149

}, abstract = {

In this paper I examine Hume{\textquoteright}s claims about the nature of moral sentiments (mainly in T 3.1.2) using as a foil the Kantian challenge to all material practical principles: they are all of the same type, being based on self-love and making all choices, including moral ones, hedonically fungible. The paper explores Hume{\textquoteright}s views on pleasure as constitutive of moral sentiment as an answer to that challenge arguing that for him only pleasure is essentially valuable for beings like us. It thus grounds a notion of value which, through a {\textquotedblleft}progressive or dynamic{\textquotedblright} view of human nature, informs a conception of moral pleasure {\textendash} a {\textquotedblleft}taste in character traits{\textquotedblright} {\textendash} as a distinctive type of pleasure that is not amenable to a mere quantitative criterium to guide moral choice.

}, url = {http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/16283}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}} } @inbook {CHAPTER1, title = {Motiva{\c c}{\~a}o e Valor em Hume e Kant}, booktitle = {O lugar das emo{\c c}{\~o}es na {\'e}tica e na metaf{\'\i}sica}, year = {2018}, note = {n/a}, pages = {397-415}, publisher = {Editora da UFPel}, organization = {Editora da UFPel}, type = {Book Section}, address = {Pelotas}, abstract = {n/a}, author = {Klaudat,}, editor = {Williges, Flavio and Fishborn, Marcelo and Copp, David} } @inbook {CHAPTER2, title = {Disgrace e a Amoralidade do Desejo}, booktitle = {Lendo J. M. Coetzee}, year = {2015}, note = {n/a}, pages = {255-270}, publisher = {Editora da UFSM}, organization = {Editora da UFSM}, type = {Book Section}, address = {Santa Maria}, abstract = {n/a}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}}, editor = {Rosenfield, Kathrin and Pereira, Lawrence} } @article {ARTICLE4, title = {Kant sobre a vontade: a influ{\^e}ncia luterana}, journal = {Veritas}, volume = {60}, year = {2015}, note = {

} pages = {594-630

}, abstract = {

A vontade racional (e a sua atividade como vontade pura) {\'e} a faculdade investigada por Kant na sua Metaf{\'\i}sica dos costumes. Neste artigo, procuro esclarecer a concep{\c c}{\~a}o que Kant tem dessa faculdade, isto {\'e}, como um poder causal constitu{\'\i}do por uma norma. Para tanto, s{\~a}o analisados tr{\^e}s textos-chave de Kant. A compara{\c c}{\~a}o com a posi{\c c}{\~a}o luterana sobre a concupisc{\^e}ncia sugere uma forte influ{\^e}ncia dessa posi{\c c}{\~a}o sobre a concep{\c c}{\~a}o kantiana da vontade.

}, url = {https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/ojs/index.php/veritas/article/view/24291}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}} } @article {ARTICLE5, title = {O Elemento Social no Ideal do Reino dos Fins}, journal = {Dissertatio}, volume = {39}, year = {2014}, note = {

} pages = {73-92

}, abstract = {

O Ideal do Reino dos Fins {\textendash} apresentado por Kant com vistas {\`a} introdu{\c c}{\~a}o de uma f{\'o}rmula do Imperativo Categ{\'o}rico - {\'e} muitas vezes interpretado como o elemento social do qual a teoria moral do autor careceria. Seres humanos seriam agentes morais concebidos como membros legisladores de uma ordem social poss{\'\i}vel. Contra essa interpreta{\c c}{\~a}o argumentarei que a dimens{\~a}o social introduzida pela concep{\c c}{\~a}o t{\'e}cnica desse Ideal {\'e} propriamente racional, apresentando uma exig{\^e}ncia normativa genuinamente cosmopolita, que, n{\~a}o obstante, confere {\`a} teoria os recursos para o tratamento moral adequado da sociabilidade de facto da ag{\^e}ncia moral, pois, afinal, as condi{\c c}{\~o}es de nossa ag{\^e}ncia efetiva s{\~a}o sociais.

}, url = {https://periodicos.ufpel.edu.br/ojs2/index.php/dissertatio/article/view/8580}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}} } @inbook {CHAPTER4, title = {Teoria Moral Intermedi{\'a}ria em Kant: entre a Teoria Moral e a Antropologia}, booktitle = {Moral e antropologia em Kant}, year = {2013}, note = {n/a}, pages = {117-143}, publisher = {IFIBE}, organization = {IFIBE}, type = {Book Section}, abstract = {n/a}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}}, editor = {Santos, Robinson and Chagas, Flavia} } @inbook {CHAPTER3, title = {"Conflito de Deveres" e a Estrutura da Experi{\^e}ncia Moral em Kant}, booktitle = {Ensaios sobre Kant}, year = {2012}, note = {n/a}, pages = {135-157}, publisher = {Linus}, organization = {Linus}, type = {Book Section}, address = {Porto Alegre}, abstract = {n/a}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}}, editor = {Louzado, Gerson} } @article {ARTICLE8, title = {Hedonismo e Sumo Bem em Kant}, journal = {Studia Kantiana}, volume = {11}, year = {2011}, note = {

} pages = {78-95

}, abstract = {n/a}, url = {http://www.sociedadekant.org/studiakantiana/index.php/sk/article/view/91}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}} } @article {ARTICLE6, title = {Hume and Literature as Moral Philosophy}, journal = {Philia e Filia}, volume = {2}, year = {2011}, note = {

} pages = {178-194

}, abstract = {

Em anos recentes um n{\'u}mero expressivo de fil{\'o}sofos tem defendido que a Literatura {\'e} parte do estudo da Filosofia Moral. Eles argumentam, principalmente com rela{\c c}{\~a}o a novelas, em raz{\~a}o de suas caracter{\'\i}sticas narrativas, que essas obras cont{\^e}m pensamento moral que objetiva convencer racionalmente ao se constitu{\'\i}rem como formas de instru{\c c}{\~a}o emocional. Neste trabalho, eu gostaria de oferecer uma resposta {\`a} pergunta sobre se David Hume em sua filosofia pr{\'a}tica est{\'a} comprometido com tal vis{\~a}o das rela{\c c}{\~o}es entre a Literatura e a Filosofia Moral e se eles pensa que seja adequado usar as t{\'e}cnicas normalmente consideradas pertencerem {\`a} Literatura no seu of{\'\i}cio de fil{\'o}sofo moral. Minha resposta ser{\'a} negativa.

}, url = {https://seer.ufrgs.br/Philiaefilia/article/view/23931}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}} } @article {ARTICLE7, title = {A obriga{\c c}{\~a}o da promessa em Hume}, journal = {Kriterion}, volume = {52}, year = {2011}, note = {

} pages = {429-445

}, abstract = {

Neste texto examino o sentido da obrigatoriedade da promessa em Hume, especialmente no contexto da sua classifica{\c c}{\~a}o da virtude do cumprimento das promessas como virtudes artificiais. Nisso a posi{\c c}{\~a}o de Hume se distingue das posi{\c c}{\~o}es aristot{\'e}lica e kantiana em Anscombe e Herman respectivamente. Mas, o problema principal - que n{\~a}o h{\'a} um motivo natural para o cumprimento das promessas- divide int{\'e}rpretes de Hume: Cohon e Baier. Defendo, seguindo Baier, que, embora n{\~a}o haja o referido motivo natural, h{\'a} uma paix{\~a}o ou motivos eficientes - por certo, n{\~a}o naturais como o motivo natural que nos conduz ao cuidado dos nossos filhos - que {\'e} o auto-interesse esclarecido: ele {\'e} auto-interesse e assim real e natural num sentido; e {\'e} esclarecido porque no reconhecimento de sua correspond{\^e}ncia nos outros se engendra um v{\'\i}nculo com o benef{\'\i}cio comum, no sentido de "de todos e de cada um".

}, issn = {0100-512X}, url = {http://ref.scielo.org/54fhmv}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}} } @inbook {CHAPTER5, title = {Vontade e luteranismo em Kant}, booktitle = {Estudos de filosofia moderna}, year = {2011}, note = {n/a}, pages = {181-193}, publisher = {IFIBE/UFPel}, organization = {IFIBE/UFPel}, type = {Book Section}, address = {Passo Fundo}, abstract = {n/a}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}}, editor = {Rocha, Ethel and Levy, Lia} } @article {ARTICLE9, title = {Os Princ{\'\i}pios de Aplica{\c c}{\~a}o da Metaf{\'\i}sica dos Costumes de Kant}, journal = {Ethic@}, volume = {9}, year = {2010}, note = {

} pages = {77-87

}, abstract = {

Que a lei moral em Kant esteja assentada numa base a priori {\'e} conhecido e {\'e} objeto de intensa discuss{\~a}o. Que a Metaf{\'\i}sica dos Costumes seja a articula{\c c}{\~a}o metaf{\'\i}sica de um sistema de deveres na sua filosofia pr{\'a}tica tamb{\'e}m {\'e} bem conhecido e muitas vezes contestado. Mas que os {\textquotedblleft}princ{\'\i}pios de aplica{\c c}{\~a}o{\textquotedblright} da Metaf{\'\i}sica dos Costumes perten{\c c}am a ela mesma, e sejam consequentemente a priori, isso n{\~a}o {\'e} t{\~a}o frequentemente reconhecido. Procuro mostrar neste trabalho o que isso significa e como isso ainda permite a Kant falar da aplica{\c c}{\~a}o dessa metaf{\'\i}sica, geradora de deveres para seres como n{\'o}s. A solu{\c c}{\~a}o me parece estar na compreens{\~a}o das voli{\c c}{\~o}es e m{\'a}ximas dos seres humanos em termos que as tornam intrinsecamente pass{\'\i}veis de avalia{\c c}{\~o}es por parte da raz{\~a}o pura pr{\'a}tica. Essa compreens{\~a}o faculta a Kant a exposi{\c c}{\~a}o de deveres (inclusive os de virtude), cuja natureza geral {\'e} a de serem exig{\^e}ncias racionais morais estritas, para seres sens{\'\i}veis imperfeitos como n{\'o}s que vivemos num mundo como o nosso.

}, url = {https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/1677-2954.2010v9n1p77}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}} } @inbook {CHAPTER6, title = {A utilidade da filosofia}, booktitle = {A filosofia e seu ensino}, year = {2010}, note = {n/a}, pages = {181-194}, publisher = {Sulina}, organization = {Sulina}, type = {Book Section}, address = {Porto Alegre}, abstract = {n/a}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}}, editor = {Novaes, Jos{\'e} and Azevedo, Marco} } @inbook {CHAPTER7, title = {O problema de Hume e os destinos da metaf{\'\i}sica}, booktitle = {Li{\c c}{\~o}es de hist{\'o}ria da filosofia}, year = {2009}, note = {n/a}, publisher = {SEC/IEL}, organization = {SEC/IEL}, type = {Book Section}, address = {Porto Alegre}, abstract = {n/a}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}} } @article {ARTICLE11, title = {Indetermination of the Mental in Anomalous Monism and Particularism in Agency}, journal = {Phil{\'o}sophos}, volume = {12}, year = {2007}, note = {

} pages = {33-54

}, abstract = {

Anomalous Monism is characterized by two major theses: (1) that the mental is indeterminate (anomalous) and (2) that rationalizations are causal explanations, more specifically though, of a sort that depends on the identification of mental particulars {\textendash} events {\textendash} which possess causal efficacy. This paper criticizes the thesis of the indetermination in a limited way, only in so far as it is based on the conception of rationalizations connected with a specific metaphysics of action: particularism. I try to show that the explanation of actions in terms of the explanations of the occurrence of particulars in mistaken. Positively, I propose that the agent is the causer, not of her actions, but rather of the results of her actions. Consequently, actions may be conceived as the causations of events by an agent, they will then be the causations of the results of the actions of the agent. This proposal clearly explores the possibility that actions themselves are not events. I intend only to bring to the fore of the philosophical discussion of action this possibility, because I see it as the unexplored theme of much of the current discussion of the topic.

}, url = {https://revistas.ufg.br/philosophos/article/view/3377}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}} } @article {ARTICLE10, title = {Necessary Sentiment" and Moral Sensibility in Kant}, journal = {Studia Kantiana}, volume = {10}, year = {2007}, note = {

} pages = {7-26

}, abstract = {

O objetivo desse trabalho {\'e} trazer para um foco mais preciso as rela{\c c}{\~o}es da moralidade com a sensibilidade humana no pensamento de Kant. Visto que, por um lado, a vontade humana {\'e} uma {\textquotedblleft}faculdade de desejar{\textquotedblright} que est{\'a} necessariamente vinculada ao prazer e desprazer, e que, por outro lado, a tarefa filos{\'o}fica em rela{\c c}{\~a}o ao tema {\'e} concebida como {\textquotedblleft}metaf{\'\i}sica{\textquotedblright}, isto {\'e}, de abordagem a priori, tem-se que os dados do problema n{\~a}o sugerem uma solu{\c c}{\~a}o f{\'a}cil. A teoria kantiana do respeito {\textendash} o {\textquotedblleft}sentimento necess{\'a}rio{\textquotedblright} {\textendash} como o m{\'o}bil da raz{\~a}o pura pr{\'a}tica {\'e} o locus classicus quando se busca essa solu{\c c}{\~a}o. A lei moral tem um efeito necess{\'a}rio sobre a sensibilidade de agentes como n{\'o}s. Nossa ag{\^e}ncia, inicialmente, se orienta naturalmente pelo amor-pr{\'o}prio, e inevitavelmente sucumbe {\`a} arrog{\^a}ncia como concep{\c c}{\~a}o de valor quando erige aquele amor como fonte de valor absoluto. A lei moral causa dano irrepar{\'a}vel {\`a} arrog{\^a}ncia, produzindo assim necessariamente a dor presente no respeito a essa lei. Esse modelo de vis{\~a}o das rela{\c c}{\~o}es que nos interessam parece estar presente tamb{\'e}m, em tra{\c c}os gerais, na teoria kantiana das {\textquotedblleft}predisposi{\c c}{\~o}es morais{\textquotedblright}, sem que, nesse caso, Kant se enderece ao problema da motiva{\c c}{\~a}o moral, mas, alternativamente, procure oferecer uma vis{\~a}o mais ampla da fenomenologia da experi{\^e}ncia moral de agentes como n{\'o}s.

}, url = {http://www.sociedadekant.org/studiakantiana/index.php/sk/article/view/80}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}} } @article {ARTICLE12, title = {Berkeley e a confian{\c c}a nos sentidos}, journal = {Integra{\c c}{\~a}o}, volume = {46}, year = {2006}, note = {

} pages = {279-286

}, abstract = {n/a}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}} } @inbook {CHAPTER8, title = {Hume e a determina{\c c}{\~a}o da mente}, booktitle = {Ensaios sobre Hume}, year = {2005}, note = {n/a}, pages = {187-204}, publisher = {Segrac}, organization = {Segrac}, type = {Book Section}, address = {Belo Horizonte}, abstract = {n/a}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}} } @inbook {CHAPTER9, title = {O Empirismo de Strawson: como o "objetivo" explica a "unidade"}, booktitle = {L{\'o}gica e Ontologia: Ensaios em homenagem a Balthazar Barbosa Filho}, year = {2004}, note = {n/a}, pages = {151-161}, publisher = {Discurso Editorial}, organization = {Discurso Editorial}, type = {Book Section}, address = {S{\~a}o Paulo}, abstract = {n/a}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}}, editor = {{\'E}vora, F{\'a}tima and Faria, Paulo and Loparic, Andr{\'e}a and Santos, Luiz Henrique and Zingano, Marco} } @article {ARTICLE13, title = {Hume, Liberty and the Object of Moral Evaluation. Kriterion,}, journal = {Kriterion}, volume = {44}, year = {2003}, note = {

} pages = {191-208

}, abstract = {

Hume{\textquoteright}s project concerning the conflict between liberty and necessity is "reconciliatory". But what is the nature of Hume{\textquoteright}s project? Does he solve a problem in metaphysics only? And when Hume says that the dispute between the doctrines of liberty and necessity is merely verbal, does he mean that there is no genuine metaphysical dispute between the doctrines? In the present essay I argue for: (1) there is room for liberty in Hume{\textquoteright}s philosophy, and not only because the position is pro forma compatibilist, even though this has importance for the recognition that Hume{\textquoteright}s main concern when discussing the matter is with practice; (2) the position does not involve a "subjectivization" of every form of necessity: it is not compatibilist because it creates a space for the claim that the operations of the will are non-problematically necessary through a weakning of the notion of necessity as it applies to external objects; (3) Hume holds that the ordinary phenomena of mental causation do not preempt the atribuition of moral responsibility, which combines perfectly with his identification of the object of moral evaluation: the whole of the character of a person, in relation to which there is, nonetheless, liberty. I intend to support my assertions by a close reading of what Hume states in section 8 of the first Enquiry.

}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1590/S0100-512X2003000200004}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}} } @article {ARTICLE14, title = {A Cr{\'\i}tica Wittgensteiniana da Tese da Subjetividade das Qualidades Secund{\'a}rias}, journal = {Theophilos}, volume = {1}, year = {2001}, note = {

} pages = {235-246

}, abstract = {n/a}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}} } @article {ARTICLE16, title = {A Interpreta{\c c}{\~a}o Externalista de Kant}, journal = {Principia}, volume = {3}, year = {1999}, note = {

} pages = {101-138

}, abstract = {

The externalist interpretation of Kant allows for a ratumal reconstruction of what is fundamental to transcendental idealism: action. Kant resorts to action several times in the Critique of Pure Reason. The very notion of "synthesis," which plays a vital role in his philosophy, is presented as a Handlung. The externalist interpretation endeavours to expiam what Kant means by action in those contexts so as to make philosophical sense of Kant{\textquoteright}s thought and at the same time to prevent it from being turned into a flawed internalism. Whereas internalism struggles to present synthesis as a mental act that is as private as thinking quietly, or even as an unconscious activity, externalism shows that, according to Kant, human knowledge depends on the ability to carry out observable actions that involve human body in a very particular way. In this article, externalism will be vindiicated in relaticm to (1) the foundations of Kant{\textquoteright}s conception of figurative synthesis of transcendental imagmation, and (2) the nature of transcendental esquemata in his critical speculative philosophy.

}, url = {https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/18346}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}} } @article {ARTICLE15, title = {Materialismo, Causalidade e Eventos no Monismo An{\^o}malo}, journal = {Episteme}, volume = {9}, year = {1999}, note = {

} pages = {47-59

}, abstract = {n/a}, url = {https://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/handle/10183/31852/000299736.pdf?sequence=1}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}} } @article {ARTICLE18, title = {Ainda sobre o Ceticismo Sem{\^a}ntico}, journal = {Veritas}, volume = {47}, year = {1997}, note = {

} pages = {49-69

}, abstract = {n/a}, url = {https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/ojs/index.php/veritas/article/view/35645}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}} } @article {ARTICLE17, title = {As Id{\'e}ias Abstratas, a Particularidade das Percep{\c c}{\~o}es e a Natureza do Projeto Filos{\'o}fico em Hume}, journal = {Manuscrito}, volume = {20}, year = {1997}, note = {

} pages = {

}, abstract = {n/a}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}} } @article {ARTICLE19, title = {On the Nature of Philosophy}, journal = {Caesura}, volume = {8}, year = {1996}, note = {

} pages = {67-76

}, abstract = {n/a}, author = {Klaudat, Andr{\'e}} }