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Intelligence Support to MONUSCO: Challenges to Peacekeeping and Security

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ABSTRACT
Persistent armed conflicts and humanitarian crises require an improved United Nations (UN) peacekeeping capability in the 21st century. One aspect of such capability is the effectiveness of its command and control (C²) structures, which is highly dependent on proper intelligence support. In order to critically evaluate such claims, this article analyzes the case of United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Both the organization of the mission-related intelligence structures (G2, JMAC, and JOC) and their practices are brought to light by interviews with MONUSCO staff, a visit to mission’s headquarters in Goma, UN reports and documents, and specialized literature. The findings indicate that intelligence contributed to improve C² at MONUSCO by playing a critical role at the tactical (neutralizing armed groups) and operational (sharing information and providing mission-wide situational awareness) levels. Nonetheless, it had a lesser impact at the strategic level, due to a persistent gap between the UN structures in New York and the field mission.

The United Nations (UN) has become an important player in the international security context since the end of the Cold War (Barnett Finnemore, 2008). Particularly, persistent armed conflicts and humanitarian crises require an even more robust UN peacekeeping capability in the 21st century (Paris, 2008). One aspect of such capability is the effectiveness of its command and control (C²) structures. In this regard, intelligence component support to peacekeeping operations is crucial. In order to critically evaluate such claims, this article analyzes the case of United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

Command and control can be defined as “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2014). In other words, C² refers to the process through which authority is constructed and goals are achieved. Accordingly, intelligence
activity in the context of peacekeeping can be defined as the specialized informational component, which supports decision-making processes and implementation of policies at all levels of the command and control chain of an organization (Norheim-Martinsen & Ravndal, 2011).

It is worth mentioning that UN peacekeeping operations are based on Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of UN Charter and are guided by the principles of consent of the parties, impartiality, non-use of force except in self-defense, and defense of the mandate. The Security Council (UNSC) defines the mandate, whereas the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) direct the mission. The UN members are invited to contribute with military and police staff, and the civil staff is recruited by the Secretariat.

The publication of the Brahimi Report in 2000 was a turning point for peacekeeping operations. The report recommended a complete overhaul in the way peacekeeping was managed by the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Secretariat (UN General Assembly & Security Council, 2000). The reason for that was the criticism towards UN in the 1990s concerning its ineffective role in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. Specifically, the report highlighted the need for improvements in peacekeeping C\textsuperscript{2} structures and for appropriate intelligence capabilities.\textsuperscript{2} The intelligence component in peacekeeping was considered taboo during the Cold War because of its association with Great Powers espionage practices (Charters, 1999; Dorn, 1999).\textsuperscript{3} This approach towards intelligence has somehow shifted after the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{4} Notwithstanding, an approach emphasizing the importance of intelligence was only able to develop—even though slowly—after the Brahimi Report recognized its significance.

Contemporary UN peacekeeping operations have formally evolved from monitoring cease-fires to a great range of tasks, such as helping rebuild states and enforcing peace. In addition to that, they have incorporated robust mandates, meaning the employment of all means to achieve the mission’s mandate, including the use of force to compel (UN DPKO and UN DFS, 2008). Consequently, the UN peacekeeping operations’ multidimensional and multinational nature have required a more complex intelligence activity (Shetler-Jones, 2008).

In order to assess such claims about the new role of intelligence in peacekeeping, a qualitative case study was conducted regarding the MONUSCO.\textsuperscript{5} It explores 18 semi-structured interviews with MONUSCO staff, one week of direct observations from visits to the headquarters in Goma and the locations of Kanyabayonga, Kiwanja, and Rutshuru, and UN reports and documents containing unstructured data.\textsuperscript{6}

Both the organization of the mission-related intelligence structures (G2, JMAC, and JOC) and their correspondent practices were analyzed in order to assess if and how intelligence may have effectively\textsuperscript{7} contributed to
MONUSCO. Intelligence practices were observed in three different levels. The tactical level refers to engagements, such as protecting civilians in specific localities and taking offensive actions to neutralize armed groups. The operational level refers to the higher levels of command pertaining to the whole mission in the field. The strategic level, in turn, refers to the UN structures in New York dealing with the mission’s mandate (Secretariat, Department of Peacekeeping, Department of Field Support, and Security Council).  

Before presenting the results of this research, the following paragraphs provide some background information on Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) and UN’s involvements in the country.

DR Congo previously experienced a colonial period under Belgian repressive rule (1885–1960), followed by secessionist movements and civil war intertwined with the Cold War, and then the long Mobutu Sese Seko dictatorship (1965–1997). The country was engulfed in two major regional wars, from 1996 to 1997 and again from 1998 to 2003. The Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2002) was the arrangement that officially ended the second war. The dispute was settled by a formal power-sharing agreement, in which the parties accorded to a national conciliation. The war caused more than five million deaths. In 2006, Joseph Kabila was elected president in elections organized with the UN support.

Since the country’s independence from Belgium, the UN has formally been there. The first United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) lasted from 1960 to 1964, following the manifold crises after the country’s independence. More recently, MONUSCO replaced the former United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), which lasted from 2000 until 2010. MONUC was established in the context of the second Congolese war (1998–2003).

MONUSCO is a multidimensional peacekeeping mission with a robust mandate, concerned mainly with the protection of civilians and the support to the Congolese government in its stabilization efforts (UN Security Council, 2010). In 2013, as the Eastern DR Congo continued to suffer from persistent conflicts and violence, the UNSC established the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), aiming to compel the armed groups to accept peace (UN Security Council, 2013). Most of the armed groups were in the eastern region of the country, rich in natural resources such as cobalt, oil, and copper. In September 2015, the main armed groups in the country were the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Democratic Forces for Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the National Liberation Front (FNL), the Forces de Resistance Patriotique d’Ituri (FRPI), and the Mai Mai. While the first four were foreign supported, the last two were indigenous. By 2016, MONUSCO was the largest
ongoing UN mission in the world. In February 2016, MONUSCO’s strength was 22,492 total personnel (16,938 military personnel, 454 military observers, 1,226 police, 816 international civilian personnel, 2,654 local civilian staff, and 404 United Nations volunteers). The approved budget for the period July 2015–June 2016 was US$1,332,178,600 (UN General Assembly, 2015).

**Intelligence organization at MONUSCO**

The highest operational authority in the MONUSCO was its head of the mission (HoM), i.e., the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), who is “responsible for implementing the mission’s mandate and has authority over all its components [civilian, police and military]” (UN DPKO and UN DFS, 2014, 19). The other main leaderships were the police commissioner (PC) and the force commander (FC), respectively, the head of the police forces and the head of the military forces. The mission headquarters (HQ) were located in both Kinshasa (DR Congo’s capital) and Goma (Eastern Congo). Whereas the SRSG was located in Kinshasa, the FC and PC were in Goma.

In September 2015, there were military personnel from 51 different countries located mostly in Eastern DR Congo. The main contributing countries to the mission were Bangladesh (Ituri Brigade), India (North Kivu Brigade), Pakistan (South Kivu Brigade), Ghana (Western Brigade), Benin (Katanga Sector), and Morocco (Northern Sector and Grand Nord Sector). The FIB, specifically, was composed by military from South Africa, Malawi, and Tanzania. The force commander by that time was a Brazilian general who was a former commander in the UN Mission in Haiti. The main intelligence components supporting the mission’s decision-making process (C²) were the military intelligence (G2), the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), and the Joint Operations Cell (JOC). Both the authorities and the main intelligence structures in the field are shown in Figure 1, where their connection can also be seen.

The G2 was located at Goma HQ and was composed of 16 personnel. Under the force commander’s authority, it had a chief (G2 chief) and a deputy (G2 deputy) (MONUSCO, 2015b). It had the responsibility over the daily standard intelligence requirements (SIR), which were distributed to the military units highlighting what they should observe. The main units comprising military intelligence were the G2 Plans (target recommendation, long and short term planning), the ISR Ops Cell (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations), the GIS’s Cell (Geographic Information System), the Analysis Cell (divided in three groups upon region: North Kivu; South Kivu & Katanga; Ituri, Western, & Sector 2), the Project (liaison with the Integrated Text and Event Management—ITEM—system), and the Arms Embargo Liaison Unit (focal point for monitoring arms
Figure 1. Authorities and intelligence structures in the field.
Note. The figure was prepared by the authors, based on the interviews and the documents provided by MONUSCO staff.

Figure 2. G2 structure.
Note. The figure was prepared by the authors, based on the interviews and the documents provided by MONUSCO staff.
embargo) (MONUSCO, 2015b). The G2’s Goma HQ structures and their respective connections mentioned in this paragraph are shown in Figure 2.

In addition to the central military intelligence at the Goma HQ, each military battalion had its own G2, which are illustrated in Figure 1 as “G2s.” The size and capacity varied. The FIB, in turn, had its own intelligence cell (see Figure 1). It was composed of three active-duty military and its task was to deliver “intelligence directives to update the brigade commander.”24 Another significant component subordinated to G2 was the Joint Intelligence and Operations Centre (JIOC). There were two JIOCs (around four officers in each) in the cities of Beni (North Kivu) and Dungu (Orientale Province).25 While the former was related to the operations against ADF, the latter was dedicated to LRA.26 They are represented in Figure 1 as “JIOCs”.

Another important element of the MONUSCO intelligence capability was the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), which was composed of 18 personnel and was located in Goma (10), Kinshasa (4), and Bukavu (4) The JMAC was:

[…] an integrated structure to support planning and decision-making by the Head of the Mission (HoM) and the Senior Management Team (SMT). The purpose of the JMAC is to collect and synthesize multi-source information to provide MONUSCO senior management with the basis for enhanced mission planning and decision-making and support the development of risk assessments relating to the implementation of the Mission’s mandate (MONUSCO, 2015c, p. 2).

Directly under the SRSG’s authority, JMAC had a chief (Goma HQ) and a deputy chief (Kinshasa HQ). Both should be civilians (UN DPKO, 2015). The JMAC’s chief was responsible for the management of its sections, the advisements to the SRSG and other authorities, the final review of its products, and the briefings for other parts of the mission, among other duties (MONUSCO, 2015c). The main structures inside JMAC were the management team (Goma HQ), the Northern Kivu and Orientale team (Goma HQ), the Western DRC (Kinshasa HQ), and the South Kivu, Maniema, and Katanga team (based in Bukavu) (MONUSCO, 2015a). JMAC’s structures and their connections mentioned in this paragraph are shown in Figure 3.

From the main office in Goma, the management team was responsible for management and support, staffed by one senior analyst, one United Nations Police (UNPOL), and one military analyst. The other teams had a territorial area of responsibility (AoR) and each was “[…] led by an International Staff who supervises a multidisciplinary group of military analysts, NPOs [National Professional Officer], UNVs [United Nations Volunteer] and UNPOL [United Nations Police] officers according to the particular organization of each team” (MONUSCO, 2015c, p. 3).
Despite the main intelligence structures in the field being the G2 and the JMAC, there was also another important structure, the Joint Operations Cell (JOC). Although its name, the JOC did not work as an operation center. It received information from the whole mission (such as the military and the police sectors) and was responsible for doing the dissemination of information within the proper UN institutional channels. It carried out the following functions:

[...] Maintain a continuous (24/7) mission-wide situational awareness. [...] Provide timely and accurate reports on key developments. [...] Respond effectively in times of crisis. [...] Facilitate the SRSG, senior management and other substantive components of the Mission, through the provision of accurate information, in their day-to-day decision-making and the implementation of the Mission’s mandate (MONUSCO, 2010, p. 3).

The JOC was composed of 14 personnel and, as JMAC, was located in Goma (13) and Kinshasa (1). Under direct SRSG authority, it had a chief and a deputy (MONUSCO, 2010). It was also, as JMAC, an integrated organization, composed by civilians, UN police, and military. The main structures inside JOC were the Drafting and Reporting Team (DRT) and the Situational Awareness Team (SAT) (MONUSCO, 2010).

Regarding the intelligence gathering, analysis, and the resulting products at MONUSCO, the main source of information was Human Intelligence (HUMINT). For G2, great part of the HUMINT came from the patrols and military observers (milobs) (MONUSCO, 2015b). They collected information from local population, community liaison assistants (CLAs), UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), and Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC), among others. Besides sending reports to G2 HQ (by e-mail), most of the

![Figure 3. JMAC structure.](image)

*Note. The figure was prepared by the authors, based on the interviews and the documents provided by MONUSCO staff.*
information collected was sent to ITEM database. Moreover, G2 also got information from other sectors’ reports (e.g., civil affairs), according to its needs. For JMAC, in turn, the HUMINT came most from its staff’s personal relationships (e.g., with local population, NGOs, UN military, UN police, and JMAC from other missions). JMAC also used information from G2 and vice-versa. It did not use ITEM database.

The second most important source was imagery intelligence (IMINT). For the G2, the IMINT collection was not only through helicopters’ air reconnaissance flights but also through ISR obtained by unmanned aerial vehicle systems (UAS). MONUSCO was the first UN mission to have drones. The UAS chief underlined that MONUSCO had five drones, providing day and night real-time imagery, which could also be used for real time operations. He also underscored that, although under G2’s authority, the drones were assets for the whole UN mission in the field. In this sense, JMAC also used IMINT provided by G2. However, the aerial observation and the conventional photos were still important because they allowed a more detailed observation when needed. In addition, G2 and JMAC also used open source information (OSINT), meaning, “press reports and social media, like twitter.” Furthermore, one of the interviewees has expressed hope to have at least limited SIGINT capabilities available in the near future.

Although HUMINT was the main source of information in DR Congo, there are still many difficulties in its use in a peacekeeping mission. The reason is that there is a need for money to pay some of the informants, which the current UN’s financial system does not allow. Moreover, there are some important tools for intelligence collection traditionally used by national intelligence systems that are questionable or even prohibited at the UN’s scope. As Walter Dorn pointed out, “the limitations on intelligence gathering are legal as well as moral, political, and practical” (Dorn, 1999, p. 420).

As troubled as intelligence gathering may still be, the development of good analysis is also an issue, though the reasons differ. Mostly, in the case of analysis, the problems concerned the professionalization and training of analysts deployed to the mission. Although some of them had intelligence background at G2 and JMAC, and were providing relevant reports, most of them lacked the skills to conduct all-sources analysis.

Analysis at G2 was divided by region (North Kivu; South Kivu & Katanga; and Ituri, Western, & Sector 2). In total, the analysis cell had only eight analysts. The G2’s analysis was focused on the military operational part of the mission. In this sense, the analysts:

Conduct Information Preparation of the Battlespace; Assess AG [Armed Groups] Intent & COAs; Assess AG Capability (Weapons Systems/Facilities, Ground Forces, Command and Control, Personnel & Leadership); Provide daily, weekly & monthly intelligence summaries; Collect, collate, analyze and prepare briefing of all information on IAGs; Conduct trend analysis on IAGs; Manage and maintains
the G2 database at FHQ and outstations; Manage and maintains the G2 sources database to provide instant and accurate POC for the branch on all subject; Manage and maintains the G2 diary (MONUSCO, 2015b, p. 4).

JMAC analysis was also divided by region (Western DRC; NK & Orientale; and South Kivu, Maniema, & Katanga). In total, there were 11 analysts. JMAC “produces analysis according to the […] intelligence cycle, i.e., the cycle of tasking, collection, analysis and dissemination” (MONUSCO, 2015c, p. 6). Moreover, JMAC had a concept of multiple source analysis, in which the gathering and analysis were interactive processes, meaning that the analyst provided “information collection requirements” led by JMAC work plan (MONUSCO, 2015c). Therefore, while the focus of G2’s analysis was to support the military component, the focus of JMAC’s analysis was the political level, providing products in order to support planning and decision making of the SRSG.37

The main intelligence products of G2 were the weekly summary (INTSUM), the daily PIR updates, the weekly ops brief/AGs assessment, the Situation Para for orders, the fragmentary order (FRAGO), the MILAD Report G2 annex, the special studies/analysis, as well as the ISR products and the liaison/coop/coordination reports (MONUSCO, 2015b). On the other hand, JMAC’s products reflected its political focus, and were the weekly threat assessment (WTA), the warning note/immediate action request, the incident analysis, the trend analysis, the scenario papers, the profiles report, and the risk mapping (MONUSCO, 2015c).

The dissemination of intelligence products was mostly made by e-mail to the authorized personnel and at the routine briefings.38 The dissemination of written material was on a “need to know basis” because of the political sensitive of some products (MONUSCO, 2015c, p. 8). Although the Joint Operations Cell (JOC) had no role in producing analysis of its own, it provided timely information products, which were the daily situational reports (SITREPS), the special incident reports (also referred to as flash reports), the inputs for daily SRSG briefs, and the updates and special reports (MONUSCO, 2010).

In short, the G2 provided the intelligence products for operations, whereas the JMAC concentrated in long term and predictive analysis for the political leadership. In addition to them, there was the JOC, which was an important tool for situational awareness and information dissemination. Moreover, the G2 was subordinated to the FC and delivered intelligence not only for his decisions related to military actions and operations but also for the overall military situational awareness. The JMAC and the JOC, in turn, were subordinated to the SRSG. While the JMAC provided intelligence for SRSG’s decisions related to political factors and the overall mission, the JOC provided on-time information for the whole mission. How well the intelligence fulfilled its tasks in the MONUSCO decision-making process at all levels is the subject of the next section.
Intelligence process at MONUSCO

Besides the organizational look, intelligence must also be evaluated from a more practical/actional point of view. The main practices of intelligence at MONUSCO differ in terms of demands and results according to the level of employment to be considered (tactical, operational, and strategical).

Neutralizing armed groups

At the tactical level, the MONUSCO mandate involved the employment of offensive military operations to neutralize armed groups, mostly after the UNSC established the FIB in 2013 ((UN) Security Council, 2013). These were designed to be intelligence-led operations in the sense Walter Dorn has described them, as “[…] driven in timing and objectives by intelligence, including operations to gain intelligence.”39 Force Commander Lt Gal Santos Cruz reinforced the view that MONUSCO offensive operations ought to be driven by intelligence in order to be effective.40 As someone from MONUSCO’s Headquarters also pointed out:

[...] here you absolutely do need intelligence on what the armed groups are planning on doing, what their capabilities are […] if you have human intelligence that can tell you maybe when a particular leader maybe in a particular area, it gives you more chance to conduct operations against them. […] Intelligence is critical […] The intelligence drives the operation. You are not doing just a framework operation, which is where you are just patrolling for presence. […] you really need intelligence during the operation, so you get information that warns you about something then you can position your forces very accurately to deal with that particular threat.41

Concerning the neutralization of illegal armed groups, the G2 and the JMAC clearly had different roles in MONUSCO.42 On one hand, the G2 chief described the functioning of their work at HQ as follows:

[...] The command brings out the problem. […] These operations no matter are led by these guys here [at G2 Headquarters]. From G2 to FC and operates. […] G2 mechanism to assess and collect a lot of information and if it is yes, a problem, he [FC] gives to a specific brigade to deal with it, to action. We assess the operation. So all we are doing is the intelligence-led.43

There was a continuous need of update and actionably data on climate, terrain, and enemy in the case of the G2, for both the mission’s headquarters and the battalions. In this sense, the JIOCs at Beni and Dungu were also instrumental for tactical purposes, since “[...] they seemed to have a quite good tool for pooling together more coordination approach at field office level [...]”44 Particularly, Beni was the main operational basis for the FIB.45 Moreover, the intelligence products from G2 to lead the tactical level operations, known as “targeting documents.” These were composed of the
following information: target name, area of operation, approval status, coordination, collateral damage risk, confidence, description, intelligence gaps, ISR access, guidance for deliver phase, trigger, task, method, effect, recommended action, approval authority, actions on objective, special instructions, tasks to supporting elements, protection of civilians, considerations on deliver phase, and ISR reporting (MONUSCO, 2010).

On the other hand, JMAC did not have a considerable role at the tactical level, as its main tasks concerned supporting the SRSG with political analysis. It is important to highlight that its role in MONUSCO was somewhat different from its role in the UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The latter was a case in which JMAC’s work coincided with the military intelligence’s work and they were much closer in providing information for intelligence-led operations. Nevertheless, it does not mean that JMAC in DR Congo did not cooperate and coordinate with G2. Indeed, officers from JMAC went to the field whenever deemed necessary. In addition, JMAC also received operational information, which it effectively shared with G2.

The MONUSCO’s intelligence-led operations against the armed groups in DR Congo were working even though there was still much to be done. From the G2 chief’s point of view: “some armed groups have disappeared. Even the existing ones they are not that [strong] anymore.” As assessed in one G2 document,

Ongoing military operations against AGs [Armed Groups] have prevented the expansion of the AGs, neutralize and disarming, thereby reducing the threat posed by AGs on state authority and civilian security and making space for stabilization activities (MONUSCO, 2015b, p. 45).

The main group defeated by MONUSCO in collaboration with the RD Congo Armed Forces (FARDC) in 2013 was known as March 23 Movement (M23). The M23 was different from other remaining armed groups since it had more firepower and was organized as conventional armed forces usually were, while other groups were more asymmetrically equipped and organized as insurgent forces. The M23 was defeated by classical land domain, land conquest, with engagements including artillery fire exchanges and considerable risk for the UN forces. In September 2015, there were still around 47 armed groups in the DR Congo. The UN mission, given its limited resources, could only focus on 10 of them and was able to conduct intelligence-led operations against 4. The main actions were being taken against the ADF, the FDLR, and the FRPI. If properly analyzed, such information could be relevant to the mission as a role, as well as to the UN Security Council and the Secretariat.

There are two issues related to the remaining armed groups that indicate the reason intelligence can be considered crucial in the case of MONUSCO. First, while some armed groups were isolated in the countryside, others were
stationed and operating in the villages. Intelligence had an important role in this regard, because there is always pressure to confirm information from all possible sources in a UN peacekeeping operation. For example, in order to bomb an armed group in an isolated area, the operation must be sure that the area is virtually isolated so that the action will not harm civilians.\(^53\) Second, most of the armed groups were in the same uniform as the FARDC. Therefore, there was a constant pressure to confirm whether the ones in consideration were an illegal armed group or actually part of the FARDC.\(^54\) This obstacle has connections with the problems between UN and DR Congo. In September 2015, the UN military operations were having difficulties with the illegal armed group FDLR, mainly due to political divergences between the UN Mission and the DRC government.\(^55\) As a G2’s senior analyst pointed out:

> Unfortunately, our relationship with FARDC is not strong as once was. […] the two generals, and kind of a split away between MONUSCO and FARDC and we are trying to repair those relationships on a regular basis and then we can continue to do joint operations. [MONUSCO forces operating together with FARDC] in a limited way right now. So in the operation Sukola I, we are providing limited logistics and limited intelligence support.\(^56\)

In this sense, one might say that keeping good (or at least not bad) relations with the national government and the FARDC helped to improve both the intelligence and the military capacity of MONUSCO, leading to the defeat of the M23. Even if one considers only the usefulness of and the integration between the intelligence component and the other offices and forces involved in MONUSCO, it is reasonable to assume that intelligence has played a very central role in tactical terms.

**Sharing information**

At the operational level (MONUSCO wide), there were many meetings in which intelligence came to be relevant. Some examples follow. Every morning, there was the “morning briefing” at Goma HQ, which was attended by elements of the force, including the force commander (FC), and sometimes JMAC and JOC. The goal was to brief and update the FC about the situation in the field.\(^57\) Every Monday, there was the “military briefing” between Goma and Kinshasa, which the FC, the SRSG, and other civilians attended.\(^58\) Every Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday, there was another kind of morning meeting, in which the JOC briefed the participants. If there was a concerning situation in those meetings, the chief of JMAC briefed on what he had in terms of intelligence, since he had cross-referenced and checked information, being able to give a verbal analysis and assessment in order to help the best decision on that concern.\(^59\) Every Saturday, there was a meeting of the FC
with the brigades’ commanders by videoconference. Twice a week, there was also an information community meeting at the JOC, where force, police, human rights, civil affairs, JMAC, and others participated. As JOC chief stressed, “that is an opportunity to share, bring all up to the same level of understanding of information of what’s going on, particularly on armed groups, it is an operation and political focus.” G2 and JMAC also had meetings to brief each other and exchange information. Nonetheless, the informal day-to-day contacts seemed more relevant.

The information sharing worked well inside MONUSCO and a significant part of the cooperation was done informally. G2, JMAC, JOC, FC, and SRSG seemed to be in the same pace and commonly concerned about the improvement of the information exchange for better results in the field. There was also a considerable cooperation and sharing between the civilian and military components. For instance, there was a military analyst from the Indian Battalion at the JMAC liaising with the Indian Battalion contingent in Nord Kivu. The goal was to facilitate the communication with that battalion in order to make the delivery of information faster for JMAC.

Observers of the intelligence–policymaker relationship in national contexts recurrently complain about deficient interoperability, excessive compartmentalization, and lack of standardization. In the case of MONUSCO, those issues were not too problematic as to thwart the relationship between intelligence and command in the field. Other dimensions appeared to be more pressing, such as insufficient personnel and some lack of analytical proficiency. This is significant, considering the multidimensional and multinational nature of the mission. Nevertheless, the general understanding regarding information sharing between MONUSCO and other relevant stakeholders in the theater was less optimistic. The most important stakeholders were DR Congo’s government components, regional bodies such as the International Conference on the Great Lakes (ICGL), and other nations’ embassies and intelligence agencies. The contacts with chef coutumier (local village authorities) were also relevant.

Regarding the national DR Congo government, there were occasionally intelligence meetings with the Agence Nationale de Renseignements (ANR), as well as with the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), and the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC). However, information sharing was mostly through bilateral contacts and informal relations. While JMAC was the main responsible for the relations with ANR, G2 was in charge of relations with FADRC military intelligence. About ANR, according to a JMAC information analyst, even though they exchanged information and had a focal point there, the relationship was somehow strained. They used to have regular structured meetings, but in September 2015, relations...
were only informal. With respect to FARDC’s military intelligence, as G2 chief pointed out:

Previously [...] we talk whichever the areas or operations concerned, we exchange that information, we give our products, and they give theirs. But when it is politics in the field here, yes it is there but not the way it was friendly before. [...] it is not that much level, but we no matter communicate with them, we share what we have, we advise them, they advise us with what they have, but the political influence is in it.

The deterioration of UN relations with DR Congo government at the political-strategic level (mainly concerning the ultimate goals of MONUSCO and Kabila’s expressed discomfort with the U.S. interests in the region) had a negative impact on the exchange of information at the operational level. Even so, more technical and informal exchanges were kept whenever the parts could find common ground.

At the regional level, MONUSCO shared information with International Conference on the Great Lakes Joint Intelligence Fusion Centre (ICGL JIF) and mostly with ICGL Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM). EJVM had one liaison office at MONUSCO HQ in Goma with two military officers working directly with G2. As the name stands for, EJVM unit was responsible for verifications in particular areas and/or armed groups, as well as for making recommendations based on its findings. Besides, EJVM personnel met every Monday with MONUSCO’s staff to give updates on general security information about the Great Lakes’ region. As a feature of intelligence, they only provided “need to know information” for the mission. In turn, mission’s brigades also briefed them whenever they had some verification mission to engage. It is worth noting that there was also information sharing with other UN missions, at both G2 and JMAC levels, such as with MINUSCA (Central African Republic) and UNMISS (South Sudan).

With other troop-contributing countries (TCC) and third countries’ diplomatic representations in Kinshasa, information sharing was also conducted in a rather informal and case-to-case basis. This is not a feature unique to MONUSCO but a common and recurrent phenomenon in all UN activities and, risk saying, in any form of coalition warfare or any international endeavor. As someone from MONUSCO headquarters pointed out, “[...] the other problem I find with intelligence is national caveats. [...] We have our national lines of information; we don’t like to spread it around. So that is a challenge to the UN. [...] Although people don’t like systems that are informal, it is the only way to go.” Considering this reality, JMAC was decisive as an institution, as long as it tried to pull together pieces of information coming from the diplomatic community, the foreign security and intelligence services
community, and the defense attaché community, both formally and informally gathered. In the case of the diplomatic community, there were meetings every two weeks between them and the JOC involving the ambassador’s committee (Security Council plus all the other diplomats) and the SRSG.

Finally, it is appropriate to mention the case of the MONUSCO Arms Embargo Working Group because JMAC (leader), FIB, Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement/Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDRRR/DDR), UNPOL, and United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) worked together on it, providing arms embargo validated data and accurate reports. Moreover, there was a relevant information exchange with FARDC military intelligence, ANR, and the group of experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo in this regard (MONUSCO, 2014).

As stressed at DPKO/DFS Handbook, “in multidimensional peacekeeping operations, the Military Component interacts with all other Mission Components, such as Civilian and Police Components to maximize the sharing of information and integration for wider collective impact of UN’s response” (UN DPKO and UN DFS, 2014, p. 21). MONUSCO tried to accomplish that mainly through meetings and bilateral contacts because, as someone from MONUSCO Headquarters highlighted, “[…] the importance—never undervalue—of a meeting or a briefing […] sometimes with the intelligence you cannot share much in writing but you can share quite a lot in talking.” It is hard to assess how much of such rationale is ex-post justification. Nonetheless, no matter how informal or problematic the information sharing within MONUSCO and between it and other stakeholders could have been, all evidence points towards a greater volume of knowledge exchange, which helped to improve what Abilova and Novosseloff call the “multidimensional situational awareness” in a mission.

**Improving the mandate**

At the strategical level, one shall remember that all UN peacekeeping operations are ultimately created at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City (UN HQ). They are responsive to bodies such as the Security Council, the General Assembly’s Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, the Secretary-General, and the Secretariat. MONUSCO’s mandate and extensions were established by Security Council’s Resolutions 1925 (2010), 2053 (2012), 2147 (2014), 2211 (2015), and 2277 (2016). The SRSG was the authority in charge of implementing the mandate in the operational theater, being a vital link
between UN HQ and the mission in the field. According to DPKO/DFS Handbook:

[...] United Nations Field Missions are planned, directed and supported by the following key departments within the United Nations Headquarters in New York; the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Field Support and Department of Safety and Security [...] The mandate for a peacekeeping operation, as established by the Security Council, is the starting point for defining a mission’s responsibilities. This will also dictate the mission structure. The command of peacekeeping operations is vested in the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council. The Secretary-General, in turn, has delegated the overall responsibility for the conduct and support of these missions to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. The Secretary-General also, with the consent of the Security Council, appoints a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), who serves as Head of the Mission and is responsible for implementing the mission’s mandate (UN DPKO and UN DFS, 2014, pp. 11–18).

In this context, as an organic part of the UN’s command and control chain ($C^2$), the intelligence component was supposed to provide information to support not only the accomplishment of the mandate but also the improvement of it at the UN HQ. In other words, intelligence produced should inform both the mission and the UN HQ about the missions’ accomplishments and challenges. It should also be consequential in terms of improving decision making about mandates and implementation planning.

In practical terms, however, there were limited intelligence structures or products available at the UN Headquarters. Although the UN Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC) was created in 2013 there, as well as some analytical capacities were available at the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), none of them had much substantive interaction with the intelligence produced in the operational theater. This, in turn, created a room for a considerable gap between the strategic and the operational levels (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016; Ekpe, 2007; Kuele, 2014). As someone from MONUSCO perceived it:

There is not much in NY to be honest. In NY, they have the political officers there who will be clearly gathering information [...] It is information, it is clean from diplomatic conversations, from cocktail parties and chats... and bits of information coming in. I mean certain members states they pass sensitive information to the UN.  

In any case, the main components providing information about MONUSCO to the strategic level were the JOC and the JMAC. The JOC sent on-time information to UN HQ, as long as there was a 24 hours structure in New York. As JOC chief pointed out:
We produce the daily and weekly reports that we are asked to do by the leadership or by New York. For ones we send to New York, it is from SRSG to UN headquarters. Every working day, the mission sends a code cable to New York, which is a summary of activities, political, operations, human rights, etc. There is like a ‘super JOC’ in New York, which is the UNOCC, the UN Ops and Crisis Centre. All the JOCs in the missions send their reports; they coordinate the reports coming from the field. They brief the UN leadership in New York about what is going on in all the missions. So we have a relationship as MONUSCO with them, as does every field mission in terms of we send the reports, but they sometimes comes back to us and ask can you confirm this, can you clarify this, you send more information on this. So there is a two ways dialogue at the code cable. The daily code cable, five daily code cable is the main means of transmission of that information plus the special or flash reports on more agitations, they also go to New York.

The JMAC, in turn, as an integrated structure was responsible for supporting the senior mission leadership in planning and decision making. Thus, some of the reports were also shared with New York. According to JMAC SOP document:

[JMAC’s] assessment and analyses should inform the work of policy and planning units [...] JMAC analytical reports and briefs [...] should be predictive, rather than historical, and focus on risks, threats and opportunities relating to the implementation of mission mandate tasks. JMAC should prioritize products, which address issues at the HoM/SMT level of decision-making (MONUSCO, 2015c, pp. 6–8).

The JOC was the main connection between the field and the UN HQ, whereas the JMAC was also relevant. Out of these two structures, the intelligence connections between the mission in the field and UN Headquarters in New York were weak.

No evidence was found that Security Council’s resolutions or the DPKO’s doctrinal documents have benefited from systematic analytical input produced by intelligence coming from either MONUSCO or UNOCC. Although intelligence does not make decisions, it can provide a common level of analysis and assessment to the UN decision-making process. In MONUSCO’s case, it seemed that there was a missing link between New York and the field, between the strategic and the operational and tactical levels, between the ends and means, contributing to less effectiveness. The establishment of the group of experts on Democratic Republic of the Congo was probably an attempt to reduce this gap. This group conducted field research in the DR Congo and offered its final report to the UN bodies in New York (UN Security Council, 2015).
Conclusion

Intelligence activity, as an integral part of renewed structures for command and control (i.e., authority), has indeed become a significant tool for UN peacekeeping operations as demonstrated by the case of MONUSCO. The findings indicate that intelligence contributed to improve C² at MONUSCO, although in different ways and intensity according to each level (tactical, operational, and strategical).

The main intelligence structures of MONUSCO, the military intelligence (G2), the JMAC, and the JOC, were consequential and effective in terms of helping the mission to achieve its objectives by sharing information and supporting the chain of command and control. The G2 provided intelligence analysis and products for operations, while the JMAC concentrated in long term and predictive analysis for the political leadership. In addition to them, the JOC was an important tool for situational awareness and institutional information dissemination.

In this sense, at the tactical level, MONUSCO can be labeled as an intelligence-led mission, especially regarding offensive actions taken against illegal armed groups. As prescribed by the mission’s mandate, the neutralization of illegal armed groups was a necessary step to protect civilians and help the Congolese government in its stabilization efforts. To accomplish such tactical goals, and to protect the force, intelligence was crucial during the period covered by the research. It is worth remembering that intelligence in MONUSCO came from different sources, mainly human (HUMINT), but also imagery (IMINT) and open sources (OSINT). Targeting information was particularly important to the FIB and the battalions, including target names, areas of operation, collateral damage risks, guidance for the deliver phase, recommended actions, and similar considerations.

At the operational level, in turn, intelligence played a critical role sharing information to provide “multidimensional situational awareness” at MONUSCO. It was done in a less structured and formal basis than observed at the tactical level. Even so, its reach was larger since it was shared with other relevant actors outside the mission itself. Consequently, it seems that intelligence was helpful to improve mission effectiveness without being detrimental to the UN’s legitimacy.

At the strategic level, in contrast, the research pointed out a significant gap between UN structures in New York and intelligence arrangements in the field. There were only limited intelligence components in New York, mainly at the UNOCC and some analytical capacities available at the DPA, OCHA, and DPKO. Their interactions with MONUSCO apparently were held through reports sent by the JOC and the JMAC at the mission level. Some intelligence have been incorporated more indirectly by reports and briefings provided by the SRSG and force commander. One could assume that the
Security Council’s resolutions and the DPKO’s doctrinaire documents received little if any direct input from intelligence coming from MONUSCO. Therefore, it cannot be implied that, at least from the present research, intelligence has had an autonomous impact in terms of improving MONUSCO’s mandates as established by Security Council’s Resolutions 1925 (2010), 2053 (2012), 2147 (2014), 2211 (2015), and 2277 (2016). Notwithstanding, this assessment needs further interviews and technical visits to the United Nations Headquarters in New York City in order to better evaluate the role of the strategic level and the interplay of it with the other two levels.

Whether MONUSCO has established a new pattern of intelligence in peacekeeping is something that remains to be seen. Since the UN missions in the 21st century have evolved to be multidimensional and embrace robust mandates, it is necessary to conduct more research on how and why intelligence activities do affect legitimacy and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. As far as observed in the case of MONUSCO, legitimacy and informality were not the most pressing concerns at that juncture. It seemed that, at least for the people directly involved with the mission in the field, the most pressing concerns were regarding coordination and adequate resources.

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Notes

3. The exception of the Cold War was the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC, 1960–1964), inasmuch as a Military Information Branch (MIB) was established. It was an important precedent to intelligence peacekeeping. See Dorn & Bell (1995), pp. 11–33.
4. At the same time the approach for intelligence activities changed at the UN and at the peacekeeping mission in the field with the end of the Cold War, “peacekeeping intelligence studies” began to flourish. The first publications were “Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping” (1994) by Hugh Smith, “Intelligence and Peacekeeping: The UN
Operation in the Congo, 1960–64” (1995) by Walter Dorn and David Bell, and “Analysis and Assessment for Peacekeeping Operations” (1995) by David Ramsbothan. Mainly after the 2000s, the topic was discussed at international conferences. Notably important was the conference “Peacekeeping and Intelligence: Lessons for the Future?” in 2002 because it originated the book “Peacekeeping Intelligence: emerging concepts for the future” (2003), edited by Ben de Jong, Wies Platje, and Robert David Steele. It contemplated the main writings regarding intelligence peacekeeping at that moment.

5. The most recent publications on intelligence peacekeeping have focused on mission’s case studies and/or on institutionalization of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC). See Ramjoué (2011), pp. 468–484; and Dorn (2009), pp. 805–835.

6. The interviews and the visits were conducted by one of the authors, who was in DR Congo from August 31 to September 7, 2015. Most of the interviewees are identified in this article by their position in the mission. Only one, who preferred not to be identified, is referred as “someone from MONUSCO Headquarters.” Our gratitude to Lt Gal Santos Cruz and his Brazilian military personnel staff for all their help with the field research, the interviews, and the public documents they have pinpointed.

7. It is important to mention that there is no standard measure to evaluate UN peacekeeping operations effectiveness (Druckman & Diehl, 2014). See Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War (2008), who measured effectiveness through the duration of peace after civil wars.

8. This article was finished at the same time the report written by Abilova and Novosseloff was published by the International Peace Institute. The authors also have used the three-level categorization (strategic, operational, and tactical) to analyze the role of intelligence in peacekeeping missions. Although their case study is United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and their definition of intelligence is a bit different than the one used here, the independently conducted studies led to similar conclusions, which reinforces the recommendations made by both. See Abilova and Novosseloff 2016, pp. 1–25.

9. First, as a colony owned by the King of Belgium Leopold II (1885–1908) and after as a Belgium colony (1908–1960). See Castellano da Silva (2012), pp. 73–92.

10. General Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku started a dictatorial regime by a coup d’état that put him in power for 32 years (1965–1997). He was supported by United States and changed the name of the country to Zaire (1971–1997).

11. In 1996, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, and Uganda invaded Zaire, aiming to overthrow Mobutu and helping Laurent Kabila to secure the presidency (First Congo War). In 1997, they succeeded and Laurent Kabila became president until 2001, changing the country’s name to Democratic Republic of Congo.

12. Laurent Kabila had excluded the Tutsis from his government and expelled Rwandan and Ugandan forces from Congo. In turn, they began the Second Congo War after that. Besides, they supported local rebellions against the Congolese government, which, on the other hand, obtained international support by Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Sudan, Chad and Libya. See Visentini (2010), pp. 76–80.

13. Joseph Kabila was the actual head of state since 2001. He assumed the Congolese government after his father, Laurent Kabila, was murdered in 2001.

14. ONUC had the mandate to ensure withdraw of Belgium forces, to provide further military and technical assistance to the Congolese government. See United Nations Security Council, Document S/RES/143. ONUC stayed in Congo until June 1964. In 1961, it was authorized to include enforcement peacekeeping, which was a unique case during the Cold War.
15. The independency was in 1960, when Patrice Lumumba (leader of one of the nationalist movements) became the first prime minister and Joseph Kasavubu, the president. The new nation was named Republic of the Congo. The days following independency witnessed a major crisis, when Belgium deployed troops to repress manifestations and impose order to protect their nationals. There was no consent by the new Congolese government, which, in turn, appealed to United Nations for military assistance. See Dorn and Bell (1995), pp. 11–33.

16. MONUC had the mandate to oversee the ceasefire agreement and withdraw of foreign forces, besides maintaining liaison with all the parts in the agreement. The ceasefire was agreed by Angola, DR Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (known as the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, 1999). On the mandate, see United Nations Security Council, Document S/RES/1279. After, the mandate was expanded to include more tasks. You can find the new tasks at the UN website that follows: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/monuc/mandate.shtml>.


18. Interview with G2 Chief, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 1, 2015.


21. In September 2015, the SRSG was Martin Kobler (from Germany), the PC was General Paschoal Champion (from France), and the FC was General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz (from Brazil).

22. Interview with Force Commander, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 5, 2015.

23. Integrated text and event management system (ITEM) was the database for all incidents and some operational information. In the force, it is used by the battalions and brigades to enter information and then to compile their daily situational reports. Interview with G2’s Force Focal Point for ITEM, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 1, 2015.

24. Interview with Chief G2 FIB at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 2, 2015.


27. Interview with Force Commander, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 5, 2015.

28. The JOC chief was responsible for the management and day-to-day work of the JOC, including coordination of its personnel, interaction with authorities, liaising with other parts inside and outside the mission, directing and disseminating reports, and organization first response in times of emergencies and crises.

29. Interview with Force Commander, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 5, 2015.

30. On ITEM database, see Footnote 23.

31. Interview with JMAC Information Analyst 1, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 2, 2015.

32. Interview with G2’s Senior Analyst, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 1, 2015.

33. Interview with G2’s UAS Chief, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 1, 2015.

34. Interview with Force Commander, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 5, 2015.

35. Interview with G2’s Senior Analyst, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 1, 2015.

36. Interview with G2 Chief, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 1, 2015.

37. The JOC, in turn, was not about intelligence analysis. As JOC’s chief stressed, “It is more about day-to-day information. So it is more factual. It’s a reporting on what has
happened with a limited amount of comment.” Interview with JOC Chief, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 2, 2015.

38. Interview with G2 Chief, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 1, 2015.

39. According to Dorn (1995, p. 806), MINUSTAH “[…] was one of the pioneers of intelligence-led UN operations, […]because […] in 2006-07, such an approach allowed the mission to gain ascendancy over gangs who controlled large sections of several Haitian cities, particularly the capital Port-au-Prince. MINUSTAH made extensive use of its JMAC, as well as its Force intelligence branch at mission headquarters (U2), and its intelligence units (S2) within the regionally based battalions of the national contingents.”

40. Interview with Force Commander, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 5, 2015.

41. Interview with someone from MONUSCO Headquarters that preferred not be identified, Goma, September 7, 2015.

42. Interview with Force Commander, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 5, 2015.

43. Interview with G2 Chief, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 1, 2015.

44. Interview with JOC Chief, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 2, 2015.

45. Interview with FIB Commander, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 2, 2015.

46. Interview with JMAC Information Analyst 2, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 1, 2015.

47. Interview with Force Commander, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 5, 2015.


49. Interview with Force Commander, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 5, 2015.

50. Interview with FIB Commander, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 2, 2015.

51. Interview with G2’s Senior Analyst, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 1, 2015.

52. As observed at the Morning Briefing, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 7, 2015.

53. Interview with Force Commander, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 5, 2015.

54. Interview with FIB Commander, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 2, 2015.

55. Interview with Force Commander, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 5, 2015.

56. Interview with G2’s Senior Analyst, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 1, 2015.

57. As observed at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 1-7, 2015.

58. As observed at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 7, 2015.

59. Interview with someone from MONUSCO Headquarters that preferred not be identified, Goma, September 7, 2015.

60. As observed at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 5, 2015.

61. Interview with JOC Chief, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 2, 2015.


63. Interview with Force Commander, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 5, 2015.

64. Interview with JMAC Military Analyst, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 2, 2015.

65. Interview with Force Commander, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 5, 2015.


67. Interview with JMAC Information Analyst 2, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 1, 2015.

68. Interview with G2 Chief, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 1, 2015.


70. Interview with EJVM Investigator, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 5, 2015.

71. Interview with EJVM Investigator, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 5, 2015.

72. Interview with EJVM Investigator, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 5, 2015.

73. Interview with G2 Chief, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 1, 2015.
74. Interview with someone from MONUSCO Headquarters that preferred not to be identified, Goma, September 7, 2015.
75. Interview with someone from MONUSCO Headquarters that preferred not to be identified, Goma, September 7, 2015.
76. Interview with JOC Chief, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 2, 2015.
77. Interview with someone from MONUSCO Headquarters that preferred not to be identified, Goma, September 7, 2015.
78. Interview with someone from MONUSCO Headquarters that preferred not to be identified, Goma, September 7, 2015.
79. Interview with Force Commander, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 5, 2015.
80. Interview with JOC Chief, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 2, 2015.
81. Interview with JMAC Information Analyst 1, at MONUSCO Headquarters, Goma, September 2, 2015.

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