@inbook {6704,
	title = {Spinoza on Ideas of Affections},
	booktitle = {Yitzhak Y. Melamed (org). A Companion to Spinoza},
	year = {2021},
	publisher = {Wiley{\textendash}Blackwell},
	organization = {Wiley{\textendash}Blackwell},
	abstract = {<p>This chapter argues that the Ethics includes versions of the views about sensation and its role in the production of knowledge that are present in the TIE and the KV. {\textquoteleft}Idea of an affection{\textquoteright} replaces the earlier terms for sensation. A sensation is a modification of the mind closely associated with a modification of body and explained in terms of the mind-body relation. In the KV, Spinoza continues to treat sensation as the immediate perception of corporeal modification and continues to take the inference from sensation to the union of mind and body as a valid one. The KV is the earliest source of Spinoza{\textquoteright}s view that the idea-object model accounts for the mind-body relation. The only occurrence of sensatio in the CM might seem to tell against an account of sensation as something different from imagination. Accounts of reason and imagination in the Ethics considerably advance Spinoza{\textquoteright}s theory of knowledge.</p>
},
	url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781119538349.ch27},
	attachments = {https://professor.ufrgs.br/sites/default/files/lialevy/files/levy_ideas_of_affections.pdf},
	author = {Levy, Lia}
}
